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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON MUTUAL FUNDS, FUND MANAGEMENT SKILLS, AND 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
Feng Dong 
Old Dominion University, 2017 
Director: Dr. John A. Doukas 
The mutual fund research focus has switched from whether average active fund managers 
have fund management skill to whether a subset of active fund managers have skills that produce 
investor benefits. In this dissertation we participate into the study stream by investigating the 
relation between managerial skills possessed by mutual fund managers and fund performance.  
Essay 1 focuses on whether investor sentiment affects the performance of skilled mutual 
fund managers. Stocks during periods of high investor sentiment are more likely to have noise, 
while during low investor sentiment periods stocks are more likely to trade close to their 
fundamental values. This implies that skilled fund managers are more likely to benefit fund 
investors the most during periods of high sentiment when asset prices are noisier and information 
is costlier. We empirically examine and confirm this intuition. Our results persist after 
distinguishing between management “skill” and “luck”. 
Essay 2 addresses the question that whether skilled fund managers’ value added stock 
picking ability is associated with investing in firms run by skilled CEOs. We find that the 
performance of high managerial ability stocks has a strong explanation power on the 
performance of mutual funds with skilled managers. Our results suggest that fund managers’ 
ability to find and invest in firms with skilled CEOs is an essential element of their stock picking 
ability, and it can enhance the fund future performance significantly. 
Essay 3 questions whether skill exists among European mutual fund industry, and if so, 
what factors can influence the validity and profitability of the skill. This research presents 
evidence that managerial skill exists in the European mutual fund industry. Furthermore, the 
relation remains positive and significant after controlling for investor sentiment and market 
dispersion. Additionally, we find a strong mediating effect of country characteristics on the 
relation between fund selectivity and fund performance.   
Overall, this dissertation investigates the efficiency of fund manager’s skills under 
different market states, finds the essential elements of fund manager’s stock picking skills, and 
explores the research to other countries. Given the vital role of mutual fund industry to the 
financial markets, the findings of this dissertation show important values for further academic 
research and industry implications.  
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Mutual funds have become an increasingly important investment instrument and attract a 
large amount of capital, from individual investors to the financial markets. By the end of 2014, 
the total value of the assets managed by mutual funds was more than 31 trillion US dollars, 
which reflected a 20% growth rate from 2007. The mutual fund industry has been studies by 
finance and economics scholars for a long time and the research focus has switched from 
whether average active fund managers have fund management skill to whether a subset of active 
fund managers have skills that produce investor benefits. In this dissertation we participate into 
the study stream by investigating the relation between managerial skills possessed by mutual 
fund managers and fund performance.  
Essay 1 focuses on whether investor sentiment affects the performance of skilled mutual 
fund managers. The price of stocks may differ from their fundamental value due to random 
noise. In this case, stocks during periods of high investor sentiment are more likely to have noise, 
while during low investor sentiment periods stocks are more likely to trade close to their 
fundamental values, i.e., have less noise. This implies that skilled fund managers with high 
insight and analytical ability are more likely to benefit fund investors the most during periods of 
high sentiment when asset prices are noisier and information is costlier. We empirically examine 
and confirm this intuition. Our results persist after distinguishing between management “skill” 
and “luck”. 
Essay 2 addresses the question that whether skilled fund managers’ value added stock 
picking ability is associated with investing in firms run by skilled CEOs, using the latter as the 
identification strategy. We find that the performance of stocks from firms with skilled CEOs has 
a strong explanation power on the performance of actively-managed mutual funds with skilled 
2 
 
fund managers. More importantly, this positive relationship only exists in mutual funds with high 
skill managers. Our results suggest that fund managers’ ability to find and invest in firms with 
skilled CEOs is an essential element of their stock picking ability, and it can enhance the fund 
future performance significantly. 
In Essay 3 we explore the question and whether skill exists among European mutual fund 
industry, and if so, whether the validity and profitability of fund managerial skills are affected by 
investor sentiment, market dispersion, and country characteristics. Using a sample of 2,947 
actively managed, domestic equity mutual funds from 11 European countries, this research 
presents evidence that the positive relation between fund selectivity and fund performance exists 
in the European mutual fund industry. Furthermore, the relation remains positive and significant 
after controlling for investor sentiment and market dispersion. In addition, we investigate the 
mediating effect of country characteristics on the relation between fund selectivity and fund 
performance, and find that managers’ selectivity ability is more valuable for funds in countries 
with high economic development, strong legal strength, small but highly liquid equity markets, 












INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT  
Do fund managers’ stock trades add value during periods of heightened investor sentiment, a 
natural setting to detect skill, when asset prices are noisier, short-selling is limited and 
information is costlier? Our results reveal that fund managers with the highest (lowest) skill 
create (experience) $7.71 ($5.64) million of added value (loss) during high sentiment periods, 
but only $3.74 million for the entire sample period while they incur a value loss of $0.18 
($30.32) million in low sentiment periods. We also find that skilled fund managers’ investments 
are associated with undervalued stocks. Our results persist after distinguishing between 
management “skill” and “luck”.  
INTRODUCTION 
“…noise creates the opportunity to trade profitably, but at the same time makes it 
difficult to trade profitably.”        Fisher Black, 1986 
Does investor sentiment affect the performance of skilled mutual fund managers? While 
investor sentiment has been held largely responsible for the dramatic rises and falls in financial 
asset prices during the last two decades, its impact on actively managed mutual funds’ 
performance remains unknown. We address this question by examining whether variations in 
fund profitability can be explained by variations in investor sentiment, since sentiment affects the 
amount of noise trading as noted by Miller (1997), which, in turn, makes it difficult to carry out 
profitable trades, as discussed in Black (1986). Since fund managers trade on stocks, their 
capacity to add value is examined during periods of heightened optimistic investor sentiment, as 
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an “acid” test of skill, when markets are noisier and it is more difficult to identify profitable 
stocks. 
A large body of the literature, motivated by the question of whether fund managers create 
value, arrives at the conclusion that actively managed funds underperform passively managed 
funds. Using fund holdings’ deviation from the benchmark portfolio to measure active 
management, the more recent literature shows that active management has a positive relationship 
with fund performance (Brands, Brown, and Gallagher, 2005; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 
2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; and Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks, 2015). This 
superior fund management performance is often attributed to management skills possessed by 
active fund managers such as stock-picking and market-timing talents. 
On the other hand, while previous work has assumed that management skill is fixed, only 
a few studies have touched upon the question of whether active fund managers’ skill varies with 
time. However, as with skills of other people, fund managers’ management skill is developed 
with experience and the efficiency of the skill to generate profits for their clients should be 
highly affected by the state of financial markets and economic conditions, which are changing 
with time. In addition, studies addressing the question of whether a fund manager's skill varies 
with time continue to assume that market participants are rational, an assumption that has been 
challenged by many behavioral finance studies in recent years (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; 
Shiller and Pound, 1989; Barber and Odean, 2001; and Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Furthermore, 
as explained by Black (1986), noise traders’ participation in the market, which can be triggered 
by optimistic or pessimistic beliefs, will force asset prices to deviate from their fundamental 
values making it difficult to produce risk adjusted excess-returns. Additionally, noise traders’ 
participation varies with time and could be related to the state of investor sentiment. Since 
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investor sentiment has been shown to influence noise trader’s investment behavior and by way of 
asset prices (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Dowling and Lucey, 2005; Edmans, Garcia, and 
Norli, 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; and Bialkowski, Etebari, and Wisniewski, 2012), fund 
performance could be also affected by the state of investor sentiment. In addition, there are 
reasons to believe that noise trader’s activity is not symmetric across optimistic and pessimistic 
sentiment periods, but will be more prevalent during optimistic ones. For instance, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) and Lamont and Thaler (2003) report that unsophisticated investors are more 
likely to enter the stock market during prosperous and investor exuberant periods. Therefore, the 
above arguments could have implications about the performance of fund managers across time. 
Specifically, if skilled fund managers trade more on (private) information about the true value of 
financial assets under management, in contrast to their low skill counterparts, they are expected 
to deliver more value during high sentiment periods when financial asset prices are noisier than 
in low sentiment periods when financial markets are not crowded by unsophisticated (noisy) 
investors. In sum, previous findings raise the important question of whether fund managers’ 
performance is affected by investor sentiment, a natural setting to detect if fund managers 
possess skill, when noise trading activity is prevalent. Surprisingly, this question has not yet been 
the focus of empirical investigation, and the aim of our analysis in this study is to address this 
issue using two different measures of fund skill and performance, controlling for the influence of 
economic business cycles and fund flows. 
In contrast to the previous literature that examines whether fund managers try to exploit 
investor sentiment by deploying sentiment-based (timing) strategies in order to attract capital 
flows (Massa and Yadav, 2015) or whether funds tilt their portfolios toward better performing 
stocks when they buy (sell) stocks that are highly sensitive to market sentiment, measured by 
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sentiment betas, preceding an increase (decrease) in investor sentiment (Cullen, Gasbarro, Le, 
and Monroe, 2013), we treat sentiment as a market condition, not as a risk factor where skilled 
managers actively time investor sentiment by modifying fund strategies based on their sentiment 
prediction.
1
 While our evidence is consistent with the previous literature showing that skilled 
fund managers outperform their low skill peers, we mainly focus on whether fund managers’ 
stock-selectivity skill is more profitable during high than low sentiment periods when noise 
trading is more prevalent and impactful on asset prices, due to short selling limitations (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997), in an attempt to determine the power of fund management skill. The practical 
implication of this analysis, is to aid investors to make more efficient fund investment decisions, 
especially when markets are populated by noise traders. Unlike Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, 
and Veldkamp (2016), who argue that the time-varying fund performance is caused by fund 
managers’ optimally choosing to process information about aggregate shocks in recessions and 
idiosyncratic shocks in booms, we treat investor sentiment as a noisy market condition which 
allows us to determine whether skilled fund managers are able to outperform their average and 
low-skilled counterparts. When we treat sentiment as risk factor, we find that sentiment-based 
(timing) strategies are associated only with low skilled fund managers realizing significant risk-
adjusted fund losses.  
Another interesting question, which has received a little attention in the literature (e.g. 
Baks, Metrick, and Wachter, 2001) is what percentage of the active fund managers’ skill is 
consistently associated with higher excess risk-adjusted returns in different states of investor 
sentiment. The answer to this question, which is addressed in this study, is very important 
                                                          
1 Specifically, Massa and Yadav (2015) consider the preferences of fund managers for holding stocks that react in a contrary 
manner to the level of investor sentiment or display a contrarian sentiment behavior. 
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because more and more capital is flowing from individual investors to professional investment 
managers.  
To examine these two questions, we employ two different management skill and fund 
performance measures over the 1990–2014 period. We first use the Amihud and Goyenko (2013) 
selectivity skill, which does not require the fund portfolio holdings (i.e., as the one by Daniel et 
al., 1998), and condition the tests of the relationship between fund selectivity and performance 
on different states of investor sentiment. The results of these tests consistent with our hypothesis 
demonstrate that fund managers with superior skills generate significantly high risk-adjusted 
returns during high sentiment periods. While high investor sentiment tends to harm the average 
mutual fund performance, low skilled fund managers incur substantial losses.  
Second, following Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), we reexamine the validity of our 
original results by using their measures of performance (i.e., the mean of the product of the gross 
abnormal return (alpha) and fund size (the value extracted by a fund from capital markets)) and 
management skill (i.e., skill ratio) and find consistently that investor sentiment harms fund 
performance, but managers with above-average stock-picking skill manage to protect fund 
performance from the adverse effects of high investor sentiment and even create value in high 
sentiment periods if they are endowed with superior management skill. Specifically, fund 
managers with the highest skill create $7.71 million of added value during high sentiment 
periods which exceeds the average realized fund gains ($3.74 million), while they incur a small 
value loss of $0.18 million in low sentiment periods.
2
  However, fund managers with the lowest 
skill experience a values loss of $5.64 million during high sentiment periods which is far lower 
                                                          
2
 The $3.74 million per year of added value created annually by the average fund manager is consistent with the Berk van 
Binsbergen (2015) who document that the average manager is skilled, adding $3.2 million per year. 
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than the average realized fund gains ($3.74 million), while they incur a substantial value loss of 
$30.32 million in low sentiment periods.  
We also examine whether the superior performance of skilled fund managers in high 
sentiment periods comes through investing in undervalued stocks. Cross-sectional analysis on the 
relation between fund performance and stock mispricing, using a set of 11 market anomalies to 
identify overpriced stocks (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012), reveals a negative relation between 
fund performance and skilled fund management indicating that skilled fund managers’ 
investments are associated with undervalued stocks. 
We then follow Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) and conduct a lucky bias analysis 
that allows us to determine if significant fund performance (alphas) is due to luck alone, and not 
management skill, for the whole sample during high and low sentiment periods. The results show 
that, even though the percentage of skilled fund managers decreases considerably after 
controlling for lucky bias, a portion (around 2%, i.e., under the 5% significant level) of fund 
managers do possess skill capable of delivering significant alphas during high sentiment periods. 
Our findings also hold when we control for the effects of net capital flows and volatility 
anomaly. In addition, when using the FEARS index (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2015) and the 
credit market sentiment index, as an alternative sentiment measures, these new results are 
qualitatively similar with our main findings. Jointly, the evidence that skilled managers generate 
high alphas in high sentiment periods suggests that they can create value for fund investors when 
markets are populated by noisy investors (signals). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the related literature 
and hypothesis development. Section III gives the data and empirical methodology. Section IV 
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shows the results, along with a discussion of the results. Section V presents the robustness check. 
Section VI concludes. 
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Malkiel (1995) found that equity mutual funds have underperformed the benchmark 
portfolio using both gross fund returns and net fund returns, and he suggests that investors should 
choose low-expense index funds rather than active funds. Gruber (1996) shows that compared 
with different indices, the average active mutual fund has a negative performance. In addition, 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), who employed a characteristics-based 
benchmark, claim that the average active fund can beat the benchmark, but by a very small 
amount. However, other studies document that even though active funds on average cannot beat 
the market benchmark, some of the active fund managers do have skills and achieve a superior 
performance (Brands et al., 2005; Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; and 
Cremers et al., 2015). 
Empirical studies show that skilled managers do add value for their clients by selecting 
valuable stocks (Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Daniel et al., 1997; and Zheng, 1999), and that 
leads to the conclusion that fund managers’ skill in identifying high-performance stocks is 
coming from their superior insight and analytical ability. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and 
Veldkamp (2011) show that the skill comes from the managers’ ability to anticipate micro- and 
macro-fundamentals. In addition, the previous literature shows that a fund attains superior 
performance if its manager focuses on the assets that s/he has specialized knowledge of. For 
example, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) found that funds focusing on some specific industries have 
better performance than the ones holding more diversified portfolios. Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy (2007) showed that if fund managers and corporate board members have a close 
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connection via shared education networks, fund managers prefer to place larger bets on those 
firms that such corporate board members serve and find that those funds perform significantly 
better on these holdings relative to their non-connected holdings. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) 
reported that changing portfolio allocation based on public information decreases fund 
performance, which supports the argument that fund manager skill is coming from private 
information rather than public information. 
While the most of this literature has focused on the stock-picking ability of fund 
managers, the findings on managers’ market-timing ability are ambiguous. Jiang, Yao, and Yu 
(2007) employed a single-index model using measures of market timing based on mutual fund 
holdings, and they found that, on average, active fund managers have a positive market-timing 
ability. However, as shown by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012), there is no evidence that market-
timing strategy increases fund performance when a multi-index model is used. Interestingly, 
there might be a negative market-timing effect on fund performance due to the sector rotation 
decisions with respect to high-tech stocks. By adding timing-related variables to the basic model, 
which is proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), denoted as the FFC model, 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) found no evidence that high selectivity funds possess any market-
timing skill. 
Meanwhile, few studies have focused on the question of whether the active fund 
managers’ skill varies with time. Reibnitz (2013), for example, shows that the market 
environment impacts on the effectiveness of active strategies, and highly skilled managers can 
produce superior returns in times of high cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns. Some 
studies have focused on the relationship between fund performance and the business cycle and 
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report that active funds, on average, have a better performance in recessions than in expansions 
(Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp 2014, 2016).  
Unlike previous studies, we argue that the activities of investors are not consistently 
rational and, thus, fund profitability can be affected by investor sentiment. There are two reasons 
to suggest that investor sentiment can influence the profitability of a fund manager’s insight and 
analytical ability. First, the level of investor sentiment can affect both overall market returns and 
individual stock returns (Miller, 1977; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong and 
Stein, 1999; Amromin and Sharpe, 2009; and Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam, 2015). 
Stocks during high sentiment periods are driven away from their fundamental values by naïve 
investors. Antoniou et al. (2015) find that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) only holds 
during pessimistic periods when investor sentiment is low and asset prices are more likely to be 
close to their intrinsic values, which reveals that the effect of more unsophisticated investors 
entering the market during high sentiment states is dramatic. In optimistic times, however, the 
opposite is true with noise traders focusing on risky stocks, and thus overvaluing high beta 
stocks. As argued by Barberis and Thaler (2003), rational investors or arbitrageurs do not 
aggressively force prices back to fundamentals because betting against sentimental investor 
activities is costly and risky. Additionally, short-selling impediments of institutional investors, 
especially mutual funds, are also major obstacles to eliminating price overvaluation. Since more 
irrational and unsophisticated traders participate in financial markets during high sentiment 
periods, asset prices are more likely to be noisy and consequently more difficult to identify good 
investment opportunities. Hence, on average, stock-picking ability during high sentiment periods 
might be limited, thus resulting in fund underperformance. If fund managers’ skills, however, are 
based on firm-specific analytic abilities and information rather than noise, fund managers with 
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high selectivity skill should be able to produce superior fund performance during high sentiment 
periods when stock prices are exposed to greater noise than during low sentiment periods. The 
ability of skilled fund managers to create value in high sentiment states is expected to depend on 
their analytical valuation skill to make profitable investment decisions and not by investing in 
overvalued stocks which are preferred by naive investors. In contrast, unsophisticated investors 
keep away from the equity market during low sentiment periods (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; 
Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Amromin and Sharpe, 2009; and Antoniou et al., 2015), with asset 
prices reverting to fundamental values. In low sentiment periods, stocks are traded at close to 
fundamental values, and this leaves less room for skilled fund managers to realize significant 
high alphas. Taken together, these arguments lead us to expect that fund managers with high 
selectivity skill will outperform their low selectivity skill counterparts in high and low sentiment 
periods. 
Second, fund performance can be influenced by investor sentiment due to market 
anomalies, which are created by irrational investor trading activities that are more pronounced in 
high sentiment periods (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). Momentum is one of the most 
significant market anomalies, and it is described as the tendency of past winners (losers) to 
outperforming (underperforming) the market benchmark in the near future. Antoniou, Doukas, 
and Subrahmanyam (2013) find a strong connection between sentiment and momentum. They 
argue that during high sentiment periods, information signals that oppose the direction of 
sentiment travels slowly due to investors’ cognitive dissonance, and they show that the 
momentum strategy works only during optimistic (high sentiment) periods. In addition, due to 
short-sale constraints, mutual fund managers are more likely to bet on positive information. 
While stocks tend to be overvalued due to the momentum effect during high sentiment periods, 
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stock prices will drift away from their intrinsic values and sophisticated fund managers should 
generate superior returns by taking advantage of this drift from true value during high sentiment 
times. That is, active fund managers with superior insight and analytical skill are expected not 
only to protect a fund’s performance from this price to value drift, but also produce a higher fund 
alpha in high investor sentiment periods when noise investor participation in the market is high. 
On the other hand, their inability to generate high alphas during low sentiment periods when 
asset prices are less noisy and near fundamental values may suggest that their superior insight 
and analytical skill is most relevant during high sentiment and noisy periods. Unlike previous 
studies, the novelty of this investigation is to shed light on whether fund managers’ performance 
varies across different states of investor sentiment and particularly whether fund investors benefit 
the most from their selectivity skill especially during high sentiment periods when market signals 
are noisy.  
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Data and Sample Selection 
Unlike most previous studies, which use the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund 
Database, we use the Bloomberg Fund Dataset, which is originally built for institutional 
investors in 1993 and is widely used in the finance industry nowadays. The dataset receives 
pricing and performance information from the fund management companies, administrators, and 
trustees directly, in the form of a feed or, more commonly, via automated email distribution 
channels with the entities. The exchange traded information comes directly from the exchange on 
which the mutual fund is listed. In addition, if one data point cannot pass the volatility threshold, 
which varies for each mutual fund based upon its past accepted volatility and the market in 
which the entity trades or prices, the data point will be rejected. These features, make Bloomberg 
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fund data reliable for academic studies and not suffering from the standard sample bias. Our data 
sample period covers 24 years from January 1990 to December 2014. We use 24-month time 
windows to estimate selectivity and past fund alphas, so the data were collected from December 
1987. We collected monthly raw returns for each fund if the fund had full return data for the 24-
month estimation period. We also collected fund-level control variables that may be associated 
with the fund’s performance: turnover, which is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated 
purchases of securities divided by the total net assets of the fund, age, expanse ratio, which is the 
annual expense ratio of each fund, and total net assets (TNA). 
To make sure our sample does not suffer from survivorship bias, we collected data from 
funds with both alive and dead statuses. We also used several criteria to restrict our sample to 
actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. We only collected fund data if a fund met 
all the following standards: 1) geographical focus is the United States, 2) country of domicile is 
the United States, 3) asset class is equity, and 4) fund type is an open-ended mutual fund. 
Because we needed 24 months’ estimation periods and our sample period ended in December 
2014, all observations were removed if the fund had an inception date later than December 2012. 
We further eliminated other types of funds, such as index funds, balance funds, international 
funds, and sector funds, by deleting funds whose name contained the word “index,” “ind,” 
“S&P,” “DOW,” “Wilshire,” “Russell,” “global,” “fixed-income,” “international,” “sector,” and 
“balanced.” Following Reibnitz (2013), we required funds to have TNA of at least $15 million in 
December 2013. Overall, our sample contained 2190 mutual funds over the period from January 
1990 to December 2014, with 273,557 observations. We set an estimation period of 24 months 
followed by a test month, and during the estimation period, we regressed monthly fund excess 
return (over the T-bill rate) on the FFC model factors and moved the window a month at a time. 
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A detailed data collection comparison between this paper and the previous literature (Amihud 
and Goyenko, 2013 and Reibnitz, 2013) is presented in Appendix I. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the mutual funds in our sample. R
2
t-1 estimations 
range from 0.219 to 0.991, with a mean value of 0.883 and a median value of 0.922.
3
 This shows 
a clear negatively skewed distribution, which indicates that around 90% of the funds’ excess 
return variance can be explained by the market indexes variance. 
TABLE 1.1 
Summary Statistics of Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds’ Characteristics 
This table shows descriptive statistics of individual fund estimates of R
2
t-1 and control variables. R
2
 t-1 is calculated 
by regressing each fund’s excess return (fund monthly raw return minuses one month T-bill rate of that month) on 
the multifactor model of Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) (FFC model) over a time window of 24 months. 
Our sample contains 2190 actively-managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from January 1990 to 
December 2014, with 273,557 observations. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases 
of securities divided by the total net assets of the fund. Expense ratio is the annual expense ratio of each fund. TNA 
is each fund’s total net assets in millions. 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Turnover (%) 85.64 56.00 0.00 3,452.00 
Age (years) 17.44 17.00 3.00 47.00 
Expense Ratio (%) 1.28 1.21 0.00 9.16 
TNA (millions) 1,267.96 234.49 8.26 202,305.77 
R
2
 t-1 0.883 0.922 0.219 0.991 
 
The main sentiment measures used in this paper is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment index (BW)
4
 and the University of Michigan sentiment index (UM)
5
. The BW index 
has been used widely in the finance literature and is constructed using six proxies of investors’ 
propensity to invest in stocks: trading volume (total NYSE turnover); the premium for dividend 
paying stocks; the closed-end fund discount; the number and first-day returns of IPOs; and the 
equity share in new issues. The BW index data are collected from January 1990 to December 
2014, and for the whole 300-month sample period, if the month t’s BW sentiment index is higher 
(lower) than the median number of all the monthly BW sentiment index numbers, month t is 
                                                          
3 Consistent with Amihud and Goyenko (2013), the top 0.5% and the bottom 0.5% R2 observations were deleted. The argument 
here is that funds with the highest R2 should be “closet indexers,” which have not been limited out by the sample selection 
criteria. Funds with the lowest R2 may be caused by estimation error. 
4 The BW sentiment data are available on Jeffrey Wurgler’s website http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/. 
5 The UM sentiment data can be found on University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers website http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/. 
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defined as a high (low) investor sentiment month. The UM index is another sentiment index 
measured outside of the financial market and used widely in finance studies. The results are 
consistent with those using BW sentiment index. Furthermore, our findings are also supported by 
using two alternative sentiment measures: credit market sentiment index and the Financial and 
Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index, as reported in the robustness tests. 
Empirical Methodology 
Fund Management Selectivity and Alpha Measures 
To examine whether the positive relationship between fund performance and 
management skill varies with time and particularly if it is more pronounced during high 
sentiment periods, we first assess fund management selectivity by employing the method of 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013). Selectivity is calculated using a fund’s R2 from regressing its 
returns on multifactor benchmark models. The main benchmark model used is the FFC model, 
which contains market excess return (RM-Rf), small minus big size stocks (SMB), high minus 
low book-to-market ratio stocks (HML), and winner minus loser stocks (MOM), and all the data 
are accessible online through the Kenneth French data library. According to Amihud and 
Goyenko (2013), a low R
2
 and indeed a low level of co-movement with the benchmark model 
applied, indicates fund management’s superior selectivity ability because highly skilled fund 
managers manage funds based on private information, which makes the fund less sensitive to 
variations in public information. Selectivity, in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), is measured as: 
                  
     
              
  
     
                       
                           (1) 
where RMSE
2
 is the variance of the error term from the regression, which denotes the 





 is the return variance that is due to the benchmark indexes’ risk. As Eq. (1) 
demonstrates, selectivity is higher when the fund’s strategy is based more on firm-specific 
information, rather than market information. More importantly, unlike other fund selectivity 
measures, such as the well-known DGTW measure (Daniel et al. 1997), which use the 
characteristics of stocks within each fund to estimate the fund manager selectivity skill, the 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) method does not require the knowledge of fund holdings or the 
benchmark index that the fund is using. The fund performance measure we use in our analysis is 
the fund gross alpha, which is the average fund abnormal return before fees. The reason for 
using the fund gross alpha rather than the net alpha is that, as Berk and Green (2002) argue, if 
skill is detectable by investors, the significant positive net fund alpha will vanish due to the 
competition among investors. In that case, gross alpha is a more appropriate way to measure the 
fund managers' performance. 
BvanB Fund Management Added Value and BvanB Alpha Measures 
As our second fund management skill measure, we use the method of Berk and van 
Binsbergen (2015), who deduce fund management skill based on the extra value added to the 
fund (i.e., the mean of the product of the gross abnormal return and fund size at the beginning of 
the period) divided by its standard error, measured over the period December 2002 to December 
2014. As discussed in Berk and Green (2002), even the gross alpha is not a suitable performance 
measure. Mutual funds share the same investment mechanism, and a value measure, rather than a 
return measure, is more appropriate approach to measure fund performance. To measure fund 
performance, the gross abnormal return has to be adjusted by fund size. On the other hand, 
unlike prior studies that have measured fund performance using risk models (FFC model, Fama–
French three-factor model, CAPM model, etc.), Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) evaluated fund 
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performance by comparing fund performance with an alternative investment opportunity set – 11 
Vanguard index funds.
6
 Their argument is that, in order to evaluate the performance of a mutual 
fund, one should compare its performance with the next best investment opportunity available to 
investors at that time. The benchmark should have two characteristics: the return of the 
benchmark should be known to investors and the benchmark can be traded. Unfortunately, the 
benchmarks used in factor models do not meet these criteria. Therefore, Berk and van 
Binsbergen (2015) suggest to use the set of passively managed index funds offered by Vanguard 
as the alternative investment opportunity set, and they define the fund benchmark as the closet 
portfolio formed by those index funds. 
We then follow Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and use the 11 Vanguard index funds to 
form the alternative investment opportunity set as the benchmark. Unlike their analysis, which 
focuses on the cross-sectional skill difference within fund managers, we use a rolling window 
regression method to test whether management skills vary with time. We collected data only 
when all the 11 index funds had available data, and finally, our data period covered 145 months, 
from December 2002 to December 2014. We then constructed an orthogonal basis set out of 
these index funds by regressing the n
th 
fund on the orthogonal basis produced by the first n-1 
funds over the whole 145-month period. The orthogonal basis for index fund n is calculated by 
adding the residuals collected from the prior regression and the mean return of the n
th
 index fund 
of the whole period. 
Next, as shown in Eq. (2), we regress the excess returns of each fund f on the 11 
Vanguard index fund orthogonal bases for the whole sample period from December 2002 to 
December 2014, using 24-month rolling window regression and moving forward 1 month each 
time. 
                                                          
6 The list of the 11 Vanguard index funds and their inception dates are shown in Appendix II. 
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          ∑   
   
    
  
                                                     (2) 
The performance measure we use is the abnormal capital inflow a fund experiences in the 
test month (denoted BvanB alpha), which is calculated as the fund's gross abnormal return (real 
raw return over its expected return) multiplied by the TNA of the fund at the beginning of the 
current month. The fund expected return is the product of multiplying the coefficients between 
each Vanguard index fund orthogonal basis and fund excess return from the 24-month preceding 
estimation period by the real numbers of each Vanguard index fund orthogonal basis in the 
current month. 
To capture fund management skill, we use the skill ratio measure introduced by Berk and 
van Binsbergen (2015), denoted as the BvanB fund skill. As shown in Eq. (3), the BvanB fund 
skill for each fund in each month is the product of a fund's abnormal return (fund alpha) times 
the fund’s size at the beginning of the month before the test month, divided by the standard error 
of the fund alpha. Fund alphas and standard errors are obtained from the 24-month rolling 
window regression of fund excess return over the alternative investment opportunity. Fund size, 
which is the total net assets of the fund, is inflation-adjusted. 
                    
                   
       
                                            (3) 
Stock Return Dispersion and Business Cycle Measures 
The previous literature has shown that the presence of dispersion in stock returns and the 
state of the economy can influence the market environment which, in turn, provides the 
opportunity of skilled fund managers to outperform the market (Reibnitz, 2013; and Kacperczyk 
et al., 2014, 2016). Active opportunity in the market, captured by cross-sectional dispersion in 
stock returns, as argued by Reibnitz (2013), could influence fund performance by the variation in 
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the arrival of firm-specific information. During a high market-dispersion period, the market price 
is affected more by firm-specific information than market conditions. If so, during high market-
dispersion times, the impact of active bets is expected to be more pronounced, and managers 
with skill in identifying, interpreting, and acting on firm-specific information will significantly 
outperform their low-skilled peers. As in Reibnitz (2013), we calculate market dispersion for 
each month. This is estimated as the average diversion between the equally weighted average 
return on S&P 500 constituents in each month and the return of each S&P 500 constituent in the 
same month. The stock return dispersion in month t (MDt) is calculated as follows: 
    √
 
   
∑             
 
                                                 (4) 
where n is the number of S&P 500 constituents in month t, Ri,t is the return of each constituent i 
in this month, and Rm,t is the equally weighted average return of all S&P 500 constituents in 
month t. We collected the list of S&P 500 constituents and their monthly returns from 
Bloomberg database. Bloomberg reports these historical data since February 1990, so our dataset 
for market dispersion ranges from February 1990 to December 2014.  
The second element that can have an impact on the profitability of skilled fund managers 
is the state of the economy. Kacperczyk et al. (2016) built an information choice model by 
assuming fund managers have a finite mental capacity (attention) and skilled managers are the 
ones who allocate their capacity efficiently. Since the optimal allocation strategy is changing 
with the state of the economy, the efficiency of fund managers’ investment strategy and fund 
return is expected to vary with time. Kacperczyk et al. (2014) decomposed manager skill into 
stock picking and market timing and report that managers balance those two strategies based on 
the state of the business cycle. The previous literature has also suggested that skilled managers 
devote more time and resources in managing a fund actively during recessions to protect the 
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fund’s performance from economic downturns (Wermers, 2000; Glode, 2011; Kosowski, 2011; 
and Reibnitz, 2013). Thus, one can argue that the effect of investor sentiment on mutual fund 
performance is caused by the correlation between the cyclical variation in sentiment and 
economic cycles. For that reason, we use the Chicago Fed National Activity Index 3 month 
average (CFNAI MA3), following Kacperczyk et al. (2014), to capture the effects of the business 
cycle on fund performance.
7
 The CFNAI is a coincident indicator of national economic activity 
comprising 85 existing macroeconomic time series. 
Lucky Bias Measurement  
Even though we employ two different measures to proxy fund manager skill to ensure 
that our results are not sensitive to a specific measure, it is reasonable to argue that fund 
performance may be due to luck rather than skill. To disentangle luck from skill, we used the 
“false discovery rate” approach developed by Barras et al. (2010) to estimate the fraction of 
mutual funds that truly outperform the benchmarks. This approach assumes that there are three 
mutual fund performance categories in the market: zero-alpha funds (performance is not 
different from 0), skilled funds (performance is significantly better than the benchmark), and 
unskilled funds (performance is significantly worse than the benchmark). The fund performances 
within each category are normally distributed. For a given significant level γ, the lucky (unlucky) 
funds within the skilled funds category and unskilled funds category are the same, and are 
calculated as: 
Fγ=π0 * γ/2                                                               (5) 
                                                          
7 Most studies use NBER business-cycle dates to clarify economic recessions or expansions. However, when we collected the 
data for this paper, NBER business cycle dates were unavailable after 2009. In addition, based on the NBER business-cycle 
dates, 200 months out of 234 sample months (1990–2009) were in expansions periods. 
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where π0 is the true proposition of the zero-alpha fund category, and γ is the significance level 
we choose. Then, the true proportions of skilled funds, Tγ
+
, and unskilled funds, Tγ
-
, adjusted by 





 - Fγ = Sγ
+





 - Fγ = Sγ
-
 - π0 * γ/2                                                 (7) 
Next, we implement the procedure of Barras et al. (2010) with a rolling window 
regression analysis. A fund will be considered only if the fund has full data during the whole 24-
month estimation period. Within each month, we count the total number of funds and P-value 
from each regression. Then, the true proposition of the zero-alpha fund category in each month 
is estimated as: 
     




    
                                                        (8) 
where λ* is a sufficiently high P-value threshold (we use λ* = 0.6, as suggested in Barras et al., 
2010). Wλ* equals the number of funds with a P-value exceeding λ
*
 within this month, and Mt is 
the total number of funds considered in this month. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Fund Management Selectivity Performance results 
We begin our examination of whether the performance of active mutual funds of 
differing management skills is sensitive to investor sentiment by predicting fund performance 
based on the fund’s lagged 1-R2 and the lagged excess return from the multifactor model, i.e., the 
fund alpha. We estimate R
2
 using rolling regressions of the FFC model with a 24-month 
window. R
2
 is used only if the fund has 24 months’ continuous data. After each fund’s R2 is 





t-1) and sort all the funds into five quintiles based on their selectivity ranking. 
Within each quintile, we sort funds into five portfolios based on their prior one month’s alpha 
(alphat-1), which is the intercept of the rolling regressions. This procedure produces 25 (5x5) 
portfolios with different selectivity and fund alphas, and each portfolio contains 4% of total 
mutual funds within the same month. 
For each month, we calculate the monthly average excess raw returns (over the T-bill 
rate) of the funds that are included in each portfolio sorted by selectivity (1-R
2
t-1) and past 
performance (alphat-1), and these average excess returns are regressed on the FFC model over the 
whole 25 years (1990–2014, 300 months) to obtain the abnormal risk-adjusted excess return, i.e., 
the portfolio fund alpha. The annualized alpha and P-value for each portfolio are reported in 
Panel A of Table 2. Next, we examine whether fund selectivity skill varies with time and mainly 
whether high selectivity is associated with higher (lower) fund performance during high (low) 
states of sentiment. We address this question by examining whether variations in fund 
performance can be explained by variations in sentiment in line with the underlying hypothesis 
of this paper predicting that fund managers endowed with high selectivity skill should be 
associated with higher risk-adjusted excess returns during high investor sentiment periods. We 
used the BW sentiment index to measure the investor sentiment and separate our sample into 
high/low sentiment subgroups based on the investor sentiment, and each subgroup contains 150 
months’ observations. Then we repeat the previous analysis for high and low sentiment periods 
by sorting funds in each month by fund selectivity and past performance and present in Table 2 






Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Lagged R
2
 and Alpha 
This table presents the portfolio fund alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, from January1990 to December 
2014 (Panel A), high sentiment (Panel B), and low sentiment (Panel C) periods, based on the sentiment index data 
available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the 
median number of all monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define this month as high (low) market sentiment 
month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R
2
 and then by fund alphat-
1. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess 
returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate the 
average monthly excess returns for each fund portfolio. This process is repeated by moving the estimation and test 
period one month at a time. Last we regress the test period average portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each 
portfolio cell, we present portfolio alpha, which is the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. ***, **, 
* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio fund alpha for the entire sample period 
  
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.75*** -2.04*** -1.84** -1.97** -2.06 -1.93*** -0.20 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.026) (0.117) (0.002) (0.765) 
2 -1.43*** -0.99** -0.90 -0.34 0.34 -0.67 0.87** 
 
(0.001) (0.049) (0.154) (0.653) (0.712) (0.196) (0.047) 
3 -0.94** -0.67 -1.17** -0.51 0.56 -0.55 0.65 
 
(0.024) (0.143) (0.044) (0.450) (0.501) (0.219) (0.145) 
4 -1.18** -1.16 0.11 -0.20 0.99 -0.28 1.05** 
 
(0.011) (0.106) (0.840) (0.792) (0.277) (0.535) (0.037) 
High -1.41* -0.81 -0.08 2.14** 3.05** 0.58 2.24*** 
 
(0.051) (0.355) (0.912) (0.025) (0.023) (0.381) (0.003) 
All -1.34*** -1.14** -0.78 -0.19 0.58 -0.57 0.92** 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.110) (0.754) (0.426) (0.166) (0.019) 
High-Low 0.19 0.62 0.91* 2.03*** 2.57** 1.27** 
 
 
(0.606) (0.191) (0.061) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Panel B: Portfolio fund alpha during high market sentiment  
  Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -2.38*** -3.71*** -2.97** -2.68* -1.45 -2.65*** 0.47 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.017) (0.054) (0.412) (0.006) (0.614) 
2 -2.34*** -1.38* -2.11** -1.02 0.02 -1.36* 1.18* 
 
(0.001) (0.097) (0.026) (0.378) (0.990) (0.095) (0.068) 
3 -1.36** -1.40** -2.19** -0.69* 0.03 -1.12* 0.61 
 
(0.021) (0.050) (0.018) (0.508) (0.982) (0.095) (0.340) 
4 -0.95 -1.19 -0.73 -0.01 0.36 -0.50 0.64 
 
(0.187) (0.150) (0.381) (0.996) (0.792) (0.488) (0.396) 
High -1.92 -1.39 -0.50 2.70* 4.82** 0.75 3.39*** 
 
(0.133) (0.379) (0.696) (0.073) (0.020) (0.499) (0.006) 
All -1.79*** -1.82** -1.70** -0.35 0.74 -0.98 1.25** 
 
(0.003) (0.014) (0.033) (0.721) (0.508) (0.147) (0.046) 
High-Low 0.17 1.03 1.23 2.48*** 3.03** 1.59** 
 
 
(0.787) (0.209) (0.117) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) 
 Panel C: Portfolio fund alpha during low market sentiment 
  Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.14** -0.33 -0.90 -1.38 -2.35 -1.21 -0.68 
 
(0.035) (0.668) (0.272) (0.156) (0.236) (0.117) (0.470) 
2 -0.61 -0.68 -0.45 -0.36 0.44 -0.34 0.47 
 
(0.186) (0.161) (0.450) (0.670) (0.711) (0.540) (0.386) 
3 -0.54 -0.31 -0.84 -0.81 0.58 -0.38 0.44 
 
(0.280) (0.549) (0.136) (0.255) (0.595) (0.413) (0.449) 
4 -1.34** -1.34 0.27 -1.22 1.40 -0.44 1.32* 
 
(0.019) (0.253) (0.687) (0.117) (0.245) (0.410) (0.051) 
High -0.68 0.30 0.16 0.89 0.63 0.26 0.65 
 
(0.328) (0.694) (0.859) (0.439) (0.702) (0.730) (0.458) 
All -0.86** -0.47 -0.34 -0.58 0.17 -0.42 0.45 
 
(0.026) (0.321) (0.457) (0.331) (0.851) (0.341) (0.312) 
High-Low 0.41 0.54 0.70 1.39* 1.68 0.94* 
 
 






Consistent with the findings of Amihud and Goyenko (2013), the results in Panel A of 
Table 2 show that greater fund selectivity, as measured by (1-R
2
t-1), yields higher fund alpha. 
The results in the row “All” clearly show that fund portfolio performance (alpha) decreases as 
we move from the high selectivity (high 1-R
2
t-1) portfolio to the low selectivity (low 1-R
2
t-1) 
portfolio. The highest annualized alpha is 3.05% (P = 0.023) for the fund portfolio with the 
highest selectivity and the best past performance. On average, around 8% of mutual funds 
outperform the benchmark significantly every month, which confirms that a relatively small 
fraction of some active funds does have selectivity skill that creates value for fund investors. 
We also calculate the performance difference between the high selectivity fund portfolio 
and the low selectivity fund portfolio by estimating a hypothetical portfolio of a long position in 
the high selectivity fund portfolio and a short position in the low selectivity fund portfolio for 
every lagged alpha quintile. These results, presented in the rightmost column of Table 2 under 
“High-Low,” indicate that the return from this strategy is positive and significant in all alpha 
quintiles except for the low alpha quintile. For the whole sample, the high selectivity fund 
portfolio outperforms the low selectivity fund portfolio by 0.92% (P = 0.019). For the highest 
and second-highest alpha quintiles, the hypothetical portfolio yields an annualized alpha of 
2.24% (P = 0.003) and 1.05% (P = 0.037), respectively. In sum, the results in Panel A of Table 2 
reveal that funds’ risk-adjusted excess return is higher for funds with greater fund selectivity skill 
(1-R
2
t-1), which is highly consistent with the patterns in Amihud and Goyenko (2013). 
As predicted, the results in Panels B and C of Table 2 demonstrate that high selectivity 
fund managers outperform the market benchmark and their low selectivity counterparts only 
during high sentiment periods. When investor sentiment level is high, as shown in Panel B, the 





4.82% (P = 0.020) and 2.70% (P = 0.073) higher excess returns than the market benchmark, 
respectively. In sum, about 8% of active funds outperform the market benchmark during high 
sentiment periods. The hypothetical strategy of a long position in the high selectivity fund 
portfolio and a short position in the low selectivity fund portfolio, rightmost “High-Low,” yields 
1.25% (P = 0.046) extra return than the market. However, the results in Panel C indicate that 
during low sentiment periods none of the fund portfolios can beat the market benchmark 
significantly. In addition, the hypothetical strategy fails to significantly outperform the market on 
average. These results indicate the superior performance of fund managers with the highest and 
the second highest selectivity skill, reported in Panel A for the entire sample period, is realized 
during high sentiment periods.  Taken together, the results are in line with our hypothesis that 
high fund management selectivity produces the highest alpha only during high sentiment 
periods. Funds with higher selectivity skill deliver higher risk-adjusted returns in high sentiment 
periods. During low sentiment periods, they fail to outperform the market when asset prices are 
commonly believed to trade near their intrinsic values due to the absence of noise traders.
8
 
Jointly, these results suggest that fund selectivity skill is far more valuable to fund investors 
when there is high sentiment and price signals are noisy due to the greater presence of investor 
hype in the market.  
BvanB Fund Management Added Value Performance Results 
In this section, we report results based on the Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) fund 
selectivity measure, i.e., BvanB fund skill. As noted earlier, this fund skill measure allows us to 
deduce the fund selectivity based on the extra value added to the fund (i.e., the mean of the 
product of the gross abnormal return and fund size at the beginning of the period divided by its 
                                                          
8 To check the sensitivity of these results, we replicated our analysis using the median number of the UM index to separate 






standard error) measured over the 24-month estimation period. The advantage of this metric it 
that it permits to gauge the success of a fund manager based on the added value of an investment 
opportunity (i.e., the net present value (NPV) of an investment) rather than the return a fund 
earns (i.e., the internal rate of return (IRR)), as bigger funds could generate more value even if 
they have lower alphas. To form the portfolios, we first rank all funds within each month based 
on their prior month’s BvanB fund skill, as described in Eq. (3), and sort them into five quintiles. 
Within each quintile, we sort funds into five portfolios based on their previous performance, i.e., 
the BvanB fund alphat-1. The BvanB fund alphat-1 of each fund in each month is the product of 
fund alphat-1 and fund inflation-adjusted TNA at the beginning of the last month in the 24-month 
estimation period, while fund alphat-1 is obtained by regressing each fund’s monthly excess 
returns on the 11 Vanguard index funds orthogonal bases. Then, for the following month, we 
calculate the average monthly excess return for each portfolio, and we regress the test period 
average portfolio returns on the alternative investment opportunity market benchmark. For each 
portfolio, we present the portfolio BvanB fund alpha, which is the product of the intercept from 
the above regression and the average inflation-adjusted TNA of all funds within the portfolio at 
the beginning of the current month, and present these results in Table 3.
9
 This procedure 
produces 25 (5x5) portfolios with a different BvanB fund skill and BvanB fund alphat-1, and 







                                                          
9 We also did a similar portfolio performance analysis using the median number of the UM index to separate high/low sentiment 
periods, and we sort funds into portfolios based on BvanB fund skill and conventional fund alphat-1, which is obtained from the 
estimation period by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns on the factors from the alternative market benchmark, formed 







Portfolio BvanB Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on BvanB Fund Skill and Lagged BvanB Fund 
Alpha 
This table presents the portfolio BvanB fund alpha, annualized, using monthly returns (145 months), from 
December 2002 to December 2014 (Panel A), high sentiment (Panel B), and low sentiment (Panel C) periods, based 
on the sentiment index data available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) 
is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define this month as high 
(low) market sentiment month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by BvanB 
fund skill (Eq. 3) and then by BvanB fund alphat-1, and both are described in detail in section III.B.2. For each 
portfolio cell, we present portfolio BvanB fund alpha, which is the portfolio alpha times the average TNA of funds 
within the portfolio at the beginning of current month (t), and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 
5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio BvanB fund alpha for the entire sample period 
 
 
BvanB fund skill 
BvanB Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -18.06* -3.25 -1.44 -0.22 0.77 -4.44 9.42* 
 
(0.074) (0.115) (0.353) (0.850) (0.609) (0.124) (0.056) 
4 -8.61 -3.25* -1.30 -0.42 1.03 -2.51 4.82* 
 
(0.103) (0.065) (0.324) (0.740) (0.563) (0.194) (0.069) 
3 -4.84 -2.30 -0.87 0.31 1.22 -1.29 3.03* 
 
(0.140) (0.138) (0.470) (0.796) (0.498) (0.393) (0.089) 
2 -4.52 -2.02 -0.64 0.14 2.14 -0.98 3.33* 
 
(0.120) (0.168) (0.575) (0.911) (0.308) (0.500) (0.053) 
High -4.80** -1.75 -0.20 0.64 3.74 -0.48 4.27* 
 
(0.048) (0.182) (0.864) (0.649) (0.337) (0.769) (0.061) 
All -8.82* -2.51 -0.89 0.09 1.78 -1.94 5.30** 
 
(0.078) (0.115) (0.472) (0.943) (0.413) (0.280) (0.044) 
High-Low 6.63* 0.75 0.62 0.43 1.48 1.98* 
 
 
(0.098) (0.150) (0.138) (0.199) (0.261) (0.060) 
 Panel B: Portfolio BvanB fund alpha during high market sentiment  
 BvanB Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -5.64 2.98 3.12 3.55* 3.44 1.49 4.54 
 
(0.732) (0.356) (0.217) (0.054) (0.167) (0.755) (0.566) 
4 8.97 1.80 2.60 2.99 4.51 4.17 -2.23 
 
(0.249) (0.516) (0.207) (0.141) (0.138) (0.166) (0.560) 
3 4.67 2.04 2.85 3.78* 3.64 3.39 -0.52 
 
(0.344) (0.416) (0.138) (0.055) (0.234) (0.169) (0.842) 
2 3.39 2.23 2.78 3.24 5.25 3.38 0.93 
 
(0.441) (0.339) (0.140) (0.114) (0.128) (0.157) (0.710) 
High 1.65 1.90 3.03 3.86 7.71 3.63 3.03 
 
(0.656) (0.370) (0.122) (0.101) (0.219) (0.183) (0.373) 
All 3.21 2.19 2.88 3.48* 4.91 3.21 0.85 
 
(0.682) (0.387) (0.154) (0.082) (0.172) (0.276) (0.829) 
High-Low 3.64 -0.54 -0.05 0.15 2.14 1.07 
 
 
(0.579) (0.516) (0.944) (0.782) (0.304) (0.520) 
 Panel C: Portfolio BvanB fund alpha during low market sentiment  
 BvanB Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -30.32** -9.39*** -5.95*** -3.95*** -1.85 -10.29*** 14.23** 
 
(0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.284) (0.002) (0.017) 
4 -25.96*** -8.22*** -5.14*** -3.77*** -2.40 -9.10*** 11.78*** 
 
(0.001) (<.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.198) (<.001) (0.001) 
3 -14.22*** -6.58*** -4.54*** -3.11** -1.15 -5.92*** 6.53*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.557) (0.001) (0.007) 
2 -12.33*** -6.20*** -4.02*** -2.92** -0.93 -5.28*** 5.70** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.032) (0.700) (0.001) (0.017) 
High -11.17*** -5.35*** -3.38*** -2.54* -0.18 -4.53*** 5.49* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.091) (0.969) (0.009) (0.074) 
All -20.68*** -7.15*** -4.61*** -3.26** -1.30 -7.02*** 9.69*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.599) (0.001) (0.006) 
High-Low 9.58** 2.02*** 1.28** 0.70* 0.84 2.88** 
 
 






Consistent with our previous findings (Table 2), the results in Table 3 reveal that funds 
with superior management skills, as measured by BvanB fund skill, have better performance. 
The results of Panel A in the row “All” show that fund portfolio performance (BvanB fund 
alpha) decreases as we move from the high BvanB fund skill portfolio to the low BvanB fund 
skill portfolio, i.e., greater fund skill produces higher BvanB fund alphas. The highest annualized 
BvanB fund alpha is 3.74 (P = 0.337) for the fund portfolio with the highest BvanB fund skill 
and the best past performance. While highly skilled fund managers with high past performance, 
Q5, do not outperform the benchmark significantly every month, the low-skilled ones realize 
significant losses of -4.80 (P = 0.048). The reason is that highly skilled managers, due to their 
high past performance, experience high capital inflow and—under the pressure to invest the extra 
capital received from investors—they are forced to make suboptimal investment decisions due to 
limited optimal investment opportunities in the market. This, in return, lowers the profitability of 
their skills. 
The results for the hypothetical portfolio of a long position in a high BvanB fund skill 
portfolio and a short position in a low BvanB fund skill portfolio for each lagged alpha quintile, 
presented in the rightmost column of Panel A under “High-Low,” indicate that the return from 
this strategy is positive and significant in all alpha quintiles. For example, the high BvanB skill 
fund portfolio outperforms the low BvanB skill fund portfolio by 5.30 (P = 0.044). For the 
highest and second-highest BvanB alpha quintiles, the hypothetical portfolio yields an 
annualized alpha of 4.27 (P = 0.061) and 3.33 (P = 0.053), respectively. On average, the high 
BvanB fund skill portfolio adds 5.30 million dollars more capital than the low BvanB fund skill 
portfolio every month (P = 0.044). Overall, these results confirm that funds with the best past 





The results in Panels B and C of Table 3 demonstrate that highly skilled managers do 
better during high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. In high sentiment periods 
(Panel B), consistent with the previous evidence, the highest annualized BvanB fund alpha is 
$7.71 million (P = 0.337) for the fund portfolio with the highest BvanB fund skill and the best 
past performance. Even though this number is not significant, it is much higher than the entire 
sample period, i.e., $3.74 million (P = 0.337). This indicates that the performance of skilled fund 
managers is pronounced when financial markets are populated with noisy investors. This means 
that managers with the highest skill produce $7.71 million added value during high sentiment 
periods, but only $3.74 million for the entire period. That is, they can double a fund’s added 
value in high sentiment periods even though they experience an increased inflow of capital 
because of their superior past performance. While highly skilled managers with high past 
performance, Q5, do not significantly outperform the benchmark every month, the low-skilled 
ones do not realize losses (P = 0.656) in high sentiment periods. This performance difference 
shows that highly skilled fund managers do considerably better in high sentiment periods (Panel 
B) than in the entire sample period (Panel A). The reason that highly skilled managers with high 
past performance do not realize statistically significant superior performance in high sentiment 
periods is because they experience high capital inflows and under the pressure to invest the extra 
capital received from investors it lowers the profitability of their skill due to limited optimal 
investment opportunities.   
However, in low sentiment periods (Panel C), the highest annualized BvanB fund alpha 
is -0.18 (P = 0.969) for the fund portfolio with the highest BvanB fund skill and the best past 
performance. This is substantially lower than the counterpart fund performance in high sentiment 





managers outperform their peers even in low sentiment periods. In addition, the row “All” in 
Panel C shows that fund portfolio performance (BvanB fund alpha) is significantly below the 
benchmark and in contrast with the corresponding row “All” for high sentiment periods (Panel 
B). While a greater fund skill produces a higher BvanB fund alpha, the highest annualized 
BvanB fund alpha is -0.18% (P = 0.969) for the fund portfolio with the highest BvanB fund skill 
and the best past performance, while the parallel BvanB fund alpha in the high sentiment periods 
is 7.71 (P = 0.219). The rest of the funds of this group realize significant negative BvanB fund 
alphas. The results for the hypothetical portfolio of a long position in a high BvanB fund skill 
portfolio and a short position in a low BvanB fund skill portfolio for every lagged alpha quintile, 
presented in the rightmost column of Panel C under “High-Low,” suggest that the high BvanB 
skill fund portfolio realizes significantly lower losses than the low BvanB skill fund portfolio by 
9.69 (P = 0.006). For the highest and second-highest BvanB alpha quintiles, the hypothetical 
portfolio yields an annualized alpha of 5.49 (P = 0.074) and 5.70 (P = 0.017), respectively, 
suggesting that the high BvanB skill fund portfolio consistently realizes significantly lower 
losses than the low BvanB skill fund portfolio. Taken together, the results are in line with our 
contention that the performance of skilled fund managers is greater in high sentiment periods 
than in low sentiment periods suggesting that fund management skill is of higher value to 
investors when there is greater noise in the market. 
Fund Portfolio Performance and Stock Market Dispersion 
As discussed in section III, equity market dispersion and the state of the economy can 
influence the performance of skilled fund managers. To examine their impact on fund portfolio 
performance, we first repeat our portfolio sorting analysis simply based on the market dispersion. 





periods based on the median number of the market-dispersion index, calculated for January 1990 
to December 2014. The reported results in Table 4 for the high (Panel A) and low (Panel B) 
market-dispersion periods indicate that skilled fund managers outperform their unskilled peers 
and the market benchmark, especially during high market-dispersion periods. This pattern, which 
is consistent with our high sentiment results, suggests that skilled fund managers can add value 
to fund investor portfolios when the market is subject to considerable uncertainty and more 
difficult than normal times for fund investors to interpret financial price signals. 
Fund Portfolio Performance and Economic Activity 
Using CFNAI MA3 to split the sample into recession and expansion periods, we repeated 
the portfolio sorting analysis using the same sample period as in the previous section (1990–
2014). Our results, as shown in Table 5, reveal that more funds with high selectivity skill realize 
positive risk-adjusted excess returns in economic expansions, which is 1.58% (P = 0.041), than 
in economic recessions, which is 0.27% (P = 0.786). In addition, the performance dispersion 
between the highest selectivity fund and the lowest selectivity fund is more pronounced in 
economic recessions, i.e., 2.71% (P = 0.008), than in expansions, i.e., 2.41% (P = 0.021), which 
is consistent with the previous literature (Kacperczyk et al., 2011) that found that skilled active 
funds provide an insurance mechanism against recessions. 
Jointly, these results—while in line with previous studies—also demonstrate that skilled 
fund managers have superior performance during states of high equity market dispersion and 
economic expansion. However, one can argue that it is essentially market dispersion or business 
cycle, rather than investor sentiment that determines the fund performance difference between 
the high and low sentiment states. In response to this argument, as shown later in Tables 7 and 8, 






Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Lagged R
2
 and Fund Alpha, in High and Low Market 
Dispersion Periods 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in high and low market sentiment periods. 
If market dispersion index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly market 
dispersion index numbers, we define this month as high (low) market dispersion month. Portfolios are formed by 
sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R
2
 and then by fund alphat-1. Both are obtained from the 24-
month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the 
factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate the average monthly excess returns for each 
fund portfolio. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. Last, we regress 
the test period average portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each portfolio cell we present portfolio alpha, which 
is the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. The sample period of the test months is from February 
1990 to December 2014 (299 months). Panel A shows the results of high market dispersion group and Panel B 
shows the results of low market dispersion group. For each portfolio, we present the portfolio alpha, annualized, 
using monthly returns and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: During high market dispersion 
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -2.31*** -3.59*** -1.87 -1.92 -1.39 -2.22** 0.38 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.163) (0.201) (0.534) (0.040) (0.729) 
2 -2.00*** -1.39* -1.38 -0.16 1.46 -0.69 1.73** 
 
(0.004) (0.096) (0.196) (0.902) (0.341) (0.432) (0.017) 
3 -1.53** -1.31* -2.04** -0.83 -0.20 -1.18 0.57 
 
(0.026) (0.083) (0.037) (0.459) (0.889) (0.113) (0.452) 
4 -2.39*** -1.39 -0.21 0.01 1.02 -0.59 1.68** 
 
(0.002) (0.121) (0.822) (0.995) (0.497) (0.442) (0.045) 
High -1.98 -2.37 0.07 3.57** 4.55** 0.77 3.28*** 
 
(0.118) (0.139) (0.962) (0.031) (0.035) (0.509) (0.008) 
All -2.05*** -2.02*** -1.09 0.11 1.09 -0.79 1.53** 
 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.196) (0.913) (0.382) (0.272) (0.020) 
High-Low 0.06 0.57 0.88 2.61** 2.88* 1.41* 
 
 
(0.925) (0.498) (0.308) (0.015) (0.051) (0.062) 
 
Panel B: During low market dispersion  
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.39*** -0.68 -1.60*** -2.10*** -2.92** -1.74*** -0.78 
 
(0.008) (0.289) (0.006) (0.010) (0.034) (0.002) (0.278) 
2 -0.98** -0.67 -0.52 -0.35 -0.84 -0.68* 0.03 
 
(0.015) (0.130) (0.307) (0.615) (0.368) (0.095) (0.947) 
3 -0.48 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 1.47* 0.10 0.88** 
 
(0.210) (0.750) (0.730) (0.744) (0.058) (0.784) (0.044) 
4 0.13 -0.82 0.57 -0.16 1.13 0.17 0.47 
 
(0.794) (0.475) (0.303) (0.814) (0.201) (0.694) (0.350) 
High -0.68 1.05 0.09 1.31 2.04 0.77 1.38 
 
(0.304) (0.119) (0.884) (0.136) (0.187) (0.191) (0.107) 
All -0.68* -0.25 -0.33 -0.31 0.18 -0.28 0.40 
 
(0.058) (0.547) (0.413) (0.518) (0.786) (0.399) (0.312) 
High-Low 0.51 0.93** 1.02*** 1.83*** 2.62** 1.38*** 
 
 










Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Lagged R
2
 and Fund Alpha, in Economic Expansions 
and Economic Recessions 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in high and low market sentiment periods. 
If the Fed National Activity Index 3 month average (CFNAI MA3) for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the 
median number of all monthly CFNAI MA3 index numbers, we define this month as economic expansion 
(recession) month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R
2
 and then by 
fund alpha. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly 
excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate 
the average monthly excess returns for each fund portfolio. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test 
period one month at a time. Last, we regress the test period average portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each 
portfolio cell, we present portfolio alphat-1, which is the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. The 
sample period of the test months is from January 1990 to December 2014 (300 months). Panel A shows the results in 
economic expansions and Panel B shows the results in economic recessions. For each portfolio, we present the 
portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level. 
 
Panel A: Economic expansions 
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.52** -3.27*** -2.55** -4.09*** -3.12* -2.92*** -0.88 
 
(0.028) (0.001) (0.029) (0.003) (0.084) (0.002) (0.327) 
2 -1.75*** -0.67 -2.65*** -1.00 -0.97 -1.41** 0.35 
 
(0.006) (0.381) (0.003) (0.298) (0.401) (0.043) (0.532) 
3 -1.07* -0.95 -1.25 -1.14 -0.02 -0.89 0.47 
 
(0.075) (0.122) (0.142) (0.203) (0.983) (0.122) (0.334) 
4 -0.46 -1.83 -0.17 -0.57 1.48 -0.31 0.92 
 
(0.459) (0.146) (0.810) (0.609) (0.176) (0.610) (0.123) 
High -0.75 -0.13 0.95 3.69*** 4.11** 1.58** 2.41** 
 
(0.422) (0.892) (0.268) (0.006) (0.024) (0.041) (0.021) 
All -1.12** -1.38** -1.14* -0.65 0.27 -0.81 0.64 
 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.086) (0.439) (0.760) (0.152) (0.176) 
High-Low 0.37 1.56** 1.82*** 3.82*** 3.60*** 2.24*** 
 
 
(0.478) (0.012) (0.003) (<.001) (0.003) (<.001) 
 
Panel B: Economic recessions 
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.89*** -1.04 -0.68 -0.30 -0.62 -0.90 0.61 
 
(0.003) (0.224) (0.464) (0.778) (0.738) (0.252) (0.512) 
2 -1.06** -1.19* 0.73 0.65 1.99 0.22 1.55** 
 
(0.042) (0.072) (0.394) (0.554) (0.161) (0.767) (0.019) 
3 -0.84 -0.06 -0.66 0.20 1.37 0.01 0.95 
 
(0.127) (0.916) (0.393) (0.835) (0.325) (0.987) (0.195) 
4 -1.87*** -0.38 0.63 0.45 0.99 -0.02 1.44* 
 
(0.006) (0.610) (0.462) (0.661) (0.497) (0.972) (0.077) 
High -1.79* -1.34 -0.62 1.61 3.54* 0.27 2.71*** 
 
(0.075) (0.313) (0.606) (0.220) (0.055) (0.786) (0.008) 
All -1.49*** -0.80 -0.12 0.51 1.48 -0.08 1.46** 
 
(0.003) (0.175) (0.866) (0.549) (0.193) (0.891) (0.013) 
High-Low 0.06 -0.17 -0.01 0.92 2.11* 0.58 
 
 








that funds with skilled managers continue to have a significantly better performance during high 
investor sentiment periods. 
Fund Management Selectivity Performance Regression Results 
So far we have analyzed the linear relationship between active fund performance, 
selectivity, and sentiment, but we want to make sure that high selectivity funds do outperform 
low selectivity funds using different factor models. To do so, we first formed two fund portfolios 
based on selectivity. In each month from January 1990 to December 2014, we formed five 
equally weighted fund portfolios based on their selectivity, which is estimated using rolling 
regressions of the FFC model with the 24-month time windows. These portfolios are rebalanced 
every month. Within these five portfolios, we only focus on the highest selectivity fund portfolio 
and the lowest selectivity fund portfolio. Within each month, we calculate the equally weighted 
average return for both portfolios and this provides a time series of monthly performance 
estimates for each portfolio. We then calculate the risk-adjusted returns of high and low 
selectivity fund portfolios using the CAPM model, FF3 model, and FFC model. The results are 
shown in Table 6, along with the performance of the hypothetical strategy of longing the high 













Regressions of Returns of Fund Portfolios on CAPM, FF3, and FFC Models 
This table reports the regression results for monthly returns on portfolios with high or low skilled funds from 
January 1990 through December 2014 (300 months) based on CAPM model, FF3 model, and FFC model. The high 





t-1 is obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each 
fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. The process repeats by moving 
the estimation and test period one month at a time. The independent variables contain market excess return (RM-Rf), 
return difference of small and big size stocks (SMB), return difference of high and low book-to-market ratio stocks 
(HML), and return difference of past winner and loser stocks (MOM). The regression results of a hypothetical 
strategy of buying high skilled fund portfolio and selling low skilled fund portfolio are also reported in this table. 
The sample period of the test months is from January 1990 to December 2014 (300 months). The P-value and 
adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 
CAPM 3 Factor Model 4 Factor Model 
 
High Skill Low Skill High - Low High Skill Low Skill High - Low High Skill Low Skill High - Low 
Intercept 0.14* -0.12*** 0.13*** 0.06 -0.13*** 0.09*** 0.05 -0.11*** 0.08** 
 
(0.082) (<.001) (<.001) (0.304) (<.001) (0.004) (0.433) (<.001) (0.031) 
RM-Rf 0.89*** 1.02*** -0.06*** 0.88*** 1.02*** -0.07*** 0.88*** 1.01*** -0.06*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
SMB 
   
0.27*** 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.05*** 0.11*** 
    
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HML 
   
0.19*** 0.02** 0.09*** 0.20*** 0.02 0.09*** 
    
(<.001) (0.052) (<.001) (<.001) (0.164) (<.001) 
MOM 
      
0.02 -0.02*** 0.02*** 
       
(0.170) (<.001) (0.001) 
          Adj. R2 0.89 0.99 0.14 0.94 0.99 0.41 0.94 0.99 0.42 
 
Unsurprisingly, the low-skilled fund portfolio delivers significant negative fund alphas in 
all three models. On the other hand, the highly skilled fund portfolio alpha is statistically 
insignificant in the FF3 and FFC models, which indicates that, on average, fund managers do not 
outperform these multifactor benchmarks. This is consistent with our earlier results 
demonstrating that only a small fraction of (skilled) fund managers (i.e., with the highest 
selectivity (Q5 quintile)), as shown in Tables 2 and 3. The high selectivity fund portfolio 
outperforms its low selectivity counterpart significantly in all three models. The hypothetical 
strategy of a long position in the high selectivity fund portfolio and a short position in the low 
selectivity delivers 1.56% (P < 0.001), 1.08% (P = 0.004), and 0.96% (P = 0.031) annualized 
alphas in each of the three models, respectively.
10
 After adjusting for other risk factors, the 
                                                          





spread in alpha between the high selectivity fund portfolio and the low selectivity fund portfolio 
decreases but continuous to remain significant. In addition, the significant negative relationship 
(-0.02, P < 0.001) between the return of the low selectivity portfolio and the momentum risk 
factor (MOM) indicates that low-skill managers require a lower return to invest in high-
momentum-related stocks, suggesting that low-skilled managers behave like the average investor 
who chases momentum market anomalies by paying high prices. This confirms that they lack 
analytic and investment selection skills. However, this is not the case for the skilled fund 
managers. The insignificant coefficient between skilled fund portfolio and MOM (0.02, P = 
0.170) means that highly skilled fund managers do not appear to make a profit by capitalizing on 
the momentum anomaly per se. For the rest of our analysis, we will focus on the FFC model. 
Subsequently, we use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of selectivity 
and its interaction with sentiment on active fund performance for the entire sample period. The 
multivariate regression results are calculated using the BW index, as an investor sentiment 
measure,
11
 while we also control for the market dispersion and business cycle effects.
12
 To test 
whether the profitability of fund management skill (selectivity) is higher during high sentiment 
periods, we estimate the following model: 
                                                                      
∑                                                                                                        (9) 
where Alphaf,t is calculated as the difference in the fund’s excess return in each month (over the 
T-bill rate) and the expected excess return in the same month. The expected excess return for 
each fund in each month is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24-
                                                          
11 We also replicate the same analysis using an orthogonalized BW index where each of the proxies has first been orthogonalized 
with respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions. The results are similar to the reported ones and are available upon request. 
12 Among those variables, CFAI MA3 and the UM index have the strongest correlation coefficient of 0.565, followed by the 
correlation coefficient of -0.513 between CFAI MA3 and market dispersion. Our main sentiment measure, the BW index, has a -
0.015 coefficient with CFAI MA3 and a 0.351 coefficient with market dispersion.  
38 
month preceding estimation period by the factors in the current month. The estimation and test 




is estimated using the FFC model with the 24-month estimation period. Control variables in the 
regression include alphat-1, expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, log of fund total 
net assets, and squared log value of the fund total net assets. Alphat-1 is the intercept from the 
FFC model using a 24-month estimation period, and as in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we 
report results with and without alphat-1 as control variables. Based on the central prediction of 
our hypothesis that active funds run by managers with high selectivity skills are expected to 
produce a better performance during high investor sentiment periods, when market signals are 
likely to be more noisy, than in low sentiment periods, we hypothesize that β1 > 0, β2 < 0, and β3 
> 0.
Consistent with the univariate results presented earlier and the above prediction, the 
results in Table 7 Panel A show that selectivity in all regression specifications, in accordance 
with the evidence in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), is positive and significantly correlated with 
fund alpha (P < 0.001) while sentiment is negative and significantly related to fund alpha (P < 
0.001), suggesting that, on average, fund performance is adversely affected when the market is 
plagued by noisy price signals as is most likely to be the case during high sentiment periods. 
However, the coefficient of the interaction variable between fund management selectivity and 
sentiment, Selectivity*Sentiment, is highly significant (0.23, P = 0.005 without alphat-1, and 0.21, 
P = 0.009 with alphat-1) and positively related to fund performance. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, this result demonstrates that during high sentiment periods, fund managers endowed 





ability to identify and make superior investments to the benefit of fund investors during high 
sentiment periods when the market is populated by noisy investors. 
Given that the distribution of R
2
 is negatively skewed with its mass being in the high 
values close to 1, the distribution of selectivity should be heavily positively skewed. Therefore, 
we replicated the previous estimation, using the logistic transformation of selectivity, labeled 
TSelectivity, as shown in Eq. (10), instead of the original selectivity measure. 
                 
           
             
                                             (10) 
The new results, reported in Table 7 Panel B, have a similar pattern with those presented 
previously in Panel A. The logistic-transformed selectivity measure is positively correlated with 
fund alpha (P < 0.001). As in Panel A, Sentiment retains its negative relation with fund alpha (-
0.04, P = 0.088 without alphat-1, and -0.11, P < 0.001 with alphat-1) and the coefficient of the 
new interaction variable, TSelectivity*Sentiment, and fund performance is still positive and 
statistically significant (0.04, P < 0.001 without alphat-1, and 0.02, P = 0.016 with alphat-1). 
Jointly, the results in Table 7 demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between fund 
performance and fund management skill in high sentiment periods. A funds’ risk-adjusted excess 
return is higher for funds run by high selectivity managers, as measured by 1-R
2







The Effect of Fund Selectivity and Investor Sentiment on Fund Performance 
This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity and investor sentiment controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is fund 
alpha, which is the difference between fund excess return (over T-bill rate) in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. The expected excess return for each fund 
in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current month. The process 
repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. The main independent variables are fund selectivity (1-R
2
t-1), market sentiment (BW sentiment index, 
available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website) and selectivity*sentiment, which is the product of selectivity and market sentiment. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log 
value of fund age, fund turnover, log value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Following Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we show the results with and without 
alphat-1 as control variables, where Alphat-1 is the intercept from the 24 month estimation period (t-24 to t-1). Sample period covers from January 1990 through December 2014. In 
Panel B, we also report the results using transformed selectivity (TSelectivity), as we shown that R
2
 is highly negative skewed. The P-value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are 
also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Using selectivity to measure skill 
 
Fund Alpha (FFC model) 
Intercept -0.83*** -0.55*** -0.67*** -0.37*** -0.80*** -0.47*** -0.80*** -0.47*** -1.11*** -0.77*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.009) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Selectivity 0.67*** 0.41*** 
  




(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Sentiment 
  
-0.02** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.19*** 
   
(0.014) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Selectivity*Sentiment 
      
0.21*** 0.17** 0.23*** 0.21*** 
       
(0.009) (0.032) (0.005) (0.009) 
Market Dispersion 
        
0.03*** 0.03*** 
         
(<.001) (<.001) 
Business Cycle 
        
0.02 0.05*** 






















Turnover -3.90E-04*** -2.70E-04*** -3.40E-04*** -2.20E-04*** -3.90E-04*** -2.60E-04*** -3.80E-04*** -2.50E-04*** -3.80E-04*** -2.50E-04*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Expense Ratio -4.80E-04 -7.10E-04 -6.80E-05 -4.50E-04 -4.60E-04 -7.00E-04 -4.70E-04 -7.00E-04 -6.00E-04 -8.40E-04 
 
(0.633) (0.475) (0.946) (0.655) (0.643) (0.485) (0.640) (0.483) (0.550) (0.400) 
log(TNA) 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.44*** 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 0.50*** 0.31*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.002) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
[log(TNA)]2 -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.02* -0.04*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.05*** -0.03** 
 
(<.001) (0.024) (0.002) (0.092) (<.001) (0.039) (<.001) (0.038) (<.001) (0.016) 
Log(age) -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.08*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 








Panel B: Using logistic transformed selectivity to measure skill 
 
Fund Alpha (FFC model) 
Intercept -0.58*** -0.39*** -0.67*** -0.37*** -0.53*** -0.28*** -0.53*** -0.29** -0.84*** -0.58*** 
 
(<.001) (0.005) (<.001) (0.009) (<.001) (0.047) (<.001) (0.043) (<.001) (<.001) 
TSelectivity 0.08*** 0.05*** 
  




(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Sentiment 
  
-0.02** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.11*** 0.02 -0.07*** -0.04* -0.11*** 
   
(0.014) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.511) (0.003) (0.088) (<.001) 
TSelectivity*Sentiment 
      
0.03*** 0.02* 0.04*** 0.02** 
       
(0.001) (0.065) (<.001) (0.016) 
Market Dispersion 
        
0.03*** 0.03*** 
         
(<.001) (<.001) 
Business Cycle 
        
0.02 0.05*** 






















Turnover -3.90E-04*** -2.70E-04*** -3.40E-04*** -2.20E-04*** -3.90E-04*** -2.60E-04*** -3.80E-04*** -2.60E-04*** -3.80E-04*** -2.50E-04*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Expense Ratio -4.70E-04 -7.10E-04 -6.80E-05 -4.50E-04 -4.60E-04 -7.10E-04 -4.90E-04 -7.20E-04 -6.30E-04 -8.70E-04 
 
(0.639) (0.479) (0.946) (0.655) (0.643) (0.479) (0.623) (0.470) (0.529) (0.384) 
log(TNA) 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.44*** 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 0.50*** 0.31*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.002) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
[log(TNA)]2 -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.02* -0.04*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.05*** -0.03** 
 
(<.001) (0.023) (0.002) (0.092) (<.001) (0.036) (<.001) (0.035) (<.001) (0.015) 
Log(age) -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.07*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 






BvanB Fund Management Added Value Regression Results 
We re-examine the effect of fund management skill and its interaction with sentiment on 
fund performance using the BvanB fund skill (ratio) and performance (alpha) measures, as 
defined in section III.B.2, to estimate the following model: 
                                                                           
           ∑                                                                  (11) 
where BvanB fund alpha (performance) is the product of fund inflation-adjusted TNA at the 
beginning of the current month and the difference between the fund excess return in the current 
month and the expected excess return of the same month. BvanB fund skill is measured as the 
product of fund alphat-1 and the fund TNA at the beginning of the last month in the 24-month 
estimation period divided by the standard error of the fund alphat-1, where fund alphat-1 is the 
intercept from the 24-month preceding estimation period. 
Basically, the regression results in Table 8 show that BvanB fund skill significantly 
contributes to the fund performance, BvanB fund alpha, in all regressions. Consistent with the 
previous results, we find mostly a significant negative relationship between investor sentiment 
and fund performance, but a positive and significant association between the interaction variable, 
BvanB skill*Sentiment, and fund performance. This indicates that, on average, sentiment harms 
the overall fund performance, but this does not hold for skilled fund managers. In fact, skilled 
fund managers during high sentiment periods experience a significantly better performance than 
in low sentiment periods due to their ability to identify and make superior investments in high 
sentiment periods when the market is populated by noisy investors. The positive and significant 
relationship between fund past performance, BvanB Alphat-1, and fund performance, BvanB fund 





far-right regressions, remain robust after controlling for the state of the economy and stock 
market dispersion. In sum, the consistency between the multivariate and the univariate results, 
regardless of fund selectivity and performance measures used, provide strong evidence in 
support of the proposition that skilled fund managers realize superior risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns in high sentiment periods when noisy trading is more prevalent and it is more difficult to 



































                                                          
13 Avramov and Wermers (2006) argue that some macroeconomic variables can effect fund managers skill and influence fund 
performance. To address this question, we use four macroeconomic variables, as suggested in their paper, to control economic 
conditions: aggregate dividend yield, which is the total cash dividends on the value-weighted CRSP index over prior 12 months 
divided by the current level of the index; default spread, which is the difference between Moody’s BAA-rated bonds yield and 
AAA-rated bonds yield; term spread, which is the different between ten-year treasury bonds yield and three-month T-bills yield; 






The Effect of Fund Skill Ratio and Investor Sentiment on Fund Performance 
This table reports the results of regressing fund’s BvanB alpha on manager’s BvanB fund skill and investor 
sentiment controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is fund’s BvanB alpha, which is the 
product of fund total net assets (TNA) in month t-1and the difference between fund excess return (over T-bill rate) 
in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. The expected excess return for each fund in month t is 
calculated by multiplying the 11 Vanguard Index fund orthogonal bases factor loadings from the 24 month 
estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the 11 Vanguard Index fund orthogonal bases factors in current month. The 
process repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. The main independent variables are 
fund BvanB skill ratio, which is measured as the product of fund alphat-1 and fund TNA at the beginning of the last 
month (t-1) in the estimation period (t-24 to t-1) divided by the standard error of the fund alphat-1, market sentiment 
(BW sentiment index, available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website), and Skill*Sentiment, which is the product of BvanB 
skill ratio and market sentiment. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund 
turnover, log value of TNA, squared log value of TNA, and BvanB alphat-1, which is the product of fund alphat-1 and 
fund TNA at the beginning of the last month (t-1) in the estimation period (t-24 to t-1) and fund alphat-1 is the 
intercept from the 24 month estimation period (t-24 to t-1). Sample period ranges from December 2002 through 
December 2014 (145 months). The P-value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
BvanB Fund Alpha 
Intercept 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
BvanB Skill  0.03** 0.04** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (<.001) (<.001) 
Sentiment 
 
0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
  




   
(<.001) (<.001) 
Market Dispersion 
   
0.01 
    
(0.975) 
Business Cycle 
   
-0.02** 
    
(0.036) 
BvanB Alphat-1 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Turnover 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.205) (0.092) (0.130) (0.243) 
Expense Ratio -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.60*** -0.60*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
log(TNA) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
[log(TNA)]
2
 7.11E-05** 6.81E-05** 6.01E-05* 5.86E-05* 
 
(0.035) (0.043) (0.072) (0.080) 
Log(age) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.631) (0.675) (0.357) (0.313) 
Adj. R
2










Stock Mispricing and Mutual Fund Performance 
We next examine whether the superior performance of skilled fund managers in high 
sentiment periods, when the views of more optimistic (noisy) investors are more pronounced and 
short selling is limited, comes through investing in undervalued stocks. To address this issue, we 
perform a cross-sectional analysis on the relation between fund performance and stock 
mispricing, using a set of 11 market anomalies to identify overpriced stocks (Stambaugh et al., 
2012), and expect a negative relation to emerge for skilled fund managers.
14,15
 Specifically, the 
stock mispricing data range between 0 and 100, and stocks with the highest mispricing values are 
the ones that are overpriced by the market, while stocks with the lowest mispricing values are 
underpriced. Then, we calculate the value weighted average of stock mispricing (VW_MISP) for 
all stocks within each fund.
16
 To check the sensitivity of our results, we replace the value 
weighted average mispricing with the equal weighted average of stock mispricing (EW_MISP) 
for all stocks within each fund. Then, we break our sample into 5 quintiles based on fund 
management skill, and estimate the relation between fund performance and stock mispricing for 
each quintile.  
Table 9 presents the coefficient between fund performance and stock mispricing by 
regressing fund performance, for the 5 management skill quintiles, on fund level mispricing, 
while controlling for past fund performance (Alphat-1), expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund 
turnover, log value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. First, as expected, 
the results in column “All” reveal a significant and negative relation between fund performance 
and stock mispricing. Furthermore, we find that the negative association between fund 
                                                          
14 The 11 anomalies contain net stock issues, composite equity issues, accruals, net operating assets, asset growth, investment to 
assets, financial distress, O-score, momentum, gross profitability premium, and return on assets. 
15 The data are available through Yu Yuan’s website http://www.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/facultylist/yyuan/. 





performance and stock mispricing is more pronounced for funds with lower management skills. 
For example, when soring funds based on fund selectivity, the coefficient between fund 
performance and VW_MISP (EW_MISP) in the lowest skill fund quintile is -0.111 (-0.111) and 
significant, while the coefficient in the highest skill fund quintile is -0.069 (-0.101). This pattern 
is even stronger when sorting funds into quintiles using BvanB fund skill measure. In sum, 
consistent with our previous evidence, the results of this cross-sectional analysis demonstrate 
that skilled fund managers’ investments are associated with undervalued stocks.  
TABLE 1.9 
Stock Mispricing and Mutual Fund Performance 
This table presents the coefficient between fund performance and fund mispricing level, along with the 
corresponding P-value and regression adjusted R
2
, by regressing fund performance on fund level mispricing for each 
management skill quintile while controlling for past fund performance (Alphat-1), expense ratio, log value of fund 
age, fund turnover, log value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Fund performance is 
estimated using both Fund Alpha and BvanB Fund Alpha measures. Fund level mispricing is measured using two 
ways: (i) VW_MISP is the market value weighted average of stock mispricing for all stocks within each fund and 
(ii) EW_MISP is the equal weighted average of stock mispricing for all stocks within each fund. Stock mispricing 
value is introduced by Stambaugh et al. (2012) and the data are available through Yu Yuan’s website 
(http://www.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/facultylist/yyuan/). Furthermore, the sample is split into quintiles based on their 
selectivity or BvanB skill, which are estimated using 24 month regression from October 2011 to September 2013. 
Fund holdings information are manually collected through Bloomberg Portfolio Analysis Database, and the data are 
collected for the last quarter of 2013. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 
Fund Alpha (FFC model) 
 
All Lowest Selectivity Skill 4 3 2 Highest Selectivity Skill 
VW_MISP -0.085*** -0.111*** -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.072*** -0.069*** 
P-Value (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.007) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.085 0.135 0.124 0.145 0.139 0.089 
EW_MISP -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.102*** -0.121*** -0.097*** -0.101*** 
P-Value (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.000) (<.0001) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.108 0.134 0.118 0.155 0.165 0.135 
 
BvanB Fund Alpha 
 
All Lowest BvanB Skill 2 3 4 Highest BvanB Skill 
VW_MISP -3.470*** -7.799** -1.671 -0.604** 0.061 -2.455 
P value (0.005) (0.037) (0.132) (0.034) (0.973) (0.583) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.090 0.095 0.181 0.181 0.038 0.030 
EW_MISP -3.098** -8.018** -2.013* -0.461 0.709 -0.353 
P value (0.012) (0.037) (0.083) (0.104) (0.702) (0.933) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Lucky Bias Analysis 
Selectivity Performance Lucky Bias Results 
One criticism about the superior performance of skilled fund managers, particularly in 
high sentiment periods, as documented above, is that it could be attributed to luck rather than to 
the differing abilities of managers. To address this concern, we followed Barras et al. (2010) and 
conduct a lucky bias analysis for the entire sample and replicated the analysis for both high and 
low sentiment periods. As shown in Table 10 Panel A, using fund risk-adjusted excess return 
(fund alpha) as a performance measure, with a 20% significance level, 4.41% of the total funds 
beat the market significantly, and within the 4.41% funds, only 1.63% of fund managers are truly 
skilled. This number decreases to 0.69% when we move to the 5% significance level. This 
indicates that some of the mutual fund managers do possess management skill, but the proportion 
is very low. 
After we take investor sentiment into consideration, the results for high (Panel B) and 
low (Panel C) investor sentiment are consistent with our hypothesis. On average, 5.10% of funds 
outperform the market benchmark with a 20% significance level during high sentiment periods. 
After we get rid of the lucky funds, this number decreases to 1.57%. Using a 5% significance 
level, the total proportion of funds with positive extra returns is 1.85%, and the skilled funds 
account for 1.00% of total funds. During low sentiment periods, 3.70% (1.13%) of total funds 
beat the market at the 20% (5%) significance level, and the true skilled-funds proportion is only 
0.73% (0.39%). The explanation for observing more skilled fund managers during high than low 
sentiment periods is that in high sentiment periods, when the market is noisy and information is 
costly, the investor demand for superior fund management skills is greater, which increases the 






Skill versus Luck on the Fund Performance Using Fund Alpha to Measure Performance 
Fund performance is measured using fund alpha based on FFC model. Panel A shows the estimated proportions of zero-alpha, 
unskilled, and skilled funds in the funds population with the monthly average fund number in each category based on Barras, 
Scaillet, and Wermers (2010)’s methodology of false discoveries. It also exhibits the proportion of funds in the right and left 
tails using four significant levels (0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20). The significant proportion in left tail is divided into unlucky and 
unskilled categories, and the significant proportion in right tail is divided into lucky and skilled categories. Average fund 
alpha and fund alpha standard division are also reported. Panel B and C show the results of false discoveries analysis during 
high and low sentiment periods. The BW sentiment index is used to capture market sentiment and is available at Jeffrey 
Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly 
BW sentiment index numbers, we define this month as high (low) market sentiment month. 
 
Panel A: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds 
 
Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled 
 
      
Proportion 84.29% 11.30% 4.41% 
      
Ave. # of funds 893 164 89 




Right Tail  
Significant level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 
Signif. % 4.55% 7.17% 9.23% 11.30% 
 
4.41% 3.47% 2.53% 1.49% Signif. % 
# of funds 66 104 134 164 
 
89 70 51 30 # of funds 
unlucky % 1.24% 2.55% 3.72% 6.10% 
 
3.26% 2.43% 1.64% 0.79% lucky % 
# of funds 18 37 54 89 
 
66 49 33 16 # of funds 
unskilled % 3.31% 4.62% 5.51% 6.40% 
 
1.63% 1.04% 0.89% 0.69% skilled % 
# of funds 48 67 80 91 
 
24 21 18 14 # of funds 
Alpha (% /month) -0.277 -0.321 -0.340 -0.354 
 
0.826 0.884 0.961 1.081 Alpha (% /month) 
Alpha Stdv. 1.979 1.985 1.995 2.007 
 
3.434 3.537 3.670 3.530 Alpha Stdv. 
 
Panel B: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds in High Market Sentiment 
 
Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled 
       
Proportion 84.29% 10.06% 5.10% 
       
Ave. # of funds 876 142 102 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 
Signif. % 3.90% 6.23% 8.22% 10.06% 
 
5.10% 4.10% 3.05% 1.85% Signif. % 
# of funds 55 88 116 142 
 
102 82 61 37 # of funds 
unlucky % 1.20% 2.48% 3.68% 4.89% 
 
3.35% 2.55% 1.70% 0.85% lucky % 
# of funds 17 35 52 69 
 
67 51 34 17 # of funds 
unskilled % 2.69% 3.75% 4.53% 4.37% 
 
1.57% 1.55% 1.35% 1.00% skilled % 
# of funds 38 53 64 73 
 
35 31 27 20 # of funds 
Alpha (% /month) -0.764 -0.743 -0.707 -0.686 
 
0.832 0.899 0.996 1.143 Alpha (% /month) 
Alpha Stdv. 2.038 2.042 2.055 2.078 
 
3.780 3.934 4.115 3.924 Alpha Stdv. 
Panel C: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds in Low Market Sentiment  
 
Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled 
       
Proportion 83.78% 12.52% 3.70% 
       
Ave. # of funds 910 185 75 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.150 0.2 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 
Signif. % 5.28% 8.12% 10.35% 12.52% 
 
3.70% 2.86% 2.02% 1.13% Signif. % 
# of funds 78 120 153 185 
 
75 58 41 23 # of funds 
unlucky % 1.35% 2.64% 3.93% 6.10% 
 
3.06% 2.32% 1.53% 0.74% lucky % 
# of funds 20 39 58 77 
 
62 47 31 15 # of funds 
unskilled % 3.93% 5.48% 6.43% 6.03% 
 
0.73% 0.54% 0.49% 0.39% skilled % 
# of funds 58 81 95 108 
 
13 11 10 8 # of funds 
Alpha (% /month) -0.197 -0.224 -0.236 -0.245 
 
0.814 0.854 0.884 0.939 Alpha (% /month) 
Alpha Stdv. 1.958 1.959 1.965 1.971 
 







BvanB Fund Added Value Lucky Bias Results 
When we replicate the lucky bias analysis, using the BvanB fund alpha, as the 
performance measure, which captures the extra capital funds absorb from the financial market, 
we find similar results to those reported in Table 9. Specifically, as shown in Table 11 Panel A, 
on average, 7.52% (3.73%) of funds outperform the market benchmark at the 20% (5%) 
significance level. The proportion drops to 5.40% (1.48%) at a 20% (5%) significance level after 
we remove the lucky funds. Once again, during high sentiment periods, the percentage of skilled 
funds goes up to 8.60% (2.71%), but in low sentiment periods, the percentage decreases to 
2.24% (0.27%). 
There are three points to take away from the lucky bias analysis. First, even though the 
average mutual manager cannot beat the market, a small fraction of fund managers (about 
0.69%, using selectivity (1-R
2
) measure and 1.48%, using BvanB value added skill measure, 
both of which are below the 5% significance level) with high stock-picking skills delivers 
persistently superior performance than their low skill peers. Second, skilled fund managers’ 
skills are more profitable during high sentiment periods when the market is crowded with noise 
traders. During low sentiment periods when stocks are more likely to be traded near their 
intrinsic values, only a smaller portion of skilled managers produces significantly positive fund 
alphas for investors, which implies that selectivity skill is less valuable in low sentiment periods. 
Third, as argued by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), there are more skilled fund managers in the 
market than we can detect using fund excess returns to capture performance because larger 
skilled funds may generate more value for their clients with relative low alphas. One could argue 
that an upward bias exists in the results due to sample selection, since good opportunities might 






Skill versus Luck on the Fund Performance Using BvanB Fund Alpha to Measure Performance 
Fund performance is measured using BvanB fund alpha based on 11 Vanguard Index Fund orthogonal bases. Panel A shows the 
estimated proportions of zero-alpha, unskilled, and skilled funds in the funds population with the monthly average fund number in each 
category based on Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010)’s methodology of false discoveries. It also exhibits the proportion of funds in 
the right and left tails using four significant levels (0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20). The significant proportion in left tail is divided into 
unlucky and unskilled categories, and the significant proportion in right tail is divided into lucky and skilled categories. Average BvanB 
fund alpha and BvanB fund alpha standard division are also reported. Panel B and C show the results of false discoveries analysis 
during high and low sentiment periods. The sentiment index data are available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index 
for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define this month as 
high (low) market sentiment month. 
 
Panel A: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds 
 
Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled 
       
Proportion 82.20% 10.27% 7.52% 
       
Ave. # of funds 1261 158 115 




Right Tail  
Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 
Signif. % 5.08% 7.42% 9.06% 10.27% 
 
7.52% 6.68% 5.58% 3.73% Signif. % 
# of funds 78 114 139 158 
 
115 102 86 57 # of funds 
unlucky % 3.00% 3.05% 3.09% 3.13% 
 
2.13% 2.24% 2.40% 2.25% lucky % 
# of funds 46 47 47 48 
 
33 34 37 35 # of funds 
unskilled % 2.08% 4.37% 5.96% 7.14% 
 
5.40% 4.44% 3.18% 1.48% skilled % 
# of funds 32 67 91 110 
 
83 68 49 23 # of funds 
BvanB Alpha ($/month) -3.991 -4.079 -3.674 -3.692 
 
3.434 3.636 3.643 3.683 BvanB Alpha ($/month) 
BvanB Alpha Stdv. 3.049 3.465 2.652 3.122  2.626 2.765 2.508 2.428 BvanB Alpha Stdv. 
 
Panel B: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds in High Market Sentiment 
 
Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled 
       
Proportion 77.47% 11.13% 11.40% 
       
Ave. # of funds 1219 175 179 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 
Signif. % 5.54% 8.01% 9.80% 11.13%  11.40% 10.09% 8.47% 5.78% Signif. % 
# of funds 87 126 154 175  179 159 133 91 # of funds 
unlucky % 3.02% 3.00% 3.02% 3.07%  2.80% 2.90% 3.05% 3.06% lucky % 
# of funds 47 47 48 48  44 46 48 48 # of funds 
unskilled % 2.53% 5.01% 6.78% 8.06%  8.60% 7.19% 5.41% 2.71% skilled % 
# of funds 40 79 107 127  135 113 85 43 # of funds 
BvanB Alpha ($/month) -3.932 -3.874 -3.566 -3.903  3.598 3.847 3.986 4.172 BvanB Alpha ($/month) 
BvanB Alpha Stdv. 2.916 2.650 2.323 3.612  2.203 2.58 2.37 2.291 BvanB Alpha Stdv. 
Panel C: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds in Low Market Sentiment 
 
Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled 
       
Proportion 86.87% 9.42% 3.71% 
       
Ave. # of funds 1298 141 55 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 
Signif. % 4.63% 6.83% 8.32% 9.42%  3.71% 3.31% 2.74% 1.72% Signif. % 
# of funds 69 102 124 141  55 49 41 26 # of funds 
unlucky % 2.98% 3.09% 3.17% 3.19%  1.47% 1.59% 1.75% 1.45% lucky % 
# of funds 45 46 47 48  22 24 26 22 # of funds 
unskilled % 1.64% 3.74% 5.16% 6.23%  2.24% 1.72% 0.98% 0.27% skilled % 
# of funds 25 56 77 93  33 26 15 4 # of funds 
BvanB Alpha ($/month) -4.052 -4.284 -3.782 -3.484  3.273 3.421 3.279 3.088 BvanB Alpha ($/month) 






Conversely, there might be a downward bias if bad funds disappear in times of low sentiment. To 
address this concern, we estimate the correlation between the number of funds 
appearing/disappearing and investor sentiment (BW Index) for each month. Interestingly, we 
find the number of funds appearing to be insignificantly correlated with investor sentiment index 
(-0.01, P=0.880), implying that skilled fund managers are not attracted by high investor 
sentiment. However, the number of funds disappearing is significantly positively correlated with 
investor sentiment (0.22, P< .001), demonstrating that investor sentiment harms their 




Sentiment beta analysis 
Several studies have focused on the profitability of mutual funds’ sentiment timing 
strategy. For example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and Carhart (1997) have showed 
that mutual funds tend to follow momentum. Recently, Massa and Yadav (2015) reported that 
mutual funds employ portfolio strategies based on market sentiment. Specifically, they find that 
low sentiment beta funds outperform the high sentiment beta funds, even after controlling for 
standard risk factors and fund characteristics. This result is attributed to the sentiment-contrarian 
strategy rather than the sentiment-momentum strategy, which, in turn, attracts significant 
investor flows in comparison to the sentiment-catering strategy. In a more recent study, Chen, 
Han, and Pan (2016) examine whether exposure to sentiment risk can explain the cross-sectional 
variation in hedge fund returns and find that funds with a sentiment beta in the top decile 
subsequently outperform those in the bottom decile by 0.67% per month on a risk-adjusted basis. 
                                                          






Therefore, they argue that some hedge funds can time sentiment and contribute to fund 
performance by increasing their exposure to a sentiment factor when the factor premium is high. 
In this section, we investigate the impact of fund sentiment timing strategy on fund 
performance. As discussed earlier, in this study, we view investor sentiment as an economic 
condition, rather than as a risk factor to be exploited by its timing and argue that skilled 
managers invest in assets based on their superior analytic ability and private information about 
an asset’s true value, rather than timing sentiment. This leads us to expect that the fund sentiment 
timing strategy is more likely to be associated with low rather than high skilled fund managers. 
To examine whether high (low) skilled fund managers are less (more) likely to time investor 
sentiment, we perform Fama–MacBeth regressions of high- and low-skilled fund portfolio 
returns and alphas on sentiment beta, while controlling for fund-level characteristics. The fund 
alpha is calculated as the intercept of the regressing portfolio excess returns on the FFC model 
for our entire 300-months sample period. Following Massa and Yadav (2015), we calculate each 
portfolio’s sentiment beta by regression using the 24 months of data proceeding the current 
month: 
                                                              (12) 
where Rp,t is the portfolio p’s return in month t; Rf,t is the risk-free rate in month t; RM-Rf is the 
market excess return in month i, SMB is the return difference of small and big size stocks in 
month i, HML is the return difference of high and low book-to-market ratio stocks in month i, 
MOM is the return difference of winner and loser stocks in month i, and Sentiment is the BW 
index for the same month. β5 is the sentiment beta estimated by running regression (12) with a 





return (13) (and portfolio alpha obtained from FFC model (14)) on the sentiment beta, with or 
without fund-level control variables: 
                                ∑                                    (13) 
                               ∑                                      (14) 
The control variables include the equally weighted average expense ratio, fund age, 
turnover, and log value of fund TNA. 
TABLE 1.12 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Fund Returns and Alpha on Sentiment Beta 
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of high skilled and low skilled fund portfolios’ excess 
returns, as well as alphas, on funds’ sentiment beta with controls of fund characteristics. In each month and for each 
portfolio with 24 monthly returns, sentiment beta is estimated by regressing the fund’s excess returns on the BW 
sentiment index along with controls from FFC factor model. Then, we perform cross-sectional regressions of fund 
excess return (or alpha) on sentiment beta with controls for fund characteristics. Fund-level control variables contain 
expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, and log value of TNA. Sample period covers from January 1990 

















































































































Table 12 reports the Fama–MacBeth regression results where the dependent variable is 
either the monthly portfolio excess return or the portfolio alpha. The only significant coefficient 
on sentiment beta that emerges from these regressions is for the low-skill fund portfolio’s alpha, 
when alpha serves as a dependent variable, indicating that low-skilled funds seem to time 
investor sentiment by employing a sentiment-momentum strategy. Other than that, the 





managers do not appear to time investor sentiment. These results support the view that skilled 
fund managers do not time investor sentiment as a value-creating strategy because, as argued by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), movements in investor sentiment are in part unpredictable. 
Therefore, fund managers betting against mispricing during high sentiment periods run a high 
risk, at least in the short run, that investor sentiment will become more extreme and prices will 
move even further away from fundamental values. Skilled fund managers focus more on stock 
selection during high sentiment periods than on timing the investor sentiment movements. 
Consistent with our previous results, these findings imply that skilled fund managers’ superior 
performance relative to their low-skilled peers is mainly due to their ability to produce more 
(private) information about the true value of financial assets under management during high 
sentiment periods when asset prices are noisier than in low sentiment periods when financial 
markets are not crowded by unsophisticated (noisy) investors. 
Fund Capital Flow Analysis   
The portfolio sorting and multivariate analysis thus far, shows that skilled fund managers 
have a significant and persistent past performance (alphat-1), and this should attract capital 
inflows from the financial market as investors tend to make investment decisions based on the 
past performance of each mutual fund. Therefore, due to limited optimal investment 
opportunities in the market skilled fund managers under the pressure to invest the extra capital 
inflows will be forced to make investment decisions which consequently may weaken fund 
performance (fund alpha), unless they are endowed with high selectivity skills. Additionally, 
studies have shown that sentiment is correlated with fund flows (Ben-Raphel, Kandel, and Wohl, 
2012). In this section, we address this issue by investigating whether the superior performance of 





To inspect the influence of capital inflows, we first estimate the capital flow of each fund 
as follows: 
                                                                        (15) 
where TNAf,t is the total net assets of fund f in month t, and Rf,t is the fund return in month t. To 
test whether and how fund performance is affected by capital flows, we include net capital flows 
2 months ago (Fowt-2) and 1 month ago (Flowt-1), and their interaction variables with fund 
selectivity and sentiment into our main multivariate regression, as presented in Eq. (9). 
Consistent with our prediction, the results in Table 13 column 1 show a negative and 
significant correlation between the previous month capital inflows (Flowt-1) with fund alpha, 
which reveals that extra capital inflows create more pressure on fund managers to invest 
resulting in lower fund alpha. The insignificant coefficients between the interaction 
Flow*Sentiment in t-1 and t-2 and fund alpha (P = 0.97 and P = 0.62 for capital inflows, 
respectively), as shown in column 2, indicate that the negative relationship between the previous 
months’ capital inflows and fund performance is not sentiment-related. The coefficients between 
the interaction Flow*Selectivity in t-1 and t-2 and fund alpha, as reported in column 3, are 
positive and significant (P < 0.001), suggesting that managers with high selectivity skill direct 
extra capital inflows in better investment opportunities delivering high alpha than their unskilled 
fund counterparts. Last, the positive and significant relationship between the interaction 
Selectivity*Sentiment and fund alpha (0.166, P = 0.04), in column 4, shows that even after 
controlling for the negative effect of capital inflows from previous months, high selectivity 
managers still possess the ability to make significantly superior investments during high 







The Effect of Fund Flow and Investor Sentiment on Fund Performance 
This table reports the regression results of following model: 
                                                                       
                             (                        )    (                        )
   (                    )   (                    )     ∑               
The dependent variable is fund alpha. The main independent variables are fund selectivity (1-R
2
t-1), market 
sentiment (BW sentiment index, available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website), selectivity*Sentiment, which is the product 
of selectivity and market sentiment, flowi,p+q, which is the net capital flow of fund i in month t+q (q equals -2, -1); 
and the product of fund flow with sentiment and the product of fund flow with selectivity. Control variables contain 
Alphat-1, which is the intercept from the 24 month estimation period (t-24 to t-1), expense ratio, log value of fund 
age, fund turnover, log value of fund total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of fund TNA. Sample period 
covers from January 1990 through December 2014. The P-value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -1.07*** -0.97*** -1.25*** -1.04*** 
 


















    
(0.040) 
Flowt-1 -6.40E-05** -3.71E-05 -6.71E-04*** -3.33E-05 
 
(0.040) (0.270) (<.001) (0.290) 
Flowt-2 2.95E-05 6.25E-05* -2.69E-04*** 5.97E-05* 
 
(0.350) (0.070) (<.001) (0.060) 
Flowt-1*Selectivity  
3.97E-03*** 





   
(<.001) 
 








Alphat-1 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Turnover 0.00*** 0.00*** -4.84E-04*** -4.68E-04*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Expense ratio -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 
(<.001) (0.010) (<.001) (<.001) 
Log(TNA) 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.71*** 0.62*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
[Log(TNA)]
2
 -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Log(age) -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.10*** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Adj. R
2






Volatility Anomaly Analysis 
There is also evidence in the literature suggesting that the volatility anomaly, either 
directly or indirectly, can lead to mismeasurement of fund manager skill (Jordan and Riley, 
2014; Novy-Marx, 2014; and Fama and French, 2015). Volatility anomaly basically means that 
the low volatility stock portfolio outperforms the high volatility stock portfolio significantly, and 
Jordan and Riley (2014) show that it has a large impact on mutual fund returns, which could 
create a significant bias when measuring managers' skills. Even though the volatility anomaly 
has been questioned by other studies, we assess the sensitivity of our results by controlling for 
the effect of the volatility anomaly.
18
  
In accord with section IV.A, we sort all the funds in each month into 25 (5x5) portfolios 
with a different selectivity (1-R
2
t-1) and past fund performance, alphat-1. Next, we examine 
whether fund selectivity skill varies with time and particularly whether high selectivity is 
associated with a higher fund performance during high sentiment states. As before, we use the 
BW sentiment index to measure the investor sentiment and if the month t’s BW sentiment index 
is higher (lower) than the median number of all the monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we 
define month t as a high (low) investor sentiment month. Then, for each month, we calculate the 
monthly average excess raw returns of funds included in each portfolio and regress the returns on 
the Fama–French five-factor plus momentum factor model, which contain the profitability factor 
and investment factor that can explain the volatility anomaly (Jordan and Riley, 2015), to obtain 
the abnormal risk-adjusted excess return, i.e., portfolio fund alpha. Table 14 presents the 
annualized fund alpha and P-value for each portfolio in high (Panel A) and low (Panel B) 
sentiment periods, respectively. 
                                                          
18 For example, Moreira and Muir (2016) showed that a volatility-managed portfolio, which decreases portfolio volatility when 
the expected market risk is high and increases the portfolio volatility when expected market risk is low, yields high alphas and 






The Effect of Volatility Anomaly and Investor Sentiment on Fund Performance 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in high and low market sentiment periods. 
If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly BW 
sentiment index numbers, we define this month as high (low) market sentiment month. Portfolios are formed by 
sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R
2
 and then by fund alphat-1. Both are obtained from the 24-
month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the 
factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate the average monthly excess returns for each 
fund portfolio. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. Last we regress 
the test period average portfolio returns on Fama-French 5 factor plus momentum model. For each portfolio cell, we 
present portfolio alpha, which is the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. The sample period of the 
test months is from January 1990 to December 2014 (300 months). Panel A shows the results of high market 
sentiment group and Panel B shows the results of low market sentiment group. For each portfolio, we present the 
portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level. 
 
Panel A: FF 5 factor plus momentum model in high market sentiment 
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -2.28*** -3.59*** -3.50*** -3.94*** -1.66 -3.00*** 0.32 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.363) (0.003) (0.742) 
2 -2.67*** -1.57* -3.41*** -2.31** -0.77 -2.14*** 0.97 
 
(<.001) (0.073) (<.001) (0.047) (0.593) (0.010) (0.149) 
3 -1.59*** -1.77** -2.90*** -1.74* -0.73 -1.74** 0.33 
 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.002) (0.099) (0.556) (0.012) (0.621) 
4 -0.84 -0.82 -0.61 -0.20 -0.06 -0.50 0.38 
 
(0.265) (0.340) (0.491) (0.870) (0.967) (0.506) (0.628) 
High -0.41 0.59 1.70 4.54*** 6.66*** 2.63** 3.56*** 
 
(0.746) (0.707) (0.159) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) 
All -1.56** -1.44* -1.75** -0.75 0.68 -0.96 1.10* 
 
(0.013) (0.059) (0.038) (0.469) (0.563) (0.178) (0.087) 
High-Low 0.89 1.97** 2.62*** 4.06*** 4.05*** 2.72*** 
 
 
(0.154) (0.018) (<.001) (<.001) (0.002) (<.001) 
 
Panel B: FF 5 factor plus momentum model in low market sentiment 
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.24** -0.05 -0.85 -1.09 -2.26 -1.09 -0.60 
 
(0.027) (0.953) (0.317) (0.274) (0.271) (0.173) (0.540) 
2 -0.56 -0.51 -0.04 -0.01 0.71 -0.09 0.57 
 
(0.244) (0.311) (0.943) (0.990) (0.566) (0.874) (0.309) 
3 -0.20 -0.24 -0.50 -0.30 0.96 -0.05 0.44 
 
(0.697) (0.650) (0.386) (0.680) (0.395) (0.916) (0.472) 
4 -1.05* -1.08 0.74 -0.63 2.30* 0.06 1.63** 
 
(0.071) (0.374) (0.257) (0.426) (0.059) (0.906) (0.020) 
High -0.34 0.75 0.92 1.96* 1.93 1.04 1.11 
 
(0.629) (0.341) (0.277) (0.081) (0.247) (0.142) (0.215) 
All -0.68* -0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.75 -0.02 0.64 
 
(0.084) (0.648) (0.891) (0.969) (0.426) (0.961) (0.167) 
High-Low 0.63 0.62 1.06* 1.75** 2.27* 1.26** 
 
 








These results continue to show that skilled fund managers’ performance is superior 
during high investor sentiment periods indicating that they are not sensitive volatility anomaly. 
Consistent with the pattern of our main results, fund portfolio performance (alpha), as shown in 
row “All,” decreases from the high selectivity (high 1-R2t-1) portfolio to the low selectivity (low 
1-R
2
t-1) portfolio in both high (Panel A) and low sentiment (Panel B) periods. Panel A shows that 
when investor sentiment level is high, the highest past alpha quintile managers with the highest 
skill and second-highest skill produce 6.66% (P = 0.002) and 4.54% (P = 0.003) higher excess 
returns than the market benchmark, respectively. The hypothetical strategy of a long position in 
the high selectivity fund portfolio and a short position in the low selectivity fund portfolio, 
rightmost “High-Low,” yields 1.10% (P = 0.087) extra return than the market benchmark for the 
entire sample. However, during low sentiment periods, as shown in Panel B, the fund portfolio 
with the highest selectivity and the best past performance cannot beat the market benchmark 
significantly (1.93%, P = 0.247). In addition, the hypothetical strategy fails to significantly 
outperform the market on average (0.64%, P = 0.167).
19
 Taken together, these results provide 
supplemental evidence indicating that skilled managers produce higher fund alphas during high 
sentiment periods, and this relationship is not biased by the volatility anomaly.   
Alternative Sentiment Measures 
We also ran robustness tests using two alternative sentiment measures: credit market 
sentiment and the Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) sentiment 
index. Following Lopez-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajsek (2016), we estimated the credit investor 
sentiment using the two-step econometric methodology. First, we calculate the spread between 
yields on seasoned long-term Baa-rated industrial bonds and yields on 10-year Treasury 
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securities for each month. Next, we regress the change in the spread based on the past 24 
months’ spreads, and the expected spread change is used as the credit investor sentiment index. 
The 24-month estimation period moves one month each time. The FEARS index, as introduced 
by Da et al. (2015), is an index based on the internet search behavior of households. To use this 
index in our analysis, we converted the data into monthly observations by taking the average of 
the daily data in order to match our data. Unreported results based on these two sentiment 




In this paper, unlike most of the previous literature that has focused on the question of 
whether fund managers improve fund performance, we examine whether skilled mutual fund 
managers deliver greater value (alpha) during high sentiment periods when security markets are 
crowded by noise traders (signals). Our results can be construed as providing general support for 
the hypothesis that skilled fund managers generate persistent excess risk-adjusted returns 
especially during high sentiment periods when asset prices are noisier and information is costlier.  
Using a large sample of U.S. domestic active-managed equity mutual funds, we 
empirically examine this conjecture and find that managers endowed with high fund 
management skills realize superior fund performance during high investor sentiment periods. 
Specifically, our result show that fund managers with the highest skill create $7.71 million of 
added value during high sentiment periods which exceeds the average realized fund gains ($3.74 
million), while they incur a small value loss of $0.18 million in low sentiment periods. However, 
fund managers with the lowest skill experience a values loss of $5.64 million during high 
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sentiment periods which is far lower than the average realized fund gains ($3.74 million), while 
they incur a substantial value loss of $30.32 million in low sentiment periods. 
We also find that only a small subset (around 2%, under the 5% significance level) of all 
fund managers has superior management skills that generate persistent excess risk-adjusted 
returns. Our findings are robust to sentiment beta effect, stock market dispersion, state of 
macroeconomic environment, alternative sentiment measures (i.e., credit market sentiment and 
the FEARS sentiment index) and the effect of the volatility anomaly.  Overall, our findings 
conclusively suggest that skilled fund managers create more value during high than low 
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Data Collection Process Comparison 
 
 
Reibnitz (2013) Amihud and Goyenko (2013) This Paper 
Sample Period 42 years (1972-2013) 21 years (1990-2010) 25 years (1990-2014) 
Database 
CRSP  Survivor-Bias-Free  
Mutual  Fund  Database 
CRSP  Survivor-Bias-Free  
Mutual  Fund  Database 
Bloomberg Fund Database 
Estimation Period 24-36 Months 24 Months 24 Months 
Criteria to choose US 
Equity Mutual funds 
1. Using Wiesenberger 
objective codes, Strategic 
Insight Objective, Lipper 
Objective, and Lipper Asset 
and Classification Codes to 
eliminate balanced, bond, 
index, and international and 
sector funds.  
 
2. Removing funds whose 
names indicate that they are 
not active domestic equity 
funds, for example those 
with names that contain 
“Index,” “S&P 500,” 
“Global,” or “Fixed-
Income.”                                                                                    
 
3. 70% of the fund portfolio 
in common stocks on 
average over the sample 
period. 
1. Using Wiesenberger 
objective codes, Strategic 
Insight Objective, Lipper 
Objective, and Lipper Asset and 
Classification Codes to 
eliminate balanced, bond, 
index, and international and 
sector funds.  
 
2. Eliminating index funds by 
deleting those whose name 
includes the word “index” or 
the abbreviation “ind”, “S&P”, 
“DOW”, “Wilshire”, and/or 
“Russell”.  
 
3. Eliminating balanced funds, 
international funds (either by 
their stated style or by their 
name), sector funds, and funds 
that hold less than 70% in 
common stocks. 
1. All status (dead and alive)   
 
2. Geographical focus: United 
States  
 
3. Asset class focus: Equity 
 
4. Country of Domicile: United 
States   
 
5. Inception Date: before 
12/31/2012      
 
6. Fund Type: Open end mutual 
fund      
 
7. Description does not contain 
any of the partial words “index, 
ind, S&P, DOW, Wilshire, 
Russell, global, fixed-income, 
international, sector, balanced". 
TNA limitation 
Monthly TNA is more than 
15 million in December 
2013 dollars.  
TNA is more than 15 million. 
Monthly TNA is more than 15 
million in December 2013 
dollars. 
Outliers 












Total Funds Number 3,048 2,460 2,190 
Fund-month 
Observations 




Mean 0.913 0.910 0.883 
Median 0.930 0.929 0.922 
Min 0.181 0.529 0.219 







Vanguard Index funds 
This table shows the list of Vanguard Index funds used to calculate the alternative market benchmark, which is the 
alternative investment opportunity set. The tickers and inception date are also included. The data for each index fund 
are collected from Bloomberg database ranging from December 2000 to December 2014 when all of 11 index funds’ 
data are available. 
 
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date 
S&P 500 Index VFINX 08/31/1976 
Extended Market Index VEXMX 12/21/1987 
Small-Cap Index NAESX 01/01/1990 
European Stock Index VEURX 06/18/1990 
Pacific Stock Index VPACX 06/18/1990 
Value Index VVIAX 11/02/1992 
Balanced Index VBINX 11/02/1992 
Emerging Markets Stock Index VEIEX 05/04/1994 
Mid-Cap Index VISMX 05/21/1998 
Small-Cap Growth Index VISGX 05/21/1998 
Small-Cap Value Index VISVX 05/21/1998 













Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Lagged R
2
 and Fund Alpha, in High and Low Market 
Sentiment Periods Using UM Index 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in high and low market sentiment periods 
based on the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index (UM sentiment index). If the UM sentiment index 
for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly UM sentiment index numbers, we 
define this month as high (low) market sentiment month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month 
into quintiles by lagged R
2
 and then by fund alpha. Both are obtained for the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-
1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. Then, for 
the following month (t), we calculate the average monthly excess returns for each fund portfolio. The process 
repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. Last we regress the test period average 
portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each portfolio cell, we present portfolio alpha, which is the intercept from 
the above regression, and the P-value. The sample period of the test months is from January 1990 to December 2014 
(300 months). Panel A shows the results of high market sentiment group and Panel B shows the results of low 
market sentiment group. For each portfolio, we present the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns and 
the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: High market sentiment periods 
    
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -2.05*** -4.14*** -2.54* -2.85* -2.69 -2.86*** -0.38 
 
(0.010) (<.001) (0.052) (0.053) (0.151) (0.005) (0.699) 
2 -2.01*** -0.67 -1.38 -0.67 0.69 -0.81 1.31** 
 
(0.003) (0.436) (0.151) (0.564) (0.585) (0.291) (0.041) 
3 -0.45 -1.29* -1.67* -0.60 0.93 -0.62 0.47 
 
(0.478) (0.060) (0.058) (0.526) (0.383) (0.307) (0.462) 
4 -0.06 -1.48 -0.31 0.46 3.35*** 0.40 1.70** 
 
(0.943) (0.280) (0.708) (0.712) (0.008) (0.583) (0.022) 
High -1.24 -1.15 0.22 4.14*** 5.80*** 1.56 3.48*** 
 
(0.340) (0.476) (0.866) (0.009) (0.004) (0.162) (0.004) 
All -1.16* -1.76** -1.15 0.07 1.58 -0.49 1.30** 
 
(0.060) (0.025) (0.136) (0.943) (0.130) (0.451) (0.030) 
High-Low 0.47 1.51* 1.46* 3.42*** 4.27*** 2.23*** 
 
 
(0.469) (0.072) (0.077) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
Panel B: Low market sentiment periods 
    
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.24** -0.53 -1.92** -2.12** -2.12 -1.58** -0.46 
 
(0.023) (0.457) (0.015) (0.013) (0.262) (0.028) (0.614) 
2 -0.85* -1.46*** -1.28** -1.03 -0.77 -1.08* 0.02 
 
(0.055) (0.004) (0.032) (0.219) (0.548) (0.070) (0.967) 
3 -1.16*** -0.25 -1.35** -1.12 -0.27 -0.82 0.41 
 
(0.009) (0.634) (0.035) (0.154) (0.825) (0.117) (0.498) 
4 -2.03*** -1.02* -0.25 -1.45* -1.20 -1.19** 0.36 
 
(<.001) (0.081) (0.707) (0.062) (0.355) (0.025) (0.602) 
High -1.14 -0.15 -0.77 0.07 0.23 -0.35 0.73 
 
(0.117) (0.860) (0.390) (0.953) (0.897) (0.650) (0.429) 
All -1.29*** -0.68 -1.10** -1.13* -0.79 -1.00** 0.23 
 
(0.001) (0.122) (0.030) (0.081) (0.436) (0.041) (0.644) 
High-Low 0.08 0.23 0.61 1.14* 1.21 0.65 
 
 








Portfolio BvanB Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on BvanB Skill and Lagged Fund Alpha, in High 
and Low Market Sentiment Periods Using UM Index 
This table presents the portfolio BvanB fund alpha, annualized, using monthly returns (145 months), from 
December 2002 to December 2014 (Panel A), high sentiment (Panel B), and low sentiment (Panel C) periods, based 
on the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index (UM sentiment index). If the UM sentiment index for the 
test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly UM sentiment index numbers, we define this 
month as high (low) market sentiment month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles 
by BvanB fund skill (Eq. 3) and then by BvanB fund alphat-1, and both are described in detail in section III.B.2. For 
each portfolio cell, we present portfolio BvanB fund alpha, which is the portfolio alpha times the average TNA of 
funds within the portfolio at the beginning of current month (t), and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio BvanB alpha based on alternative investment opportunity 
 
BvanB fund skill 
Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -29.64*** -11.21*** -8.13*** -8.32*** -23.35*** -16.13*** 3.15 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.211) 
4 -11.07*** -4.61*** -3.05*** -2.09 -3.86 -4.94*** 3.60* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.092) (0.166) (0.002) (0.064) 
3 -4.17 -1.87 -0.44 0.28 1.83 -0.87 3.00 
 
(0.137) (0.166) (0.689) (0.817) (0.511) (0.555) (0.117) 
2 0.01 0.84 1.79 2.95** 8.76*** 2.87* 4.38** 
 
(0.998) (0.550) (0.115) (0.023) (0.001) (0.064) (0.026) 
High 18.16*** 6.79*** 7.32*** 9.02*** 30.39*** 14.34*** 6.11** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.015) 
All -7.58** -2.01 -0.50 0.37 2.76 -0.95 5.17** 
 
(0.027) (0.159) (0.668) (0.775) (0.337) (0.548) (0.018) 
High-Low 23.90*** 9.00*** 7.72*** 8.67*** 26.87*** 15.23*** 
 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
 Panel B: Portfolio BvanB alpha in high market sentiment 
  Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -23.81*** -7.87*** -5.51*** -5.93*** -23.37*** -13.30*** 0.22 
 
(<.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (<.001) (<.001) (0.955) 
4 -4.55 -1.45 -0.49 0.55 -1.43 -1.47 1.56 
 
(0.293) (0.511) (0.789) (0.780) (0.755) (0.549) (0.586) 
3 3.80 1.82 2.65 3.27 7.18 3.74 1.69 
 
(0.375) (0.403) (0.149) (0.114) (0.103) (0.131) (0.530) 
2 9.43** 5.24** 5.48*** 6.59*** 12.96*** 7.94*** 1.77 
 
(0.040) (0.028) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.521) 
High 30.95*** 12.64*** 12.61*** 13.69*** 35.95*** 21.17*** 2.50 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.494) 
All 1.59 2.07 2.95 3.64* 6.26 3.62 2.34 
 
(0.758) (0.364) (0.127) (0.091) (0.180) (0.166) (0.462) 
High-Low 27.38*** 10.25*** 9.06*** 9.81*** 29.66*** 17.23*** 
 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
 Panel C: Portfolio BvanB alpha in low market sentiment 
  Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -35.40*** -14.49*** -10.71*** -10.68*** -23.33*** -18.92*** 6.04* 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.062) 
4 -17.50*** -7.73*** -5.58*** -4.70*** -6.26* -8.35*** 5.62** 
 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.002) (0.051) (<.001) (0.035) 
3 -12.02*** -5.51*** -3.49*** -2.66** -3.44 -5.43*** 4.29 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.040) (0.315) (0.001) (0.118) 
2 -9.28** -3.49** -1.86* -0.64 4.62 -2.13 6.95** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.089) (0.603) (0.138) (0.162) (0.013) 
High 5.56 1.03 2.09* 4.41*** 24.90*** 7.60*** 9.67*** 
 
(0.192) (0.487) (0.082) (0.003) (<.001) (<.001) (0.005) 
All -16.63*** -6.04*** -3.91*** -2.85** -0.70 -5.45*** 7.96*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.043) (0.836) (0.002) (0.009) 
High-Low 20.48*** 7.76*** 6.40*** 7.55*** 24.12*** 13.26*** 
 
 







The Effect of Fund Selectivity, Skill Ratio, and Investor Sentiment on Fund Performance, 
Controlling for Macroeconomic Conditions 
This table reports the results of regressing fund performance (fund alpha based on FFC model or fund BvanB alpha) 
on manager’s skill (selectivity or BvanB skill ratio) and investor sentiment, controlling for other characteristics. The 
main independent variables are fund selectivity (1-R
2
t-1), market sentiment (BW sentiment index, available at Jeffrey 
Wurgler’s website) and selectivity*sentiment, which is the product of selectivity and market sentiment. We use four 
macroeconomic variables to control economic conditions: aggregate dividend yield, which is the total cash 
dividends on the value-weighted CRSP index over prior 12 months divided by the current level of the index; default 
spread, which is the difference between Moody’s BAA-rated bonds yield and AAA-rated bonds yield; term spread, 
which is the different between ten-year treasury bonds yield and three-month T-bills yield; and the yield on the 
three-month T-bill. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, log 
value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. The P-value and adjusted R2 for each regression are 
also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 
Fund alpha (FFC model) 
  
Fund BvanB alpha 
Intercept -0.794*** -0.844*** 
 





Selectivity 0.410*** 0.414*** 
 





Sentiment -0.242*** -0.260*** 
 





Selectivity*Sentiment 0.278*** 0.286*** 
 














   
(<.0001) 
Aggregate Dividend Yield -8.026*** -6.060*** 
 





default Spread 0.275*** 0.218*** 
 





Term Spread -0.015* -0.023*** 
 





Three Month T-bill 0.047*** 0.040*** 
 





Alphat-1 0.320*** 0.322***  





Turnover -0.071*** -0.069*** 
 





Expense Ratio 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 





log(TNA) -0.001 -0.001 
 
















Log(age) -0.029** -0.030*** 
 

















DOES CORPORATE MANAGERIAL ABILITY MATTER TO FUND MANAGERS? 
ABSTRACT 
           In this paper, we examine whether skilled fund managers’ value creation is linked with the 
performance of high managerial ability stocks—that is, the stocks of firms run by skilled chief 
executive officers (CEOs)—using the latter as their stock identification strategy. We find that the 
performance of the stocks of firms managed by skilled CEOs has strong explanatory power in 
the performance of actively managed mutual funds headed by highly skilled fund managers. The 
evidence shows that the excess value added generated by mutual fund managers is $3.47 million 
per year with exposure to high CEO managerial ability stocks, whereas the average performance 
of all mutual funds is -$1.94 million. 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies using fund holdings’ deviation from the benchmark portfolio to measure 
mutual fund managers’ management skill show that fund management skill has a positive 
relation with fund performance (Brands, Brown, and Gallagher, 2005; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng, 2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks, 2015). 
Furthermore, empirical studies report that skilled fund managers add value by selecting valuable 
stocks (Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997; Zheng, 
1999) and that their talent in identifying high-performance stocks is due to their superior insight 
and analytical ability. Amihud and Goyenko (2013), using 1 - R
2
 to measure fund selectivity 
without paying attention to the composition of fund portfolios, find that funds tracing less the 
market benchmark (i.e., skilled fund managers) are associated with higher risk-adjusted excess 





long-held view that risk-adjusted returns (net or gross alpha) are an appropriate measure of 
mutual fund management skill, propose the dollar value of a fund’s added value over its 
benchmark as the measure of skill and find that the average mutual fund adds value by extracting 
about $3.2 million US Dollars a year from financial markets. They also find skilled fund 
managers’ superior performance to persist for 10 years.21 
While most previous studies focus on whether skilled fund managers improve fund 
performance or how to estimate fund managerial skill, the important question of how skilled 
fund managers detect valuable stocks remains largely unexplored. As mentioned by Wermers, 
Yao, and Zhao (2012), the majority of active mutual fund managers claim that they select 
valuable stocks using private information generated from stocks’ fundamental information. 
Employing the “generalized inverse alpha” (GIA) approach, the authors conclude that the private 
information used by active fund managers in the stock selection process is distinct from stock 
fundamental information, which is contained in publicly available quantitative signals. 
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) show that skilled fund managers use more private information than 
public information to change portfolio allocation, implying that fund managers’ superior 
analytical ability helps them to recognize and process idiosyncratic information efficiently, 
which, in turn, leads them to identify the most valuable stocks. Therefore, previous research 
argues that the superior performance of skilled mutual fund managers is rooted in private 
information, but only a few studies try to characterize the private information used by fund 
managers. For instance, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) claim that the private information may be about 
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 As BvanB argue, due to the scale effect, a fund’s ability to outperform the benchmark (net or gross alpha) 
declines as the size of the fund increases and, therefore, the manager’s selectivity skill should be adjusted by fund 
size. Net alpha, the authors argue, is determined in equilibrium by competition between investors and not by 





valuation and performance prediction for specific industries and find that fund managers have 
better performance if they are more familiar with and focus on specific industries.  
Motivated by the growing body of literature and the business world that managers matter 
for firm behavior and economic performance (i.e., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Kaplan, Klebanov, 
and Sorensen, 2012; Demerjian, Lev, and McVay, 2012), in this paper, we explore whether the 
superior fund performance delivered by skilled fund managers is associated with the 
performance of stocks from companies run by chief executive officers (CEOs) with high 
managerial ability. If, in fact, CEO skill matters and its importance varies across fund managers, 
it can help to explain variation in fund performance. Intuitively, we want to quantify how much 
of the observed variation in fund performance can be attributed to fund managers’ stock selection 
based on CEO managerial ability.
22
 
We add to this literature by testing the proposition that skilled fund managers’ value 
creation is related to the performance of high managerial ability stocks (i.e., stocks from firms 
run by skilled CEOs), using the latter as their stock identification strategy. To the extent that a 
company’s stock valuation ultimately reflects the quality of its managers through their large 
contributions to corporate profits, the question of whether fund manager performance is 
associated with the performance of stocks from companies led by adept corporate managers 
remains unexplored. Accordingly, if stocks are highly likely to represent firms run by more 
efficient (skilled) corporate managers than others, fund managers using corporate managerial 
ability as a stock selection identification strategy should significantly contribute to a fund’s 
superior performance. However, whether the source of mutual fund managers’ superior stock 
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 Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) indirectly support this argument by showing that, if fund managers have more 
information about corporate board members through shared education networks, they will place larger bets on those 





picking ability is rooted in the stocks of firms run by CEOs with high managerial talent has not 
been the focus of the empirical finance literature until now. In this paper, we add to this literature 
by examining whether the value (fund performance improvement) created by skilled fund 
managers can be explained by the performance of high managerial ability stocks. That is, we 
explore whether CEO managerial skill, as an identification strategy, plays an important role in 
explaining skilled mutual fund performance by analyzing the connection between mutual fund 
managers’ stock selectivity skill and CEO managerial ability through the relation between the 
performance of skilled mutual funds and high managerial ability stocks. 
There are three reasons to suggest that CEO managerial ability should be an important 
factor for fund managers’ consideration in their stock picking decisions. First, the financial 
literature documents that corporate managerial ability plays an important role in a firm’s future 
performance. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) link the loss of an adept manager to abnormal negative 
returns. Holcomb et al. (2009), show that managerial ability can serve as the basis of value 
creation and superior firm performance. Chang et al. (2010) report that higher-ability CEOs 
receive higher compensation and that differences in CEO ability account for differences in firm 
value and performance. Using a manager–firm matched panel data, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
find that managerial ability, measured by manager fixed effects, shapes a large range of 
corporate decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions or research and development (R&D) 
investments.
23
 Consequently, low-ability corporate managers may lead firms to adopt suboptimal 
strategies, hurting firm performance. Consistent with this view, Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 
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 Prior literature (i.e., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Gow, Kaplan, Larcker, and Zakolyukina, 2015) has explored 
heterogeneity across corporate managers, such as differences in managerial ability, personality traits, management 
styles, education, or work experience, to explain differences in corporate policies and value across firms without a 
narrow focus on specific executive characteristics. A different stream of research has concentrated on executive 
characteristics such as risk aversion, time preferences, optimism, and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 





(2012) find a strong relationship between changes in managerial ability, measured by managers’ 
efficiency in generating revenues, and changes in a firm’s subsequent performance.24 In the same 
vein, Andreou, Ehrlich, Karasamani, and Louca (2015) report that firms with high managerial 
ability had better performance even during the 2008 global financial crisis. These findings 
suggest that the stocks of firms under the helm of CEOs with high managerial ability are 
expected to have better performance than their counterparts managed by low-skilled CEOs 
because the former run corporate organizations more efficiently and direct capital resources to 
projects with favorable growth opportunities. Therefore, such stocks should attract the attention 
of skilled mutual fund managers if corporate managers’ ability is viewed as a sign of efficiently 
run corporations, signaling favorable future stock price increases.  
The second reason why CEO managerial ability matters as an investment identification 
strategy to skilled mutual fund managers is that skilled CEOs can limit firm total risk. For 
example, Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2016) document that companies with CEOs possessing 
higher managerial ability have lower credit risk, because of the lower likelihood that they will 
miss principal or interest payments. In addition, Trueman (1986) points out that CEOs with 
higher managerial ability are more likely to issue earnings forecasts to keep the market aware of 
changes in the firm’s economic environment, which, in turn, lowers stock price volatility. Baik, 
Farber, and Lee (2011) provide empirical evidence in support of Trueman’s argument and show 
that the frequency of earnings forecasts increases when the firm’s CEO has greater managerial 
ability. Third, firms with strong CEO managerial abilities are subject to less information 
asymmetry (Andreou et al., 2015; Baik, Farber, and Lee, 2011), which increases the accuracy of 
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 Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) show that their managerial ability measure is strongly associated with 
manager fixed effects and that stock price reactions to CEO turnover are positive (negative) when they assess the 
outgoing CEO as being of low (high) ability. The authors also report that replacing CEOs with CEOs with more 





mutual fund managers’ stock valuations. Since more firm-specific information is released to the 
equity market by CEOs with high managerial ability, mutual fund managers’ research efforts are 
expected to be less costly and their stock picking choices are more likely to be rewarded with 
higher excess returns when they invest in the stocks of such firms. The above arguments lead to 
the hypothesis that CEO managerial skill is likely to act as an important factor in skilled fund 
managers’ portfolio allocation, resulting in superior fund performance.25 Surprisingly, this 
question has not been the focus of empirical investigation and the aim of this study is to address 
this issue. 
To address this question, we first examine whether heterogeneity across stock valuations 
is associated with differences in managerial ability, using the managerial ability score (MA-
Score) data proposed by Demerjian et al. (2012). This MA-Score estimates corporate managerial 
ability based on how efficiently superior managers, especially CEOs, can transform corporate 
resources into revenue relative to their industry peers. In their research, Demerjian et al. first use 
data envelopment analysis to estimate firm efficiency and then remove any firm-specific 
characteristics that are expected to assist or hamper the management’s efforts to obtain an 
accurate managerial efficiency measure. The unexplained portion of firm efficiency is attributed 
to managerial ability. In the context of this study, the MA-Score is employed as a proxy for 
corporate managerial ability to assess its predictive power on firm performance (i.e., stock alpha) 
using portfolio analysis. Consistent with the evidence of Demerjian et al., we find firms with 
higher managerial ability, as measured by the company’s MA-Score one year prior, have better 
performance than their peers. Specifically, the stocks of companies with the highest managerial 
ability generate a 4.74% abnormal return every year (P = 0.017), which exceeds the average 
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The literature on managerial compensation dynamics (i.e., Lucas, 1978) argues that managerial ability 
(competitive advantage) is rewarded with higher compensation because it enables shareholders to earn positive 





managerial ability performance (1.57%, P = 0.077), whereas the stocks of companies with the 
lowest managerial ability experience a negative 5.00% abnormal return every year (P = 0.042), 
which is far lower than the average. Therefore, given this evidence, if managerial ability is used 
by skilled fund managers as a stock selection strategy, fund performance should be positively 
and significantly related to the stock performance of high managerial ability firms. 
Next, we estimate fund manager skill and fund performance by employing two different 
measures over the 1990–2014 sample period. First, fund management selectivity skill is assessed 
by employing the method of Amihud and Goyenko (2013). Then, we estimate fund manager skill 
and fund performance using the measures of management skill (i.e., skill ratio) and performance 
(i.e., the value extracted by a fund from capital markets) of BvanB. The evidence based on both 
measures consistently shows that fund managers with the highest skill create $3.74 million of 
value added, which exceeds the average realized fund loss of $1.97 million, while fund managers 
with the lowest skill experience a value loss of $18.06 million every year. To determine whether 
the performance of mutual funds managed by skilled fund managers is linked with the stocks of 
firms run by managers of high managerial ability, we sort all sampled firms into high managerial 
ability firms (top 50%, top 33%, or top 20%) and low managerial ability (bottom 50%, bottom 
33%, or bottom 20%) firms based on their previous year’s managerial ability score. If skilled 
mutual fund managers do have stock picking skills by detecting firms of high managerial ability 
and investing in such firms, their fund performance should be positively and significantly 
correlated with the performance of high managerial ability firms. 
To examine the relationship between highly skilled mutual fund performance and the 
performance of high managerial ability stocks, we sort all mutual funds into quintiles based on 





performance for each mutual fund is measured by the abnormal return, which is the difference 
between the real return and the expected return of the test month, with a 24-month moving 
estimation window. This procedure enables us to inspect the merit of our hypothesis without 
requiring knowledge of the fund’s portfolio holdings. The results of these tests support the 
hypothesis that skilled fund managers’ performance is positively and significantly associated 
with the performance of firms run by managers possessing high managerial skill, suggesting that 
fund managers’ superior stock picking ability is linked with investments in high managerial 
ability stocks. Conversely, the alphas of skilled mutual funds are insignificantly related with the 
average performance of low CEO managerial ability firms, implying that the superior 
performance of skilled fund managers comes from investing in high CEO ability stocks, since 
low CEO ability stocks fail to improve fund performance. Furthermore, we find a significant 
negative relation between skilled funds’ BvanB alphas and the stock performance of firms led by 
CEOs with low managerial ability. These results provide additional support for the view that 
skilled fund managers’ superior fund performance comes through investing in firms headed by 
CEOs with superior managerial ability. 
Next, we apply an analysis using the composition of each fund to confirm whether funds 
with highly skilled fund managers are loaded with a higher proportion of high–MA-Score stocks. 
By calculating the value-weighted MA-Score for each fund, we find that the highest-skilled fund 
quintile is linked with the highest average fund level MA-Score value. This provides additional 
evidence that skilled fund managers’ stock holdings are associated with high managerial ability 
stocks.  
In addition, to test the persistence of the relationship between corporate managerial 





based on the average MA-Score of the past two years instead of the previous year. The results of 
this test demonstrate consistently that the superior performance of skilled mutual fund managers 
is closely linked with the performance of high managerial ability stocks, revealing that this link 
is not a short-lived phenomenon. 
Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2015) show that investors update their expectations about the 
future outcomes of firms dynamically when there is uncertainty about the managerial ability of 
top corporate managers. Along this argument, skilled mutual fund managers are expected to 
respond to corporate managerial skill changes and improve fund performance in anticipation of 
investors’ revised expectations about managerial skill. We investigate this hypothesis by sorting 
firms in our sample into two groups based on each firm’s MA-Score change in the previous year. 
Then, we estimate the average performance of the firms in each group and examine their relation 
with the performance of mutual funds run by skilled managers. The results ascertain that skilled 
mutual fund managers can accurately assess CEO managerial ability ahead of their peers and 
other investors generating superior fund performance. Furthermore, this finding confirms that 
CEO managerial ability is an essential source of value creation by fund managers possessing 
superior stock picking ability. 
Kacperczyk, van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014, 2016) argue that mutual fund 
managers successfully pick stocks in economic expansions and time the market in recessions. 
Accordingly, one would expect CEO managerial ability to be more precious for skilled fund 
managers during economic expansions, since CEO managerial ability information is mainly used 
during fund managers’ stock selection process. The evidence supports this hypothesis by 





the performance of mutual funds run by skilled managers during economic expansions than in 
recessions. 
In the next two robustness checks, we examine whether the indispensable role of CEO 
managerial ability assessment in fund managers’ stock selection skill is concentrated in picking 
stocks from specific industries or is based on certain fund trading strategies. Even though the 
results based on the selectivity measure show that fund performance is more pronounced in 
mutual funds adopting the Value strategy and only appears when the underlying stocks are from 
certain industries (i.e., mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, communications, 
electric, gas, and sanitary services), the results based on the BvanB skill measure indicate that the 
corporate managerial ability-based stock picking strategy of skilled fund managers produces 
superior abnormal returns in all types (Value, Growth, and Blend) of mutual funds and across 
industries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and the 
empirical methodology. Section 2 discusses the results. Section 3 presents the results from 
robustness tests. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Data and sample selection 
The data cover actively managed US mutual funds and US public traded companies. The 
mutual fund data are obtained from the Bloomberg Fund Dataset, which is widely used in the 
finance industry but has not been used in academic studies. Hence, this dataset does not suffer 
from the standard sample bias. The data sample period covers 25 years, from 1990 to 2014. To 





data for the previous two years (24 months). Therefore, our data collection starts in January 
1988. We collect monthly raw returns for each fund if the fund has complete data for more than 
two years. We also collect fund-level control variables that could be associated with fund 
performance: turnover, which is the minimum of the aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of 
securities divided by each fund’s total net assets (TNA), age, and expense ratio (i.e., the fund’s 
annual expense ratio). We control for survivorship bias by collecting data for both alive and dead 
funds. We also use several criteria to restrict our sample to actively managed US equity mutual 
funds: 1) The geographical focus is the United States, 2) the country of domicile is the United 
States, 3) the asset class is equity, 4) the fund type is an open-ended mutual fund, and 5) the 
inception date is no later than December 2012. Furthermore, we exclude other types of funds, 
such as index funds, balance funds, international funds, and sector funds, by deleting funds 
whose name contains the term index, ind, S&P, DOW, Wilshire, Russell, global, fixed-income, 
international, sector, or balanced. In addition, we require funds to have a minimum TNA of 
$15 million (in December 2013 dollars). Overall, the sample contains 2,190 mutual funds over 
the period from 1990 to 2014.
26
  
To collect company data, we first match the list of companies having managerial ability 
score data with the list of companies, both alive and dead, listed in the NASDAQ, New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stock exchanges. The 
managerial ability score data, introduced by Demerjian et al. (2012), are from Sarah McVay’s 
UW faculty website.
27
 Finally, our sample consists of 2,469 companies and covers the period 
from 1989 to 2013. Other firm-level annual variables, such as a firm’s total debt-to-total equity 
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 The top and bottom 1% of R
2
 observations were deleted. The reason for their exclusion is that funds with the 
highest R
2
 should be index funds, which have not been filtered out by the sample selection criteria. The lowest R
2
 
values of funds may be due to estimation error. 
27





ratio (D/E), return on equity (ROE), market-to-book ratio (M/B), and market capitalization, are 
obtained from the Bloomberg database for all the companies in the sample.
28
 The summary 
statistics for the annual data of mutual funds and companies are reported in Table 1. 
TABLE 2.1 
Summary statistics  
This table shows the summary statistics of US actively managed equity mutual funds and US public-traded 
companies with CEO managerial ability scores (MA-Scores). Panel A gives the statistics for mutual funds. R
2
t-1 is 
calculated by regressing each fund’s excess return (fund monthly raw return minuses risk free rate of that month) on 
the multifactor model of Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) (FFC model) over a time window of 24 months. 
The risk factors are accessible online through the Kenneth French data library. Expense ratio is the annual expense 
ratio of each fund. TNA is each fund’s total net assets in millions. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales or 
aggregated purchases of securities divided by the total net assets of the fund. Our sample contains 2,190 actively-
managed equity mutual funds over the period from January 1990 to December 2014. Panel B shows the summary 
statistics of US public-traded companies with CEO managerial ability scores. The companies are collected by 
matching companies having managerial ability data with companies listed in NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX stock 
exchanges. The managerial ability score data are introduced by Demerjian and McVay (2012) and are public 
available online. Finally we have 2,469 companies in our sample and the time period is from 1990 to 2014. Debt to 
equity ratio is the ratio of total debt to the total equity hold by the company in each year. Market to book ratio is the 
ratio of the company’s market capitalization to its accounting value for each year. ROE is the return on equity of the 
company. Size is captured using the company’s total market capitalization. 
 
Panel A: Mutual fund summary statistics 
Variable Mean 25% Median 75% 
Age (Year) 12.83 7.00 11.00 17.00 
Expense Ratio (%) 1.18 0.92 1.15 1.35 
R
2
t-1 0.88 0.85 0.92 0.95 
TNA (Million $) 1,105.42 57.93 190.06 782.90 
Turnover 67.94 27.00 48.92 83.00 
Panel B: Company summary statistics 
Variable Mean 25% Median 75% 
Firm MA-Score 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.08 
Debt to Equity Ratio (%) 64.48 2.66 30.44 72.36 
Excess Return (%) 15.77 -18.35 7.13 35.72 
Market to Book Ratio (%) 3.28 1.32 2.14 3.58 
ROE (%) 4.81 1.28 10.89 18.61 
Size (Million $) 5,340.08 135.04 589.81 2,323.17 
 
As shown in Table 1, the R
2
 estimates for mutual funds have a mean value of 0.88 and a 
median value of 0.92. This reveals a clear negatively skewed distribution, which indicates that 
more than 80% of the funds’ excess return variance can be explained by the variance of market 
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indexes. On the other hand, the MA-Score values show an average of 0.01, with a median 
number of 0.00. 
Methodology 
In this section, we describe in detail the corporate managerial ability, mutual fund 
performance, and fund manager’s skill measures used in our analysis. 
Corporate managerial ability measure 
The CEO managerial ability measure is the MA-Score measure introduced by Demerjian 
et al. (2012), which is defined as management’s efficiency, relative to its industry peers, in 
transforming corporate resources into firm revenue. Compared with previous CEO skill 
measures, such as the manager’s fixed effects skill measure, the MA-Score measure is more 
precise and easier to implement. 
Specifically, Demerjian et al., (2012) use a two-step process to measure a firm’s 
managerial ability score. First, they employ data envelopment analysis to optimize firm 
performance across different inputs and outputs and then they compare each firm to the most 
efficient outcome. They then distinguish managerial performance from firm performance by 
regressing the total firm efficiency score on the firm’s size, market share, cash availability, life 
cycle, operational complexity, and foreign operations and collect the residual from this 
estimation as the measure of managerial ability. This measure is highly correlated with previous 
management skill measurements, such as managers’ fixed effects and historical stock returns. 
Demerjian et al. also conduct tests to establish the validity of this managerial ability measure and 
find that abnormal stock returns around the time of a CEO turnover announcement are negatively 





shown to be positivity associated with the firm’s future stock return and profitability. These 
results suggest that the MA-Score managerial ability measure can be used as a reliable proxy to 
gauge CEO managerial skill in the context of our study. 
Furthermore, we take another step to verify whether the MA-Score measure is an 
appropriate CEO managerial skill measure by using a firm’s MA-score in the previous year to 
predict the stock’s mispricing level during the current year.29 With firm-level controls, along 
with year and industry fixed controls, we find that the MA-score has significantly negative 
predictive power in the mispricing level of the firm’s stock. Hence, our evidence demonstrates 
that the CEO skilled-based stock-picking identification strategy of fund managers is equivalent 
to identifying and investing in stocks subject to low mispricing, since mispricing will introduce 
greater volatility to stock performance and skilled CEOs can protect the stocks from 
unpredictable price changes caused by market anomalies for the interests of their stockholders. 
Fund selectivity and performance measures 
To examine whether a positive relationship between skilled fund managers’ performance 
and the performance of firms run by skilled CEOs exists, we first assess fund manager skill by 
employing the method of Amihud and Goyenko (2013). In their research, Amihud and Goyenko 
calculate fund manager skill, which they refer to as selectivity, using a fund’s R2 obtained by 
regressing fund returns on multifactor benchmark models. The benchmark multifactor model 
used in this study is that proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) and is denoted 
the FFC model, which contains market excess returns (RM - Rf), small minus big size stocks 
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 The mispricing data are introduced by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) and can be collected from Robert F. 
Stambaugh’s website, at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaug/. The firm-level control variables contain the 
industry-adjusted return on assets, monthly stock return, number of total analysts following, M/B, monthly stock 






(SMB), high minus low book-to-market ratio stocks (HML), and winner minus loser stocks 
(MOM), and all the data are accessible online through Kenneth French’s data library. Amihud 
and Goyenko argue that a low level of co-movement with the benchmark model (i.e., the FFC 
model), which is reflected by a low R
2
, shows high fund management skill because highly skilled 
fund managers manage funds based on private information, which makes the fund less sensitive 
to public information variations. Selectivity, as for Amihud and Goyenko, is measured as 
                  
     
              
  
     
                       
                           (1) 
where RMSE
2
 is the variance of the error term from the regression, which denotes the 
idiosyncratic risk of a fund; Total Variance is the overall variance of a fund’s excess return; and 
Systematic Risk
2
 is the return variance that is due to the benchmark indexes’ risk. As shown in 
Eq. (1), fund selectivity will be higher when the fund’s strategy is based less on market 
information, which is reflected in systematic risk. The advantage of this method is that it does 
not require knowledge of fund holdings or the benchmark index that the fund is using. However, 
as shown in Table 1, the distribution of R
2
 is negatively skewed, which means that the 
distribution of selectivity should be heavily positively skewed. Therefore, we used the logistic 
transformation of selectivity, TSelectivity, as shown in Eq. (2), as the first fund manager skill 
measure: 
                 
           
             
                                             (2) 
We use the average fund abnormal return before fees, the fund gross alpha, to measure 
fund performance. The reason for using the fund gross alpha rather than the net alpha is that, as 





alpha will vanish due to the competition among investors. In that case, gross alpha is a more 
appropriate way to measure fund manager performance. 
BvanB fund skill and performance measures 
Besides the selectivity measure of Amihud and Goyenko (2013), fund manager skill is 
also estimated using the method of BvanB, who deduce fund manager skill based on the extra 
value added to the fund divided by its standard error (the BvanB measure). Compared with the 
selectivity measure, the BvanB measure is a more suitable way to measure fund performance. As 
argued by BvanB, the gross abnormal return has to be adjusted by fund size to estimate fund 
performance. In addition, the authors also question the benchmark used in previous research 
(e.g., FFC model, Fama–French three-factor model, capital asset pricing model) and argue that, 
for a reliable market benchmark, the return of the benchmark should be known to investors and 
the benchmark should be tradable. Unfortunately, the benchmarks used in factor models do not 
meet these criteria. To solve this problem, BvanB use the set of passively managed index funds 
offered by Vanguard as the alternative investment opportunity set and they define the fund 
benchmark as the closet portfolio formed by those index funds. 
Following BvanB, we also use the 11 Vanguard index funds as the benchmark.
30
 We 
started collecting data when all the index funds have data and, therefore, our data period covers 
14 years, from 2001 to 2014. As BvanB, we construct an orthogonal basis set out of these index 
funds by regressing the nth
 
fund on the orthogonal basis produced by the first n - 1 funds over the 
whole sample period. The orthogonal basis for index fund n is calculated by adding the residuals 
collected from the prior regression and the mean return of the nth index fund of the whole period. 
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After we obtain the new benchmark, we regress the excess returns of each fund on the 11 
Vanguard index fund orthogonal benchmark for the whole sample period, from 2003 to 2014, 
using 24-month rolling window regression and moving forward one year each time. We calculate 
fund performance using the abnormal capital inflow of each fund in the test year (denoted BvanB 
alpha), which is calculated as the fund's gross abnormal return (real raw return over its expected 
return) multiplied by the inflation-adjusted TNA of the fund at the beginning of the current year. 
The fund expected return is the product of the loading of each Vanguard index fund on the 
orthogonal basis on the fund excess return from the preceding 24-month estimation period by the 
real numbers of each Vanguard index fund on the orthogonal basis in the current year. 
As BvanB, we use the skill ratio measure (denoted BvanB skill) to capture fund 
management skill, as shown in Eq. (3). Each fund’s BvanB skill in each year is calculated as the 
fund’s abnormal return (fund alpha) multiplied by the inflation-adjusted fund size at the 
beginning of the last year, divided by the standard error of the fund alpha, collected from the 24-
month rolling window regression of fund excess returns over the alternative investment 
opportunity formed with the 11 Vanguard index funds: 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Effect of CEO managerial ability on stock performance 
To examine whether CEO managerial ability works as a means of fund managers’ stock 
picking identification strategy, we examine whether high (low) fund performance is associated 
with the performance of the stocks of firms run by CEOs with high (low) managerial skill. 





stock performance. If the stocks of firms managed by skilled CEOs are associated with abnormal 
gains, they should be attractive to mutual fund managers and beneficial to fund performance. 
Therefore, discovering firms run by talented CEOs and investing in these companies should 
assist fund managers in improving fund performance. That is, using corporate managerial skill as 
an investment strategy, skilled fund managers should be able to deliver value. To explore the 
relation between stock performance and a company’s CEO’s ability, we first sort all companies 
in each year (t) into quintiles based on their CEOs’ managerial ability scores (MA-Score) in year 
t - 1. The managerial ability score data are from Demerjian and McVay (2012) and are available 
online. Then, within each quintile, we further sort all firms into five groups based on their past 
performance (i.e., firm alphat-1). The firm alphat-1 values are the intercepts of regressing each 
company’s monthly stock excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from the FFC model 
for a 24-month estimation period. This procedure produces 25 (5×5) portfolios of different 
corporate managerial abilities and past performances. Then, we report the equally weighted firm 
annualized abnormal returns and P-values for each portfolio during the whole sample period 
(January 1990 to December 2014) in Table 2. To estimate the monthly abnormal return for each 
company, we calculate the difference between the company’s monthly excess return (over the 
risk-free rate) and the expected excess return of the same month. To calculate the expected 
excess return for each company in the current month, we multiply the FFC model factor 
loadings, which are also obtained from the preceding 24-month estimation period (t - 2 to t - 1) 
by the FFC model factors in the same month. This process is repeated by moving the estimation 








Portfolio firm alpha, sorting on lagged CEO managerial ability score and alpha 
The table presents the portfolio average of firm annual abnormal return (firm alpha) in the whole sample periods 
from January 1990 to December 2014. Portfolios are formed by sorting all companies in each year into quintiles by 
lagged CEO managerial ability score (MS-Score) and then by firm alphat-1. The managerial ability score data are 
introduced by Demerjian and McVay (2012) and are public available online. Firm alphat-1 data are obtained from the 
24-month estimation period by regressing each company’s monthly stock excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the 
factors from FFC model. Then, we calculate the abnormal return in month t for each company as the difference 
between company excess return (over risk free rate) in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. 
The expected excess return for each company in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings 
from the 24 month preceding estimation period (t-2 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current month. The process 
repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. We report the equal weighted firm abnormal 
returns for each portfolio and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 
  CEO Managerial Abilityt-1 
Stock Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -5.00** 3.94* 1.97 4.02** 1.47 1.28 3.23*** 
 
(0.042) (0.056) (0.271) (0.023) (0.409) (0.391) (0.008) 
4 -2.39 0.76 0.98 4.14*** 3.52** 1.40 2.95*** 
 
(0.126) (0.619) (0.505) (0.004) (0.026) (0.183) (0.002) 
3 -2.22 3.72*** 3.10** 2.37* 3.88*** 2.17** 3.05*** 
 
(0.113) (0.005) (0.025) (0.083) (0.005) (0.020) (<.0001) 
2 -0.99 2.99** 2.48* 4.26*** 3.26** 2.40** 2.13** 
 
(0.532) (0.039) (0.077) (0.007) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) 
High -6.93*** 0.77 2.54 1.84 4.74** 0.59 5.84*** 
  (0.002) (0.699) (0.122) (0.330) (0.017) (0.654) (<.0001) 
All -3.51*** 2.43** 2.22** 3.33*** 3.37*** 1.57* 3.44*** 
 
(0.006) (0.016) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.077) (<.0001) 
High-Low -0.96 -1.58 0.29 -1.09 1.64 -0.34 
 
  (0.490) (0.215) (0.800) (0.331) (0.195) (0.681) 
 
 
Consistent with the findings of Demerjian et al. (2012), the results in Table 2 show that 
firms under the helm of high CEO ability (a high CEO MA-Score in the prior year) earn high 
abnormal stock returns (i.e., stock alpha).
31
 The highest abnormal return is 4.74% (P = 0.017) for 
the portfolio with the highest managerial ability and best past performance, while the average 
abnormal return for the whole sample is 1.57% (P = 0.077).
32
 Meanwhile, the results indicate 
that, if active mutual funds aggressively invest in the stocks of firms managed by CEOs with 
high managerial ability, they can reap large rewards for fund investors. We also perform a 
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 Even though this relation has been documented by Demerjian et al. (2012), we confirm this relation in our context 
by narrowing the data to only public companies traded on the AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ stock exchanges, 
because those stocks are available for mutual fund managers to invest in and their financials are more reliable.  
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regression analysis by regressing stock alpha on CEO MA-Scoret-1 and stock alphat-1, controlling 
for firms’ total D/E, ROE, M/B, and market capitalization. The regression results, reported in 
Appendix II, for the sample period from 1990 through 2014, consistently show that the stocks of 
firms managed by CEOs with higher managerial ability have significant better performance than 
other stocks. Jointly, these findings confirm that investing in the stocks of firms under the 
directorship of skilled CEOs is expected to be very attractive to skilled mutual fund managers 
because such stocks represent valuable investment opportunities that could improve fund 
performance. 
Effect of fund manager skill on fund performance 
In this section, we examine the predictive power of the two fund manager skill measures 
on fund performance used in our analysis. First, we test the predictive power of the selectivity 
measure (i.e., the logistic transformation of 1 - R
2
t-1) on fund performance (i.e., fund annual 
alpha). As stated by Amihud and Goyenko (2013), this selectivity measure captures the 
proportion of fund performance that is explained by trading on private information and, 
therefore, we expect a significant positive relation between high fund selectivity and the fund 
alpha. We estimate R
2
 using a 24-month window rolling regression procedure and R
2
 is used 
only if the mutual fund has 24 months of complete continuous data in the estimation period. 
Then, for each month, we rank all mutual funds in the quintiles based on their 1 - R
2 
value. 
Within each quintile, we sort funds into five portfolios based on their alphat-1, which is the 
intercept from the estimation regression. This procedure produces 25 (5×5) portfolios with 
different fund manager selectivities and past performances. For each portfolio, we report the 
equally weighted firm abnormal returns and P-values during the whole sample period (January 





month t for each mutual fund, we calculate the difference between the fund excess return (over 
the risk-free rate) in month t and the expected excess return for the same month. To calculate the 
expected excess return for each fund in month t, we multiply the FFC model factor loadings, 
which are also collected from the preceding 24-month estimation period (t - 2 to t - 1) by the 
FFC model factors in the current month. This procedure is repeated by moving the estimation 
and test period one month at a time. 
The results in Table 3, Panel A, show that, when the overall mutual fund industry cannot 
beat the market benchmark significantly (-0.57%, P = 0.166), funds in the highest selectivity 
quintile generate a significant, positive 3.05% annual alpha (P = 0.023). In addition, the return of 
the hypothetical portfolio of a long position in high-selectivity funds and a short position in low-
selectivity funds delivers a significant positive annual alpha (0.92%, P = 0.019 for the whole 
sample; 2.24%, P = 0.003 for funds with the best past performance). These results confirm that 
fund selectivity is positively associated with fund alpha. 
We re-examine the effect of fund management skill on fund performance using the 
BvanB skill measure. The main difference with the previous portfolio analysis is that the BvanB 
skill and performance (BvanB alpha) measures are used, as defined in Section 1.2.3. This metric 
permits us to gauge the success of a fund manager based on the value added of an investment 
opportunity (i.e., the net present value of an investment) rather than the return a fund earns (i.e., 
the internal rate of return), since bigger funds could generate more value even if they have lower 









Fund portfolio performance, based on sorting on fund manager skill and lagged fund performance 
This table presents the fund portfolio performance (fund alpha and fund BvanB alpha), annualized, using monthly 
returns. In panel A, portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R
2
 and then by 
fund alphat-1. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly 
excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate 
the average monthly excess returns for each fund portfolio. This process is repeated by moving the estimation and 
test period one month at a time for the period from January 1990 to December 2014. Last we regress the test period 
average portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each portfolio cell, we present portfolio alpha, which is the 
intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. Panel B presents the portfolio BvanB fund alpha, annualized, 
using monthly returns (145 months), from December 2002 to December 2014. Portfolios are formed by sorting all 
funds in each month into quintiles by BvanB fund skill (Eq. 3) and then by BvanB fund alphat-1, and both are 
described in detail in section 1.2.3. For each portfolio cell, we present portfolio BvanB fund alpha, which is the 
portfolio alpha times the average TNA of funds within the portfolio at the beginning of current month (t), and the P-
value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 






Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -1.75*** -2.04*** -1.84** -1.97** -2.06 -1.93*** -0.20 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.026) (0.117) (0.002) (0.765) 
2 -1.43*** -0.99** -0.90 -0.34 0.34 -0.67 0.87** 
 
(0.001) (0.049) (0.154) (0.653) (0.712) (0.196) (0.047) 
3 -0.94** -0.67 -1.17** -0.51 0.56 -0.55 0.65 
 
(0.024) (0.143) (0.044) (0.450) (0.501) (0.219) (0.145) 
4 -1.18** -1.16 0.11 -0.20 0.99 -0.28 1.05** 
 
(0.011) (0.106) (0.840) (0.792) (0.277) (0.535) (0.037) 
High -1.41* -0.81 -0.08 2.14** 3.05** 0.58 2.24*** 
 
(0.051) (0.355) (0.912) (0.025) (0.023) (0.381) (0.003) 
All -1.34*** -1.14** -0.78 -0.19 0.58 -0.57 0.92** 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.110) (0.754) (0.426) (0.166) (0.019) 
High-Low 0.19 0.62 0.91* 2.03*** 2.57** 1.27** 
 
 
(0.606) (0.191) (0.061) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Panel B: Portfolio BvanB fund alpha for the entire sample period 
 
 
BvanB fund skill 
BvanB Alphat-1 Low 4 3 2 High All High-Low 
Low -18.06* -3.25 -1.44 -0.22 0.77 -4.44 9.42* 
 
(0.074) (0.115) (0.353) (0.850) (0.609) (0.124) (0.056) 
4 -8.61 -3.25* -1.30 -0.42 1.03 -2.51 4.82* 
 
(0.103) (0.065) (0.324) (0.740) (0.563) (0.194) (0.069) 
3 -4.84 -2.30 -0.87 0.31 1.22 -1.29 3.03* 
 
(0.140) (0.138) (0.470) (0.796) (0.498) (0.393) (0.089) 
2 -4.52 -2.02 -0.64 0.14 2.14 -0.98 3.33* 
 
(0.120) (0.168) (0.575) (0.911) (0.308) (0.500) (0.053) 
High -4.80** -1.75 -0.20 0.64 3.74 -0.48 4.27* 
 
(0.048) (0.182) (0.864) (0.649) (0.337) (0.769) (0.061) 
All -8.82* -2.51 -0.89 0.09 1.78 -1.94 5.30** 
 
(0.078) (0.115) (0.472) (0.943) (0.413) (0.280) (0.044) 
High-Low 6.63* 0.75 0.62 0.43 1.48 1.98* 
 
 







Consistent with our previous findings (Table 3, Panel A), the results in Table 3, Panel B, 
reveal that funds with superior management skills, based on the BvanB fund skill measure, 
exhibit better performance than the average mutual fund. The highest annualized BvanB fund 
alpha is $3.74 million (P = 0.337) for the fund portfolio with the highest BvanB fund skill and 
the best past performance, while the average performance of all mutual funds is -$1.94 million (P 
= 0.280). The results for the hypothetical portfolio of a long position in a high BvanB fund skill 
portfolio and a short position in a low BvanB fund skill portfolio, presented in the rightmost 
column of Panel B under “High–Low”, indicate that the return from this strategy is positive and 
significant ($5.30 million, P = 0.044). For the highest and BvanB alphat-1 quintiles, the 
hypothetical portfolio yields an annualized alpha of $4.27 million (P = 0.061). Overall, these 
results confirm the existence of a positive relationship between those funds with the greatest 
management skill and performance.
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We also perform regression analysis to assess the validity of the linear relationship 
between fund manager skill and fund performance, controlling for other effects. For both 
measures, we regress fund performance (fund alpha or fund BvanB alpha) on fund manager skill 
(TSelectivity or BvanB skill), controlling for fund past performance (fund alphat-1 or fund 
BvanB alphat-1), the expense ratio, the log value of fund age, TNA, and the squared log value of 
TNA and report these results in Appendix III. Consistent with the results from portfolio analysis, 
the regression results show that fund manager skill in all the regression specifications is positive 
and significantly associated with fund performance. Jointly, in accordance with previous studies, 
these results demonstrate that both fund selectivity and BvanB fund management skill measures 
are reliable metrics that allow us to capture fund managers’ stock picking skill. Both measures 
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demonstrate that skilled managers at the helm of mutual funds significantly outperform their 
peers. 
Skilled fund performance and CEO managerial ability 
The central hypothesis of this research is that the superior performance of mutual funds 
headed by skilled fund managers (i.e., top 20% of funds with the highest stock picking skill in 
each year) relative to their low-skilled peers is associated with the stocks of firms run by CEOs 
possessing high managerial skills. To address this issue, at the beginning of each year from 1990 
to 2014, we assign all funds in our sample to one of five equally weighted portfolios based on 
managers’ stock picking skill inferred from the selectivity measure, as defined in Section 1.2. In 
each year, we treat the mutual funds in the top selectivity quintile as the funds with skilled 
managers. To proxy for the performance of firms with high and low CEO skill, we sort all firms 
into two groups (each group contains 50% of the companies in the sample), three groups (each 
group contains 33% of the companies in the sample), and five groups (each group contains 20% 
of the companies in the sample) based on each firm’s past year MA-Score and compute the 
average performance for each group. The performance of the groups consisting of the top 50%, 
33%, or 20% of the firms is used to identify the performance of firms with skilled CEOs, while 
the performance of the groups containing the bottom 50%, 33%, or 20% of firms is used to 
indicate the performance of firms with low managerial ability CEOs. We then regress the 
highest-skilled funds’ annual fund alpha, obtained from the top 20% of funds in terms of 
selectivity, on the performance of the two company groups managed by CEOs with high (top 
50%, top 33%, or top 20%) or low (bottom 50%, bottom 33%, or bottom 20%) managerial 






High and low managerial ability stocks’ performance and high selectivity funds’ performance (Alpha) 
This table reports the results of regressing high selectivity (top 20%) fund annual alpha on the performance of firms assigned in groups with high (top 50%, 33%, 
and 20%) and low (bottom 50%, 33%, and 20%) lagged CEO managerial ability scores, controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the 
annual alpha of high selectivity funds, representing the top 20% funds with the highest selectivity in each year. The annual fund alpha is the difference between 
fund excess return (over risk free rate) in year t and the expected excess return of the same year. The expected excess return for each fund in year t is calculated 
by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month preceding estimation period by the FFC model factors in current year. The process is repeated 
by moving the estimation and test period one year at a time. The main independent variables are the average abnormal firm returns (firm alpha) with MA-Scores 
in the high (top 50%, 33%, and 20%) and low (bottom 50%, 33%, and 20%) groups. Companies are sorted into groups based on their CEO MA-Scores in prior 
year. The abnormal return in year t for each company is calculated as the difference between company excess return (over risk free rate) in year t and the 
expected excess return of the same year. The expected excess return for each company in year t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from 
the 24 month preceding estimation period by the FFC model factors in current year. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test period one year at a 
time. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Sample period 
covers from 1990 through 2014. We present the P values and adjusted R
2
 for each regression. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 Top 20% Selectivity Fund Alpha 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Intercept -0.88 -0.29 -0.47 -0.81 -0.29 -0.64 -1.06 -0.62 -1.07 
 
(0.815) (0.940) (0.902) (0.829) (0.940) (0.866) (0.777) (0.870) (0.776) 
Alpha of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 0.15*** 
 
0.25*** 





      Alpha of Bottom 50% MA-Score Firms 
 
0.05 -0.08 
      
  
(0.174) (0.106) 
      Alpha of Top 33% MA-Score Firms 




   




   Alpha of Bottom 33% MA-Score Firms 
    
0.04 -0.03 
   
     
(0.158) (0.505) 
   Alpha of Top 20% MA-Score Firms 








Alpha of Bottom 20% MA-Score Firms 
       
0.06** 0.00 
        
(0.023) (0.973) 
Fund Alphat-1 1.61*** 1.71*** 1.57*** 1.63*** 1.71*** 1.61*** 1.66*** 1.70*** 1.66*** 
 (0.001) (<.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Expense Ratio -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Turnover -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(Age) -0.70 -0.79 -0.77 -0.70 -0.79 -0.73 -0.69 -0.72 -0.69 
 (0.222) (0.171) (0.178) (0.220) (0.169) (0.204) (0.225) (0.208) (0.229) 
Log(TNA) 1.27 1.28 1.24 1.27 1.29 1.26 1.30 1.30 1.30 
 (0.309) (0.306) (0.319) (0.308) (0.303) (0.312) (0.297) (0.298) (0.297) 
[Log(TNA)]2 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
 
(0.236) (0.236) (0.241) (0.234) (0.234) (0.237) (0.223) (0.230) (0.223) 
Strategy Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 






High and low managerial ability stocks’ performance and high BvanB skill funds’ performance (value added) 
This table reports the results of regressing high (Top 20%) BvanB skill fund annual BvanB alpha on the performance of company groups with high and low CEO 
ability scores controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the annual alpha of high BvanB skill funds, representing the top 20% funds 
with the highest BvanB skill in each year. The main independent variables are added value of high (top 50%, 33%, and 20%) and low (bottom 50%, 33%, and 
20%) MA-Score firms, which is the average of company’s abnormal return timing the company’s market capitalization at the beginning of year t in each group. 
Companies are sorted into groups based on their CEO MA-Scores in prior year. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund 
turnover, log value of TNA, squared log value of TNA, and BvanB alphat-1, which is the product of fund alphat-1 and fund TNA at the beginning of last year in 
the estimation period and fund alphat-1 is the intercept from the 24 month preceding estimation period. Sample period ranges from 2003 through 2014. The P-
value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 Top 20% BvanB Skill Fund Alpha 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Intercept 453.04*** 705.06*** 540.05*** 415.51*** 756.59*** 633.34*** 425.96*** 661.11*** 499.81*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Added Value of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 0.20*** 
 
0.35*** 





      
Added Value of Bottom 50% MA-Score Firms 
 
-0.34*** -0.49*** 
      
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
      
Added Value of Top 33% MA-Score Firms 




   




   
Added Value of Bottom 33% MA-Score Firms 
    
-0.21*** -0.31*** 
   
     
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
   
Added Value of Top 20% MA-Score Firms 








Added Value of Bottom 20% MA-Score Firms 
       
-0.08*** -0.06*** 
        
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Fund BvanB Alphat-1 0.04 0.80 0.65 -0.01 0.53 0.31 0.06 0.35 0.14 
 
(0.961) (0.339) (0.417) (0.993) (0.533) (0.693) (0.938) (0.683) (0.856) 
Expense Ratio -32.12** -31.59*** -18.33 -24.84** -33.20*** -13.52 -15.08 -35.50*** -13.21 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.119) (0.042) (0.008) (0.243) (0.200) (0.005) (0.259) 
Turnover -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 
 
(0.417) (0.284) (0.713) (0.544) (0.265) (0.747) (0.808) (0.279) (0.858) 
Log(Age) 18.14** 7.59 8.18 17.08* 6.74 3.94 16.14* 13.66 14.30* 
 
(0.044) (0.391) (0.331) (0.051) (0.452) (0.636) (0.055) (0.133) (0.087) 
Log(TNA) -223.06*** -291.73*** -246.16*** -213.72*** -302.07*** -267.34*** -218.93*** -278.82*** -237.99*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
[Log(TNA)]2 26.22*** 30.39*** 27.25*** 25.84*** 31.12*** 29.00*** 26.19*** 29.73*** 27.30*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Strategy Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 






As hypothesized, skilled mutual fund alpha values are positively and significantly linked 
with the average performance of firms run by high-ability CEOs. This indicates that the high 
alpha delivered by skilled fund managers is strongly associated with the superior stock 
performance of firms managed by CEOs with high managerial skills (0.25, P = 0.001 for the top 
50% of firms; 0.17, P = 0.006 for the top 33%; 0.16, P = 0.002 for the top 20%). On the other 
hand, the skilled mutual fund alpha values are insignificantly related with the average 
performance of low CEO managerial ability firms, suggesting that investing in the stocks of 
firms run by low-ability CEOs fails to improve fund performance (-0.08, P = 0.106 for the 
bottom 50% of firms; -0.03, P = 0.505 for the bottom 33%; 0.00, P = 0.973 for the bottom 20%), 
further corroborating that skilled fund managers’ superior fund performance comes from 
investing in firms managed by CEOs of superior managerial ability. In sum, the results clearly 
show that the highest quintile of skilled fund managers generates the highest alpha when 
investing in the stocks of firms operating under the helm of highly skilled corporate managers. 
We repeat the previous analysis using the BvanB measures of fund management skill and 
fund performance. Specifically, we regress the high BvanB skill funds’ annual alpha, obtained 
from the top 20% of funds with the highest BvanB skill, on the performance of the two company 
groups managed by CEOs with high (top 50%, top 33%, or top 20%) or low (bottom 50%, 
bottom 33%, or bottom 20%) managerial ability scores, controlling for other fund characteristics. 
Furthermore, in accord with the argument of BvanB, we use a firm’s value added to measure 
each firm’s performance for year t, which is calculated by its abnormal return (stock alpha) times 
the firm’s inflation adjusted market capitalization at the beginning of year t. We then regress the 
high BvanB skill funds’ annual BvanB alpha, obtained from the top 20% of funds with the 





with high or low managerial ability, controlling for other fund characteristics, and report these 
results in Table 5. 
The pattern of these results provides additional support for our hypothesis that the 
superior performance of mutual funds, under the helm of skilled mutual managers, is associated 
with the stocks of firms run by CEOs of high managerial talent. Specifically, the regression 
results in Table 5 show that the performance of firms run by CEOs with high managerial ability 
significantly contributes to the performance of mutual funds managed by skilled fund managers 
(0.35, P < 0.0001 for the top 50% of firms; 0.42, P < 0.0001 for the top 33%; 0.25, P < 0.0001 
for the top 20%). Additionally, we find a significant, negative relation between the skilled funds’ 
BvanB alpha values and the stock performance of firms led by CEOs with low managerial 
ability (-0.49, P < 0.0001 for the bottom 50% of firms; -0.31, P < 0.0001 for the bottom 33%; -
0.06, P < 0.0001 for the bottom 20%). This negative relation reveals two things. First, even 
within the top 20% highest skilled mutual funds, a portion of the mutual funds show a significant 
performance correlation with low managerial ability stocks, which consequently harm fund 
performance. A probable reason for this negative relationship (i.e., investing in firms with low 
managerial ability) may be related to increased capital inflows due to past superior performance, 
limiting options to invest in firms with superior managerial ability. In addition, due to short 
selling restrictions, the majority mutual funds can only hold long stock positions. Hence, 
investing in stocks of firms with low managerial ability while they hold stock positions in firms 
with high managerial ability could be viewed as a way of creating a short selling position to 
protect fund performance. The last regression (regression [9]) shows that when highly skilled 
fund managers invest in both high and low managerial ability firms, this both improves (0.25, P 





net fund performance (0.19). This pattern also holds for regression (regression [6]) for the top 
33% of skilled fund managers, but not for the top 50% of skilled fund managers (regression [3]). 
Second, when skilled fund managers correctly anticipate the negative effects of a CEO’s 
managerial ability, one would expect them to cash out the investment in this company quickly 
and take a hedge position on the company’s stock by investing in the company’s competitors or 
in companies with the opposite operating strategy. The latter activity can cause a negative 
relation between skilled fund performance based on the BvanB value measure and the stock 
performance of firms led by CEOs with low managerial ability.
34
 
Skilled fund performance, fund manager skill, and CEO managerial ability 
Subsequently, we perform multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of fund 
manager skill, high/low MA-Score firm performance, and their interactions on fund performance 
for the entire sample period (1990–2014). First, we estimate the following model: 
Skilled Fund Alphaf,t = TSelectivityf,t + Alpha of High MA-Score Firmst + Alpha of Low 
MA-Score Firmst +TSelectivityf,t* Alpha of High MA-Score Firmst +∑Controlsf,t                  (4) 
Based on the central prediction of our hypothesis, skilled mutual fund managers are 
expected to invest in the stocks of firms run by skilled CEOs to improve fund performance. 
Therefore, a positive and significant relation between the interaction of fund selectivity and the 
average stock return performance of firms managed by CEOs with high managerial ability, 
TSelectivity* Alpha of High (top 50%, 33%, or 20%) MA-Score Firms, and fund performance 
(Alpha) is expected to emerge from the regression analysis. 
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 We also replicate the same analyses in Section 2.2 by replacing high/low MA-Score firm performance by the 
average CEO MA-Score values for each group in the previous year. The results can be found in Appendix VI, which 






High and low managerial ability stocks’ performance, fund selectivity, and high selectivity funds’ performance (Alpha) 
This table reports the results of regressing top 20% highest selectivity fund alphas on manager’s selectivity, high and low CEO MA-Score firms’ performance, and the interactive 
variable of fund selectivity timing high MA-Score firms’ performance, controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the annual alpha of high selectivity 
funds, representing the top 20% funds with the highest selectivity in each year. The main independent variables are alpha of high (top 50%, 33%, and 20%) and low (bottom 50%, 
33%, and 20%) MA-Score firms, calculated as the average abnormal returns of companies in high and low CEO MA-Score scores groups, and the interactive variable of fund 
selectivity timing high MA-Score firms’ alpha. We present the P values and adjusted R2 for each regression. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level 
 Top 20% Selectivity Fund Alpha 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Intercept 0.76 1.00 -0.13 0.84 0.87 0.00 0.57 0.45 -0.34 
 
(0.839) (0.790) (0.972) (0.823) (0.817) (0.998) (0.880) (0.904) (0.927) 
Fund TSelectivity 2.51*** 2.43*** 0.91 2.47*** 2.46*** 1.27* 2.49*** 2.52*** 1.40** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.211) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.074) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.047) 
Alpha of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.38*** 
       (0.002) (0.005) (<.0001) 
      Alpha of Bottom 50% MA-Score Firms 
 
-0.06 -0.04 
       
 
(0.261) (0.395) 
      TSelectivity* Alpha of top 50% MA-Score Firms 
  
0.29*** 
       
  
(0.001) 
      Alpha of Top 33% MA-Score Firms 
   
0.13*** 0.14** 0.27*** 
    
   
(0.005) (0.023) (<.0001) 
   Alpha of Bottom 33% MA-Score Firms 
    
-0.01 0.01 
    
    
(0.889) (0.867) 
   TSelectivity* Alpha of top 33% MA-Score Firms 
     
0.23*** 
    
     
(0.004) 
   Alpha of Top 20% MA-Score Firms 
      
0.15*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 
 
      
(<.0001) (0.006) (<.0001) 
Alpha of Bottom 20% MA-Score Firms 
       
0.02 0.02 
        
(0.592) (0.481) 
TSelectivity* Alpha of top 20%  MA-Score 
Firms 
        
0.19*** 
         
(0.006) 
Fund Alphat-1 1.41*** 1.39*** 1.34*** 1.43*** 1.43*** 1.39*** 1.46*** 1.46*** 1.45*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Expense Ratio -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.27*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Turnover -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(Age) -0.84 -0.89 -0.76 -0.85 -0.86 -0.76 -0.84 -0.81 -0.70 
 (0.137) (0.117) (0.183) (0.134) (0.133) (0.184) (0.140) (0.155) (0.220) 
Log(TNA) 1.38 1.36 1.23 1.38 1.38 1.28 1.41 1.42 1.30 
 (0.265) (0.273) (0.321) (0.264) (0.266) (0.303) (0.255) (0.252) (0.293) 
[Log(TNA)]2 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 
 (0.219) (0.223) (0.265) (0.217) (0.218) (0.249) (0.207) (0.206) (0.241) 






High and low managerial ability stocks’ performance, fund BvanB skill, and high BvanB skill funds’ performance (value added) 
This table reports the results of regressing top 20% highest BvanB skill fund alphas on manager’s BvanB skill, high and low CEO MA-Score firms’ performance, and the 
interactive variable of fund BvanB skill timing high MA-Score firms’ performance, controlling for other fund characteristics. The main dependent variable is the annual BvanB 
alpha of high BvanB skill funds, representing the top 20% funds with the highest BvanB skill ratio in each year. The main independent variables are added value of high (top 50%, 
33%, and 20%) and low (bottom 50%, 33%, and 20%) MA-Score firms, calculated as the average of company’s abnormal return (alpha) timing the company’s market 
capitalization at the beginning of the current year, for high and low CEO MA-Score groups, and the product of fund BvanB skill and added value of high MA-Score firms. We 
present the P values and adjusted R2 for each regression. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 Top 20% BvanB Skill Fund Alpha 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Intercept 402.66*** 504.80*** 541.10*** 365.77*** 593.57*** 684.57*** 377.57*** 452.80*** 551.79*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001 (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BvanB skill 1.36*** 0.93** 0.46 1.36*** 1.04** 0.66 1.33*** 1.26*** 0.92** 
 
(0.003) (0.028) (0.290) (0.002) (0.013) (0.113) (0.002) (0.003) (0.026) 
Added Value of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 
      
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
      
Added Value of Bottom 50% MA-Score Firms 
 
-0.49*** -0.50*** 




      
BvanB Skill* Added Value of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 
  
0.01*** 
      
   
(<.0001) 
      
Added Value of Top 33% MA-Score Firms 
   
0.32*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 
   
 
   
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
   
Added Value of Bottom 33% MA-Score Firms 
    
-0.31*** -0.33*** 
   
 
    
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
   
BvanB Skill* Added Value of Top 33% MA-Score Firms 
     
0.01*** 
   
      
(<.0001) 
   
Added Value of Top 20% MA-Score Firms 
      
0.26*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 
 
      
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Added Value of Bottom 20% MA-Score Firms 
       
-0.06*** -0.08*** 
 
       
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
BvanB Skill* Added Value of Top 20% MA-Score Firms 
        
0.01*** 
         
(<.0001) 
BvanB Alphat-1 -2.09* -0.83 0.16 -2.14** -1.33 0.20 -2.03* -1.83* -0.17 
 (0.060) (0.428) (0.882) (0.048) (0.194) (0.845) (0.051) (0.077) (0.865) 
Expense Ratio -31.25** -17.82 -17.91 -23.98** -12.94 -12.74 -14.24 -12.47 -12.55 
 (0.013) (0.129) (0.125) (0.050) (0.263) (0.263) (0.226) (0.286) (0.271) 
Turnover -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.452) (0.744) (0.694) (0.585) (0.783) (0.632) (0.856) (0.903) (0.675) 
Log(Age) 17.80** 8.01 7.37 16.73* 3.77 2.30 15.79* 14.01* 13.69* 
 (0.048) (0.341) (0.379) (0.056) (0.650) (0.779) (0.060) (0.094) (0.093) 
Log(TNA) -203.31*** -232.42*** -245.39*** -194.15*** -251.93*** -284.08*** -199.85*** -219.65*** -256.03*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
[Log(TNA)]2 24.31*** 25.92*** 27.10*** 23.93*** 27.51*** 30.32*** 24.33*** 25.53*** 28.73*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 





Consistent with the tests presented earlier and the above prediction, the results in Table 6 
show that the average performance of firms run by skilled CEOs, Alpha of High (Top 50%, 33%, 
or 20%) MA-Score Firms, in all the regression specifications is positive and significantly 
correlated with high selectivity fund alpha. Furthermore, the interaction of fund management 
selectivity and the average performance of skilled CEO firms, TSelectivity* Alpha of High (top 
50%, 33%, or 20%) MA-Score Firms, is also positively and significantly associated with high 
selectivity fund alpha (0.29, P = 0.001 in regression [3]; 0.23, P = 0.004 in regression [6]; 0.19, 
P = 0.006 in regression [9]), suggesting that skilled fund managers create more value by 
investing in the stocks of firms run by CEOs with high managerial ability than in those of firms 
run by CEOs with low managerial ability. Interestingly, while the interactive term in the 
horserace, TSelectivity* Alpha of High (top 50%, 33%, or 20%) MA-Score Firms in regressions 
[3], [6], and [9], remains positive and significant, fund selectivity (Fund TSelectivity), however, 
turns out to be less significant (0.09, P = 0.211 for regression [3]; 1.27, P = 0.074 for regression 
[6]; 1.40, P = 0.047 for regression [9]), indicating that fund managers’ stock picking skill 
delivers greater value to fund performance when they invest in the stocks of firms managed by 
CEOs with superior managerial ability. 
Next, we replicate the previous regression analysis using the BvanB skill and 
performance measures and report the results in Table 7, Panel A. Consistent with the pattern of 
results in Table 6, these regression results show that the average performance of firms run by 
skilled CEOs is positive and significantly correlated with a high BvanB fund alpha, suggesting 
that investing in the stocks of firms headed by skilled CEOs improves fund performance. The 
interaction of the BvanB skill and the average performance of skilled CEO firms, BvanB Skill* 





associated with high selectivity fund alpha (0.01, P < 0.0001 in regressions [3], [6], and [9]), 
respectively, indicating that skilled fund managers’ investment in such firms improves fund 
performance. On the other hand, as in Table 5, the contribution of the stocks of firms run by low-
skilled CEOs (Added Value of Bottom 50% MA-Score Firms) to fund performance, BvanB 
alpha, is significantly negative (-0.50, P < 0.0001 in regression [3]; -0.33, P < 0.0001 in 
regression [6]; -0.08, P < 0.0001 in regression [9]). Jointly, the results from the multivariate 
regression analysis lend support to the hypothesis that skilled mutual fund managers’ CEO 
managerial ability-based stock selection investment strategy has a positive and significant impact 
on mutual fund performance. Funds earn higher (lower) subsequent returns by investing in the 
stocks of companies managed by CEOs with high (low) managerial ability. Hence, adopting 
corporate managerial ability as a stock identification and investment strategy is an essential 
component of mutual fund performance success.
35,36,37
 
Skilled fund performance and CEO managerial ability change 
Since CEO managerial ability is not expected to be static over time and is not accurately 
known at a point of time, it is interesting to examine how its changes (i.e., increases or 
decreases) influence fund performance, to the extent that managerial ability is considered 
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 From now on, we only report the results using the top and bottom 50% MA-Score firm performance, since the 
33% and 20% measures give consistent results. 
36
 We replicate the analyses by exploring the performance relation between high managerial ability stocks and 
mutual funds in the lowest fund managers’ skill quintile (bottom 20%) compared to mutual funds in the highest 
managers’ skill quintile (top 20%). Unsurprisingly, the coefficients for the performance of funds with less-skilled 
managers and the average performance of high managerial ability stocks, using both fund selectivity and the BvanB 
skill measures, are insignificant, at zero (-0.01, P = 0.719 for the selectivity measure and 0.04, P = 0.379 for the 
BvanB measure).  
37
 Furthermore, to assess the persistence of the impact of CEO ability on fund performance, we use the previous 
two-year average MA-Score to identify firms with high or low managerial ability. The new evidence is consistent 
with the previous results based on both skill measures and provides additional support for the positive and 
significant association between skilled fund performance and the stocks of firms managed by CEOs with high 






important by fund managers for their stock picking decisions. To examine this effect, we sort the 
firms into two groups based on each firm’s previous year MA-Score change (MA-Scoret-2 - MA-
Scoret-1) and then estimate the relation between each group’s performance change (i.e., high and 
low CEO ability change firms’ alpha) and skilled mutual fund performance. The results are 































High and low managerial ability change stocks’ performance and skilled funds’ performance 
This table reports the results of regressing top 20% highest selectivity (BvanB skill) fund alpha on fund manager’s 
selectivity (BvanB skill) and performances of firm groups with high/low previous year CEO MA-Score changes 
controlling for other fund characteristics. Firms are sorted into two groups based on their previous year CEO MA-
Score changes. For regression [1] and [2], the dependent variable is the annual alpha of high selectivity funds, 
representing the top 20% funds with the highest selectivity in each year. The main independent variables are firm 
alphas of high and low previous year CEO MA-Score changes, which are the average abnormal returns of 
companies in high and low previous year CEO MA-Score change groups. For regression [3] and [4], the dependent 
variable is the annual BvanB alpha of high BvanB skill funds, representing the top 20% funds with the highest 
BvanB skill ratio in each year. The main independent variables are value added of high and low previous year CEO 
MA-Score changes, which are the average abnormal returns of companies in high and low previous year CEO MA-
Score change groups time the company’s market capitalization at the beginning of each year. Fund-level control 
variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of 
TNA. We present the P values and adjusted R
2
 for each regression. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level. 
 
Top 20% Selectivity Fund Alpha Top 20% BvanB Skill Fund Alpha 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept -1.53 0.13 612.50*** 563.68*** 
 









   
1.30*** 
    
(0.005) 





Low CEO Ability Change Firm Alpha -0.14** -0.11 
  
 (0.039) (0.114)   
High CEO Ability Change Firm Added Value   0.06* 0.07** 
   (0.080) (0.045) 
Low CEO Ability Change Firm Added Value   -0.15*** -0.16*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
Fund Alphat-1 1.82*** 1.55***   
 
(0.001) (0.001)   
Fund BvanB Alphat-1   0.21 -1.86 
   (0.813) (0.102) 
Expense Ratio -0.24** -0.28*** -36.96*** -36.06*** 
 
(0.018) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Turnover -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.08 -0.07 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.270) (0.298) 
Log(Age) -0.74 -0.88 14.83 14.58 
 
(0.196) (0.122) (0.105) (0.110) 
Log(TNA) 1.47 1.59 -270.32*** -251.51*** 
 
(0.241) (0.200) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
[Log(TNA)]2 -0.14 -0.14 29.21*** 27.38*** 
 
(0.190) (0.172) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Strategy Control YES YES YES YES 









These results show a positive and significant relation between CEO ability increases and 
fund performance. Specifically, the performance of mutual funds run by skilled managers is 
positively and significantly associated with the performance of firms experiencing large CEO 
ability improvement (0.19, P = 0.003 based on the selectivity measure, controlling for lagged 
fund selectivity; 0.07, P = 0.045 based on the BvanB skill measure, controlling for lagged fund 
BvanB skill). The opposite pattern is observed when firms experience CEO ability declines, 
especially when the BvanB alpha and BvanB skill measures are used. In sum, these results 
suggest that skilled fund managers’ performance is linked with CEO managerial ability changes, 
implying that the stock picking decisions of highly skilled fund managers based on the high CEO 
managerial ability strategy (preference) contribute significantly to fund alpha. That is, the 
investment exposure of skilled fund managers to the stocks of firms headed by high-ability CEOs 
pays off. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Fund portfolios sorted by high managerial ability (MA-Score) stocks 
Our earlier results provide support for the hypothesis that skilled fund managers’ value 
creation is related to the performance of high managerial ability stocks. In this section, we 
examine the robustness of this result by analyzing the composition of fund portfolios. The fund 
portfolio information is manually collected from the Bloomberg Portfolio Analysis database.
 38
 
Specifically, using cross-sectional analysis for each year, we investigate whether the portfolios of 
highly skilled fund managers are loaded with a higher proportion of high–MA-Score stocks than 
the portfolios of less-skilled fund managers. To address this, we first identify the MA-Score for 
                                                          
38
 Only funds with full information in the 24-month estimation period and have no less than 10 stocks with MA-





each stock held within each fund portfolio and then we calculate the value-weighted score of 
each fund, as follows: 
           
∑                           
∑              
                                      (5) 
where FundScorej is the value-weighted MA-Score for fund j, MAScorei,j is the MA-Score of 
stock i in fund j, and MarketValuei,j is the total market value of stock i in fund j. Finally, for each 





Fund portfolio MA-Score, based on sorting on fund manager skill 
This table presents the average value-weighted fund MA-Scores of each fund portfolio. Fund portfolios are formed 
by sorting all funds in each year into quintiles by fund selectivity (logistic transformed 1-R
2
) or fund BvanB skill. 
Fund selectivity (Eq. 1 and 2) and fund BvanB skill (Eq. 3) are estimated separately using 24-month monthly fund 
data in current year and one year before. Within each portfolio, we estimate the portfolio MA-Score by averaging 
the value-weighted average fund MA-Score of all the funds containing in the portfolio, and the value-weighted 
average fund MA-Score is calculated as the sum of market value weighted MA-Scores of the stocks holding by the 
fund. Fund portfolio holdings information are manually collected from Bloomberg Portfolio Analysis database, and 
stock MA-Score data are available through Sarah McVay’s UW faculty website. We report the cross sectional 
analysis results for the last two years of our sample period (2012 and 2013).  
 
  Fund Portfolio MA-Score 
Fund Manager Skill Selectivity Skill Measure   BvanB Skill Measure 
 
2012 2013   2012 2013 
Q1 (Highest Skill) 0.074 0.068 
 
0.072 0.074 
Q2 0.069 0.066 
 
0.070 0.063 
Q3 0.070 0.067 
 
0.062 0.073 
Q4 0.071 0.068 
 
0.065 0.073 
Q5 (Lowest Skill) 0.062 0.066   0.070 0.073 
All 0.069 0.067   0.068 0.071 
 
 
The average portfolio FundScore results, presented in Table 9, provide additional support 
for our hypothesis by showing that the highest-skilled fund quintile (Q1) has the highest average 
FundScore, among all five quintiles, indicating that skilled fund managers’ stock holdings are 
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associated with high managerial ability stocks. On the other hand, the portfolios of low-skilled 
fund managers appear to be tilted in favor of low managerial ability stocks. 
Skilled fund performance, CEO ability, and economic states 
Previous studies have shown that fund managers’ value creation varies with the state of 
the economy (Glode, 2011; Kosowski, 2011; Kacperczyk, van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp, 
2014, 2016). Specially, Kacperczyk et al. (2014, 2016) argue that mutual fund managers pick 
stocks in economic expansions and time the market in recessions. Along this argument, one 
would expect CEO managerial ability to be more precious for skilled fund managers during 
economic expansions, since CEO managerial ability information is mainly used during fund 
managers’ stock selection process. To test the sensitivity of our results, we condition our 
previous regression analysis to the state of the economy. We follow Kacperczyk et al. (2014) and 
use the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) to capture the business state. The CFNAI 
is a coincident indicator of national economic activity comprising 85 macroeconomic time series. 
For the whole sample period, if the CFNAI index in year t is higher (lower) than the median 
number of the sample of all the index numbers, year t is defined as an economic expansion 
(recession). Separately, we perform a regression of fund performance on skilled-CEO firm 
performance while controlling for other fund-level control variables in economic expansions and 











High managerial ability stocks’ performance, skilled funds’ performance, and business states 
This table reports the results of regressing high skill (selectivity and BvanB skill) fund annual alpha on 
the performance of company groups with high and low CEO ability scores in economic expansions and 
economic recessions, controlling for other fund characteristics. If the 12-month average Fed National 
Activity Index (CFNAI) for the test year (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all yearly 12-
month average CFNAI index numbers, we define this year as economic expansion (recession) year. The 
dependent variable is the annual alpha of high selectivity (BvanB skill) funds, which are the top 20% 
funds with the highest selectivity (BvanB skill) in each year. For the selectivity skill measurement, the 
main independent variable is alpha of top 50% MA-Score firms, which is the average abnormal 
performance of companies in high CEO ability scores group. For the BvanB skill measurement, the main 
independent variable is added value of top 50% MA-Score firms, which is the average of each company’s 
abnormal performance timing the company’s market capitalization at the beginning of year t in high CEO 
ability scores group. Companies are sorted into two CEO ability groups (high and low) based on their 
CEO ability score in prior year (t-1). Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund 
age, fund turnover, log value of TNA, squared log value of TNA, and fund alphat-1 (BvanB alphat-1). 
Sample period ranges from 1990 through 2014 for selectivity measurement and from 2003 to 2014 for 
BvanB skill measurement. The P-value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 
Top 20% Selectivity Fund 
Alpha  

























Alpha of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 0.46*** 
 
0.12** 





    
Added Value of Top 50% MA-Score Firms     0.38***  0.21*** 
     (0.010)  (<.0001) 
 Fund Alphat-1 2.09***  
1.35** 





    












































































































In line with previous studies, the results in Table 10 demonstrate that, even though a 
positive relation exists in both economic states, the performance of skilled mutual funds has a 
markedly stronger relation with the performance of firms run by skilled CEOs during economic 
expansions than in economic recessions. Using the fund selectivity measure, we find the 
coefficient decreases from 0.46 (P < 0.0001) in economic expansions to 0.12 (P = 0.054) in 
economic recessions, while, based on the BvanB fund skill measure, the coefficient decreases 
from 0.38 (P = 0.010) in economic expansions to 0.21 (P < 0.0001) in economic recessions. 
Thus, consistent with the findings of Kacperczyk et al. (2014, 2016), our results show that the 
performance relation between skilled fund managers and the stocks of firms managed by skilled 
CEOs is more pronounced during economic expansions than in recessions. In sum, controlling 
for the state of the economy, our evidence continues to point out that skilled fund managers’ 
performance is reliably linked with the stocks of firms run by CEOs of high managerial ability. 
Skilled fund performance, CEO ability, and fund trading strategy 
We next investigate whether the positive relation between the performance of skilled 
fund managers and the performance of high managerial ability that we have documented so far is 
driven by certain (asset class) fund investment strategies. To address this issue, we classify 
mutual funds within the highest management skill quintile into three groups based on their fund 
management strategy: Growth, Value, and Blend.
40
 For each group, we reexamine the association 
between the fund performance of the fund managers with the highest skill with the performance 
of those firms run by the CEOs with the high managerial ability. The results are reported in 
Table 11. When the fund selectivity measure is used, only Value strategy funds are positively 
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 Within our 2,190 mutual fund sample, we have 7 types of trading strategies based on their Bloomberg trading 
strategy classification, and 98% of the funds are covered in the main three strategies: Growth, Value, and Blend. 






and significantly associated with the stocks of firms managed by CEOs with high managerial 
ability (0.22, P = 0.001), while the other two fund strategies (i.e., Growth and Blend) show a 
positive but not significant (0.08, P = 0.394 for Growth strategy; 0.14, P = 0.111 for Blend 
strategy) relation with high managerial ability stocks. When switched to the BvanB fund skill 
measure, all three fund strategy groups show a significant positive relationship with high 
managerial ability stocks (0.17, P < 0.0001 for Growth strategy; 0.15, P < 0.0001 for Value 
strategy; 0.32, P < 0.0001 for Blend strategy). Since the BvanB fund skill measure, as argued by 
BvanB, represents a more accurate fund management skill measure because it measures fund 
performance adjusted by total assets under management, these results indicate that skilled fund 
managers, no matter which fund management strategy they follow, consistently generate excess 
value through their ability to recognize the value of corporate managerial ability and to pick the 
stocks of firms managed by adept CEOs. 
Skilled fund performance, CEO ability, and firm industry 
Our last robustness check examines whether the positive relation between the 
performance of skilled fund managers and high managerial ability stocks is more pronounced in 
certain industries. We first group all companies based on their two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification code and then, within each industry, we assign each firm into a high or a low CEO 
ability group, based on the firm’s CEO MA-Score the previous year. Then, we calculate the 
average performance of firms with skilled CEOs (in the top 50% based on the prior year’s MA-
Score) in each industry annually and regress the skilled mutual fund performance on the average 
performance of firms with skilled CEOs in each industry, controlling for other fund-level 
variables. The coefficients with their corresponding P-values are shown in Table 12. The pattern 





skilled fund manager performance and high managerial ability stocks holds across industries. 
The explanations of these results are analogous to those of the results reported in Table 11. When 
we use the fund selectivity to measure fund manager skill, the positive and significant relation 
between the performance of skilled fund managers and high managerial ability stocks is 
documented for only four industries (mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services). However, when the BvanB fund skill 
measure is used, the evidence indicates this relationship is not industry specific. While the 
relation between skilled fund manager performance and high managerial ability stocks is 


















High managerial ability stocks’ performance, skilled funds’ performance, and fund trading strategies  
This table reports the results of regressing high skill (selectivity and BvanB skill) fund annual alpha, grouped based 
on their investment strategies (growth, value, and blend), on the performance of high managerial ability stocks, 
controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the annual alpha of high selectivity (BvanB 
skill) funds, which are the top 20% funds with the highest selectivity (BvanB skill) in each year. For the selectivity 
skill measurement, the main independent variable is the performance of high managerial ability stocks, which is the 
average abnormal performance of stocks from companies in high CEO MA-Score group (top 50%). For the BvanB 
skill measurement, the main independent variable is the average added value of top 50% MA-Score firms, which is 
the average of each stock’s abnormal performance timing the company’s market capitalization at the beginning of 
year t in high CEO MA-Score group (top 50%). Companies are sorted into two CEO ability groups (high and low) 
based on their CEO MA-Score in prior year (t-1). Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of 
fund age, fund turnover, log value of TNA, squared log value of TNA, and fund alphat-1 (BvanB alphat-1). Sample 
period ranges from 1990 through 2014 for selectivity measurement and from 2003 to 2014 for BvanB skill 
measurement. The P-value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Top 20% Selectivity Fund Alpha 
 
Top 20% BvanB Skill Fund Alpha 
Fund Strategy Growth Value Blend 
 
Growth Value Blend 
Intercept 1.60 8.11 -12.24 
 
333.08** 624.25*** 398.58** 
 
(0.820) (0.135) (0.105) 
 
(0.014) (<.0001) (0.016) 
Alpha of Top 50% MA-Score Firms 0.08 0.22*** 0.14 
    
 
(0.394) (0.001) (0.111) 
    
Added Value of Top 50% MA-Score Firms     0.17*** 0.15*** 0.32*** 
     (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Fund Alphat-1 1.51** 0.41 1.48*     
 
(0.033) (0.697) (0.081) 
    
BvanB Alphat-1     
-0.95 -1.25 0.79 
     
(0.524) (0.564) (0.522) 
Expense Ratio -2.56*** -0.86 -0.16 
 
-11.65 -16.52 -95.12*** 
 
(<.0001) (0.574) (0.167) 
 
(0.515) (0.468) (0.001) 
Turnover -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01** 
 
-0.15 0.07 0.01 
 
(0.206) (0.010) (0.045) 
 
(0.195) (0.724) (0.906) 
Log(Age) 0.39 -1.06 -2.46** 
 
23.70 19.48 8.72 
 
(0.700) (0.177) (0.034) 
 
(0.110) (0.185) (0.630) 
Log(TNA) 0.32 -1.68 7.49*** 
 
-186.21*** -294.66*** -182.61*** 
 
(0.890) (0.283) (0.007) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.001) 
[Log(TNA)]
2
 -0.01 0.11 -0.71*** 
 
22.83*** 32.14*** 23.85*** 
 
(0.951) (0.372) (0.004) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Adj. R
2
 0.063 0.046 0.047 
 










High managerial ability stocks’ performance, skilled funds’ performance, and stock industries  
This table reports the coefficients between the performance of high managerial ability stocks in different industries 
and the performance of funds having high skill (selectivity and BvanB skill) managers. Companies are sorted into 
industry groups based on their 2-digit SIC code. Within each group, companies are sorted into two CEO ability 
subgroups (high and low) based on their CEO MA-Score in prior year (t-1). The dependent variable is the annual 
alpha of high selectivity (BvanB skill) funds, which are the top 20% funds with the highest selectivity (BvanB skill) 
in each year. For the selectivity skill measurement, the main independent variable is the performance of high 
managerial ability stocks, which is the average abnormal performance of stocks from companies in high CEO MA-
Score group (top 50%). For the BvanB skill measurement, the main independent variable is the average added value 
of top 50% MA-Score firms, which is the average of each stock’s abnormal performance timing the company’s 
market capitalization at the beginning of year t in high CEO MA-Score group (top 50%). Companies are sorted into 
two CEO ability groups (high and low) based on their CEO MA-Score in prior year (t-1). Fund-level control 
variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, log value of TNA, squared log value of TNA, 
and fund alphat-1 (BvanB alphat-1). Sample period ranges from 1990 through 2014 for selectivity measurement and 
from 2003 to 2014 for BvanB skill measurement. The P-values for each coefficient are also presented. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
 
Industry Division Top 20% Selectivity Fund Alpha Top 20% BvanB Skill Fund Alpha 












transportation, communications, electric, gas 





























In this paper, we examine whether the value created by skilled fund managers can be 
attributed to the performance of high managerial ability stocks. Prior research on CEO ability has 
shown a strong prediction power of CEOs’ managerial skill in future firm performance. We 
hypothesize that this predictive power makes CEO’s managerial ability valuable for mutual fund 
managers and using CEOs’ high managerial ability as an identification strategy should be 
associated with superior mutual fund performance, especially for funds managed by highly 
skilled fund managers. Hence, a significant positive connection should exist between the 
performance of mutual funds run by skilled managers and the performance of high managerial 
ability stocks. 
Consistent with this prediction, this paper shows that the excess value added generated by 
mutual fund managers with exposure to high managerial ability stocks ($3.47 million per year) is 
much higher than the average performance of all mutual funds (-$1.94 million per year). 
Consequently, this research provides strong evidence that the performance of high managerial 
ability stocks has strong explanatory power for the performance of actively managed mutual 
funds headed by highly skilled fund managers. Furthermore, this positive relation exists for 
stocks across all industries and for funds with different types of trading strategies. 
The results of this paper enable us to characterize the private information used by skilled 
fund managers and to suggest that their stock selection is based on information about the level of 
CEO managerial ability, while previous research mainly focuses on firm- and industry-level 
explanations. In sum, our research suggests that skilled mutual fund managers’ superior 







Allen, F. & Babus, A. (2008). Networks in finance. Available at SSRN. 
Amihud, Y. & Goyenko, R. (2013). Mutual fund's R
2
 as predictor of performance. Review of 
Financial Studies 26(3): 667-694. 
Andreou, P. C., Ehrlich, D., Karasamani, I., & Louca, C. (2015). Managerial ability and firm 
performance: Evidence from the global financial crisis. Available at SSRN. 
Baik, B. O. K., Farber, D. B., & Lee, S. S. (2011). CEO ability and management earnings 
forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28(5), 1645-1668.  
Berk, J. B. & Green, R. C. (2002). Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Berk, J. B. & van Binsbergen, J. H. (2015). Measuring skill in the mutual fund industry. Journal 
of Financial Economics 118(1): 1-20. 
Bertrand, M. & Schoar, A. (2002). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. 
Available at SSRN. 
Bonsall IV, S. B., Holzman, E. R., & Miller, B. P. (2016). Managerial Ability and Credit Risk 
Assessment. Management Science 2016 May 2. 
Brands, S., Brown, S. J., & Gallagher, D. R. (2005). Portfolio concentration and investment 
manager performance. International Review of Finance, 5(3‐4), 149-174.  
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of 
finance, 52(1), 57-82.  
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. (2007). The small world of investing: Board connections 
and mutual fund returns. NBER Working Paper. 
Cremers, K. J., Martijn, M. A. F., Pedro, P. M., & Laura, T. S. (2015).Indexing and Active Fund 
Management. Available at SSRN. 
Cremers, K. M. & Petajisto, A. (2009). How active is your fund manager? A new measure that 
predicts performance. Review of Financial Studies. 22(9): 3329-3365. 
Daniel, K., Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., & Wermers, R. (1997). Measuring mutual fund 
performance with characteristic‐based benchmarks. The Journal of finance, 52(3), 1035-
1058.  
Demerjian, P., Lev, B., & McVay, S. (2012). Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure 





Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds. Journal of financial economics. 33(1), 3-56.  
Glode, V. (2011). Why mutual funds “underperform”. Journal of Financial Economics. 99(3): 
546-559. 
Gruber, M. J. (1996). Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds. The 
Journal of Finance. 51(3): 783-810. 
Kacperczyk, M., Nieuwerburgh, S. V., & Veldkamp, L. (2014). Time‐Varying Fund Manager 
Skill. The Journal of Finance. 69(4), 1455-1484.  
Kacperczyk, M. & Seru, A. (2007). Fund manager use of public information: New evidence on 
managerial skills. The Journal of Finance. 62(2): 485-528. 
Kacperczyk, M., Sialm, C., & Zheng, L. (2005). On the industry concentration of actively 
managed equity mutual funds. The Journal of Finance. 60(4), 1983-2011.  
Kacperczyk, M., Van Nieuwerburgh, S., & Veldkamp, L. (2016). A rational theory of mutual 
funds' attention allocation. Econometrica. 84(2), 571-626.  
Kosowski, R. (2011). Do mutual funds perform when it matters most to investors? US mutual 
fund performance and risk in recessions and expansions. The Quarterly Journal of 
Finance. 1(03): 607-664. 
Pan, Y., Wang, T. Y., & Weisbach, M. S. (2015). Learning about CEO ability and stock return 
volatility. Review of Financial Studies, hhv014. 
Stambaugh, R. F., Yu, J., & Yuan, Y. (2014). The long of it: Odds that investor sentiment 
spuriously predicts anomaly returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 114(3), 613-619. 
Trueman, B. (1986). Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of 
accounting and economics. 8(1): 53-71. 
Van Nieuwerburgh, S. & Veldkamp, L. (2009). Information immobility and the home bias 
puzzle. The Journal of Finance. 64(3): 1187-1215. 
Wermers, R., Yao T., & Zhao J. (2012). "Forecasting stock returns through an efficient 
aggregation of mutual fund holdings." Review of Financial Studies 25.12: 3490-3529. 
 Zheng, L. (1999). Is money smart? A study of mutual fund investors' fund selection ability. The 









Vanguard Index funds 
This table shows the list of Vanguard Index funds used to calculate the alternative market benchmark, which is the 
alternative investment opportunity set. The tickers and inception date are also included. The data for each index fund 
are collected from Bloomberg database ranging from December 2000 to December 2014 when all of 11 index funds’ 
data are available. 
 
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date 
S&P 500 Index VFINX 08/31/1976 
Extended Market Index VEXMX 12/21/1987 
Small-Cap Index NAESX 01/01/1990 
European Stock Index VEURX 06/18/1990 
Pacific Stock Index VPACX 06/18/1990 
Value Index VVIAX 11/02/1992 
Balanced Index VBINX 11/02/1992 
Emerging Markets Stock Index VEIEX 05/04/1994 
Mid-Cap Index VISMX 05/21/1998 
Small-Cap Growth Index VISGX 05/21/1998 
Small-Cap Value Index VISVX 05/21/1998 
















CEO managerial ability and firm’s stock performance  
This table reports the results of regressing firm’s stock alpha on this firm’s CEO MA-Score score in previous year 
controlling for other firm level characteristics. The dependent variable is firm alpha, which is the difference between 
stock excess return (over risk free rate) in year t and the expected excess return of the same year. The expected 
excess return for each stock in year t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month 
preceding estimation period (t-2 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current year. This process is repeated by moving 
the estimation and test period one year at a time. The main independent variables are CEO MA-Score in previous 
year (t-1), which is introduced by Demerjian et al. (2012) and available online, and stock alphat-1, which is the 
intercept from the 24 month preceding estimation period (t-2 to t-1). Firm-level control variables contain firm total 
debt to total equity ratio (D/E ratio), return on equity (ROE), market to book ratio (M/B ratio), and market 
capitalization. Sample period covers from 1990 through 2014. We show the regression results with and without 
alphat-1 and results with and without industry control. We present the P values and adjusted R
2
 for each regression. 




Intercept 13.12* 13.12* 
 
(0.068) (0.068) 
CEO MA-Score 4.14* 4.12* 
 
(0.093) (0.096) 




D/E Ratio 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
M/B Ratio -0.32*** -0.32*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROE 0.01 0.01 
  (0.455) (0.470) 
Log(Size) -3.05*** -3.05*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Industry Control YES YES 
Adj. R
2








Fund management skill and fund performance 
This table reports the results of regressing fund performance on fund manager’s skill, controlling for other fund 
characteristics. In regression [1] and [2], the dependent variable is fund annual alpha, which is the difference 
between fund excess return (over risk free rate) in year t and the expected excess return of the same year. The 
expected excess return for each fund in year t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 
24 month preceding estimation period by the FFC model factors in current year. This process is repeated by moving 
the estimation and test period one year at a time. The main independent variables are fund selectivity, which is the 
logistic transformed value of (1-R
2
t-1), and fund alphat-1, which is the intercept from the 24 month preceding 
estimation period. In regression [3] and [4], the dependent variable is fund’s BvanB alpha, which is the product of 
fund total net assets (TNA) in year t-1 and the difference between fund excess return (over T-bill rate) in year t and 
the expected excess return of the same year. The expected excess return for each fund in year t is calculated by 
multiplying the 11 Vanguard Index fund orthogonal bases factor loadings from the 24 month preceding estimation 
period (t-2 to t-1) by the 11 Vanguard Index fund orthogonal bases factors in current year. The process repeats by 
moving the estimation and test period one year at a time. The main independent variable is fund BvanB skill, which 
is measured as the product of fund alphat-1 and fund TNA at the beginning of the last year (t-1) in the estimation 
period (t-2 to t-1) divided by the standard error of the fund alphat-1. Fund-level control variables for all regressions 
contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, log value of TNA, squared log value of TNA, and 
BvanB alphat-1, which is the product of fund alphat-1 and fund TNA at the beginning of the last year (t-1) in the 
estimation period (t-2 to t-1) and fund alphat-1 is the intercept from the 24 month preceding estimation period (t-2 to 
t-1). The P-value and adjusted R
2
 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 
5% or 10% level. 
 
 
Fund Alpha BvanB Alpha 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept 0.83 0.26 743.39*** 743.25*** 
 
(0.562) (0.854) (<.0001) (<.0001) 











Fund BvanB Skill 
  
1.36*** 1.38*** 
   
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
BvanB Alphat-1    
-0.07 
    
(0.847) 
Expense Ratio -0.30*** -0.25*** -20.25*** -20.29*** 
 
(<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(TNA) 0.35 0.40 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.460) (0.397) (0.309) (0.308) 
[Log(TNA)]
2
 -0.04 -0.04 14.50*** 14.49*** 
 
(0.360) (0.309) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Turnover -0.01*** -0.01*** -333.22*** -333.13*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(Age) -0.37* -0.33 35.83*** 35.82*** 
 
(0.086) (0.127) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Strategy Control YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R
2








High and low CEO MA-Score and skilled funds’ performance 
This table reports the results of regressing high selectivity (BvanB skill) fund annual alpha on the average MA-
Score in high and low CEO managerial ability groups. The dependent variable is the annual alpha of high selectivity 
(BvanB skill) funds, representing the top 20% funds with the highest selectivity (BvanB skill) in each year. The 
main independent variables are high MA-Score *1,000 and low MA-Score*1,000, which are the average CEO MA-
Score of companies in high CEO MA-Score group and low MA-Score group, timing 1,000. Companies are sorted 
into two groups (high and low) based on their CEO MA-Scores in prior year (t-1). The process repeats by moving 
the estimation and test period one year at a time. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of 
fund age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Sample period covers from 1990 through 
2014 for selectivity measure and from 2003 to 2014 for BvanB skill measure. We present the P values and adjusted 
R
2




Top 20% Selectivity 
Fund Alpha 
Top 20% BvanB Skill 
Fund Alpha 























BvanB Alphat-1  
0.59 
   
(0.499) 

















































THE PAYBACK OF MUTUAL FUND SELECTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ABSTRACT 
Using a sample of 2,947 actively-managed domestic equity mutual funds from 11 
European countries, we investigate the performance of mutual fund selectivity across markets. 
The evidence of this paper supports the argument that selectivity (1-R2) still benefits fund 
investors outside US. Our analysis is robust after controlling for investor sentiment and market 
dispersion. In addition, we investigate the mediating effect of country characteristics on the 
profitability of fund selectivity, indicating that managers’ selectivity ability is more valuable in 
countries with high economic development, strong legal strength, small but highly liquid equity 
markets, and young mutual fund industries.   
INTRODUCTION 
Since their invention in 1924, mutual funds have become an increasingly important 
investment instrument and attract a large amount of capital from individual investors to the 
financial markets. By the end of 2014, the total value of assets managed by mutual funds 
exceeded US$31 trillion, which reflected a 20% growth rate since 2007 (Investment Company 
Institute, 2015). With a value of US$16 trillion, the United States has the largest mutual fund 
industry in the world. Numerous studies have confirmed the extremely important role of the 
mutual fund industry in US financial markets, showing the relation between US mutual fund 
performance and fund managers’ skills ( Malkiel, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers, 1997; Brands, Brown, and Gallagher, 2005; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 





Amihud and Goyenko, 2015). However, only a few studies have explored these questions in 
other settings, such as European countries. 
This gap is noteworthy because the mutual fund industry in Europe is the second largest 
mutual fund industry in the world. As of the end of 2014, the European mutual fund industry had 
more than US$9.5 trillion in assets under management, which is 31% of the world’s total mutual 
fund industry. Among the current mutual funds worldwide, 44% are from European countries. 
Meanwhile, the net sale of European mutual funds in 2014 was US$617 billion, more than twice 
that in 2013, while the net sale of mutual funds in the United States was US$318 billion. Given 
the important role the European mutual fund industry plays in the world economy and its 
dramatic growth in recent years, academic studies of its workings are very relevant but lacking. 
In this paper, we investigate whether fund selectivity, an established measure of fund 
management skill, is associated with superior fund performance for actively managed domestic 
equity mutual funds in European countries. 
Several studies have investigated the determinants of fund performance in the European 
mutual fund industry, but only at a very macro level. Both Grünbichler and Pleschiutschnig 
(1999) and Otten and Bams (2002) have conducted aggregate research on the European mutual 
fund industry’s performance and Otten and Bams (2002) find that, unlike US mutual funds, 
European mutual funds as a whole slightly outperform the market benchmark. Banegas, Gillen, 
Timmermann, and Wermers (2013) show that European mutual fund performance can be 
explained by macroeconomic state variables, such as the default yield spread, the term spread, or 
the dividend yield. Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Romos (2012), using the data of actively 
managed equity mutual funds from 27 countries, find that both fund-level variables and country 





performance if they are located in countries with highly liquid markets and strong legal 
protection. Many other studies focus on specific European countries (e.g., Dermine and Roller, 
1992; Shukla and van Imwegen, 1995; Blake and Timmermann, 1998; Dahlquist, Engstrom, and 
Soderlind, 2000; Cesari and Panetta, 2002). However, these focus on evaluating the overall 
performance of the European mutual fund industry and more valuable questions from the 
investor’s perspective—whether fund management skills exist and whether managers with higher 
skills can generate more profits for their clients—have received less attention from academia. 
Abinzano, Muga, and Santamaria (2010) use stochastic dominance techniques to show that some 
European mutual fund managers do possess management skills. Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and 
O’Sullivan (2008) employ a cross-sectional bootstrap methodology and find evidence that some 
top-performing UK equity mutual fund managers have stock-picking abilities. Furthermore, 
Franck and Kerl (2013) point out that European fund managers actively change their portfolio 
allocations based on sell-side analyst information and this strategy benefits fund performance. 
However, as far as we know, no study has been conducted to measure European mutual fund 
managers’ skill (i.e., fund selectivity) directly and there is no evidence that managerial skill leads 
to superior fund performance. The aim of our analysis is to address those issues. 
Empirical studies based on the US mutual fund industry show that mutual fund managers 
with high managerial skills do add value for their clients by selecting valuable stocks (Gruber, 
1996; Carhart, 1997; Daniel et al., 1997; Zheng, 1999). The skill may be due to their superior 
analytical ability to anticipate macro or micro fundamental information (Kacperczyk, van 
Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp, 2011) or special knowledge of specific industries or companies 
(Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2007; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). Petajisto (2013) uses active share, 





the benchmark index, to capture fund managers’ selectivity skill and finds a strong relation 
between active management and fund performance. Amihud and Goyenko (2013), using a lower 
fund R
2
 value from regressing its returns on multifactor benchmark models to proxy for higher 
selectivity skill, find similar results. One advantage of Amihud and Goyenko’s method is that it 
does not require the knowledge of fund holdings or the fund’s benchmark index. Following their 
methodology and using a special sample of 2,947 actively managed domestic equity mutual 
funds from 11 European countries over the years 2000–2015, we add to this literature by 
estimating fund manager’s stock-picking skill directly and investigating the relation between 
managerial skills and fund performance. To measure fund manager skill, we first construct the 
benchmark factors in the Fama–French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (FFC 
model) for each individual country, using all the stocks included in the Bloomberg database, and 
calculate fund selectivity following Amihud and Goyenko (2013). Our analysis reveals evidence 
that, as in the US mutual fund industry, a significantly positive relationship exists between fund 
selectivity and fund performance in the European mutual fund industry. 
Subsequently, our analysis is robust to adjusting for two market conditions, investor 
sentiment and market dispersion, which can strongly influence fund performance. First, investors 
are not consistently rational and investor sentiment can influence the profitability of a fund 
manager’s skill. Previous literature on investor sentiment has shown that it can affect both 
overall market returns and individual stock returns (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; Amromin and Sharpe, 2009; Antoniou, Doukas, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2015). During high-sentiment periods, the equity market is filled with greater 
noise than during low-sentiment periods. Hence, asset prices are more likely to be noisy and it is 





during high-sentiment periods is limited, thus resulting in fund underperformance. During low-
sentiment periods, stocks are traded around their fundamental values and overall mutual fund 
performance should be higher during low-sentiment periods, when asset prices are less noisy. 
The above argument indicates that the relation between fund selectivity and fund performance 
should be affected by market sentiment. We estimate market sentiment for each country based on 
the European market Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) and further test the sensitivity of our 
results by replacing the major sentiment index with four alternative market sentiment measures. 
The results show the same trend as our previous findings. 
Second, von Reibnitz (2013) shows that market dispersion, which is used to measure the 
level at which stocks prices are affected by firm-specific information, can also influence the 
market state and consequently impact the effectiveness of fund manager skill. If fund manager 
skills result from their great insight and analytical ability, average mutual funds cannot yield 
high risk-adjusted returns during periods of low market dispersion when access to firm-specific 
information is costly. Thus, mutual fund manager selectivity should be more profitable during 
periods of high market dispersion, when more firm-specific information is available in the 
market. Our results also support this argument. 
Next, we study how the profitability of fund selectivity relates to country-level 
characteristics. Unlike previous studies, which examine the direct effects of country-level 
variables on fund performance (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2012), we argue that those factors, such as 
equity market development or legal protection strength, could influence the validity of fund 
manager skills, which consequently affect mutual fund performance. To address this question, 
we employ a two-step regression procedure and find that fund manager skill is more valuable 





strong legal protection, small but highly liquid equity markets, and a young mutual fund 
industry. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and empirical 
methodology. Section 2 presents the empirical findings, along with a discussion of the results. 
Section 3 concludes with a discussion of the implications of this study for the literature on 
mutual fund performance and managerial skill. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we describe our sample selection process and then present the methodology 
used to calculate fund performance and fund selectivity. Lastly, we explain the other market 
variables and country-level characteristics in our analysis. 
Sample Description 
We first collect data for European actively managed domestic equity mutual funds. The 
source is Bloomberg mutual fund database and the time period is from January 1998 to 
December 2015 (the first 24 months of data are used to estimate fund selectivity and fund 
performance as of January 2000). The criteria used to collect data are 1) whether the fund status 
is active or dead, 2) whether the country of domicile is European, 3) whether the asset focus is 
equity, 4) whether the inception date is before December 31, 2013, and 5) whether the fund type 
is an open-end mutual fund. To eliminate index funds or international funds, funds with a 
description containing any of the partial terms are deleted: index, ind, global, fixed-income, 
international, sector, balanced, bond, money-market, and convertible debt. In addition, each fund 
must have more than 25 months of continuous data. Our final sample consists of 3,388 mutual 
funds from 17 European countries. The list of countries and the numbers of mutual funds in each 






List of European countries in the database 
This table lists all the European countries in Bloomberg with actively-managed domestic equity mutual 
fund database, along with the number of mutual funds within each country.  Totally we have 3,388 
actively-managed European domestic equity mutual funds, both active and dead status, from January 
2000 to December 2015. 

















United Kingdom 152 
Total 3,388 
 
To ensure reliable results, we narrow down the list of countries to those with more than 
100 months of available mutual funds data. Of the 17 European countries, 12 remain. We then 
delete Luxembourg, because it often functions as an offshore mutual fund market for other 
countries. Finally, we have 11 countries in the database, with 2,947 actively managed mutual 





return for all European mutual funds is 0.49%, Sweden has the highest average monthly return 
(0.81%), and Austria has the lowest (0.36%). The average of total net assets (TNA) for all funds 
in the sample is US$235.15 million and the average age is 10.11 years. 
TABLE 3.2 
Summary statistics of actively managed equity mutual funds’ characteristics from 11 selected 
European countries 
This table shows the means of mutual funds’ descriptive statistics in each country and the number of 
funds from each country for 11 European countries with more than 100 mutual funds data in Bloomberg 
actively-managed domestic mutual fund database.  Expense ratio is the annual expense ratio of each fund. 
TNA is each fund’s total net assets in millions. Our sample contains 2,947 actively-managed equity 
mutual funds over the period from January 1998 to December 2015. 
Country Age (years) TNA (Million $) Expense Ratio (%) Raw Return (%) Number of Funds 
Austria 10.87 81.93 1.68 0.36 371 
Denmark 13.19 173.71 1.93 0.78 138 
Finland 8.66 169.66 1.84 0.51 156 
Germany 11.69 208.98 2.27 0.57 339 
Ireland 7.74 599.02 1.83 0.46 641 
Italy 10.90 181.62 2.24 0.39 308 
Netherlands 10.93 170.71 1.57 0.57 111 
Spain 8.98 76.20 2.05 0.41 399 
Sweden 14.17 433.88 1.63 0.81 147 
Switzerland 11.13 186.60 1.73 0.54 185 
United Kingdom 7.98 171.96 1.83 0.59 152 
All 10.11 235.15 1.95 0.49 2,947 
 
Measuring Fund Selectivity and Performance 
The next step is to estimate fund performance (fund alpha) and fund selectivity for all 
mutual funds in our sample. Following Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we use 1 - R
2
 to measure 
fund selectivity, where R
2
 is obtained from regressing each fund’s returns on the multifactor 





fund performance has a low level of co-movement with the market benchmark and the higher a 
manager’s selectivity skill, the more private information the manager will use and the less 
sensitive the fund’s performance will be to market benchmark movement. The model to estimate 
R
2





                                                                (1) 
where Ri,t is the return in US dollars of fund i in month t over the one-month US Treasury bill 
rate in month t; RMt - Rft is the market excess return in US dollars in month t; SMBt (small minus 
big) is the return difference between a large capitalization portfolio and a small capitalization 
portfolio in month t; HMLt (high minus low) is the return difference between a high–book-to-
market ratio portfolio and a low book-to-market ratio portfolio in month t; and MOMt 
(momentum) is the return difference between the past 12 months’ winners and the past 12 
months’ losers. To employ this model, we first construct the monthly benchmark factors from the 
FFC model for each country using all equity values included in the Bloomberg equity database 
traded in each country. The variable RM is calculated as the value-weighted average return of all 
stocks, active or dead. We then form the SMB, HML, and MOM factors following the method 
described by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). To test the validity of our estimation, 
we calculate the correlation between each market return factor and the same country’s major 
market index return.
41







                                                          
41 The following are the major markets: Austrian Traded Index (ATX Index) for Austria, OMX Copenhagen Index (KFX Index) 
for Denmark, OMX Helsinki Index (HEX Index) for Finland, German Stock Index (DAX Index) for Germany, Irish Stock 
Exchange Overall Index (ISEQ Index) for Ireland, FTSE Italia All-Share Index (FTSEMIB Index) for Italy, Amsterdam 
Exchange index (AEX Index) for the Netherlands, Spanish Continuous Market Index (IBEX Index) for Spain, Stockholm Stock 
Exchange Index (OMX Index) for Sweden, Swiss Market Index (SMI Index) for Switzerland, and FTSE 100 Index (UKX Index) 






Market risk factor summary and correlations between market premium and major market index 
return for each country 
This table gives the average of the risk factors in the estimated Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
model (FFC model) for each country. The table also shows the coefficient between the market return 
factor (RM) and the major market index return for each country. (Austrian Traded Index (ATX Index) for 
Austria, OMX Copenhagen Index (KFX Index) for Denmark, OMX Helsinki Index (HEX Index) for 
Finland, German Stock Index (DAX Index) for Germany, Irish Stock Exchange Overall Index (ISEQ 
Index) for Ireland, FTSE Italia All-Share Index (FTSEMIB Index) for Italy, Amsterdam Exchange index 
(AEX Index) for Netherlands, Spanish Continuous Market Index (IBEX Index) for Spain,  Stockholm 
Stock Exchange Index (OMX Index) for Sweden, Swiss Market Index (SMI Index) for Switzerland, and 
FTSE 100 Index (UKX Index) for United Kingdom). *** stands for Pearson’s P value at 1% significant 
level. 
 
Country RM SMB HML MOM Market Index Correlation 
Austria 1.203 -0.238 0.150 0.510 ATX Index 0.928*** 
Denmark 1.774 0.388 -1.008 0.698 KFX Index 0.868*** 
Finland 1.548 -0.170 0.296 0.555 HEX Index 0.987*** 
Germany 1.111 1.032 1.152 0.873 DAX Index 0.926*** 
Ireland 0.969 -0.325 0.166 0.062 ISEQ Index 0.749*** 
Italy 0.637 -0.063 1.293 0.101 FTSEMIB Index 0.963*** 
Netherlands 0.800 0.018 -0.158 0.581 AEX Index 0.951*** 
Spain 0.951 0.113 0.748 0.660 IBEX Index 0.972*** 
Sweden 1.315 0.184 0.306 0.531 OMX Index 0.985*** 
Switzerland 0.994 -0.192 0.393 0.332 SMI Index 0.865*** 
United Kingdom 0.787 0.390 0.284 0.656 UKX Index 0.966*** 
All 1.099 0.103 0.329 0.505 
  
Std. Dev. 0.341 0.391 0.622 0.249 
  
 
We calculate fund performance (the fund’s alpha), past performance (the fund’s alphat-1), 
and fund selectivity (logistically transformed 1 - R
2
) using a 24-month moving window 
regression based on the estimated FFC model for each individual country. The fund alpha is the 
difference between the fund’s return in month t and the expected return of the same month. The 
expected return for each fund in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor 
loadings from the preceding 24-month estimation period (months t - 24 to t - 1) by the FFC 
model factors in the current month. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test period 
one month at a time. The fund’s alphat-1 is the intercept from the preceding 24-month estimation 







negatively skewed, which means that the distribution of 1 - R
2
 should be heavily positively 
skewed. Therefore, we use the following logistic transformation of (1 - R
2
) to measure fund 
manager selectivity skill: 
               (
    
        
)     (
    
  
)                              (2) 
One thing to be noted here is that, based on the argument of Berk and Green (2004), the 
performance measure based on fund return (the fund’s alpha) is inaccurate due to economic 
scale, since superior performance can be detected by investors and abstract capital inflows. 
Consequently, managers with more capital must choose suboptimal investment opportunities due 
to the limited number of investment opportunities in the market, which harms fund performance. 
However, Ferreira et al. (2012) show that this scale effect is not present outside the US mutual 
fund industry. 
Investor Sentiment and Market Dispersion 
In this section, we estimate market sentiment and market dispersion and incorporate these 
two factors into the analysis. We argue that, on average, high market sentiment signals a high 
level of noise trader participation, which will hurt the performance of the overall mutual fund 
industry because the asset prices are more likely to be noisy and, therefore, it will be more 
difficult to identify good investment opportunities. To measure European market sentiment, we 
use the CCI, a survey-based index designed to measure consumer confidence in European 
countries. This index is available through the European Commission database. To ensure that the 
sentiment measure is free of macroeconomic influences, we use the residual from the regression 
of the CCI index on a set of macroeconomic variables that includes Europe’s inflation rate, the 
growth rate of Europe’s employment rate, the growth rate of Europe’s industrial production, the 





nondurable goods production, the consumer price index change in Europe’s service industry, and 
European recession indicators based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The data reflect the period from January 2000 through December 2015. 
We also estimate the market dispersion for each European country in our sample. Market 
dispersion, as argued by von Reibnitz (2013), measures how the level of stock price is affected 
by firm-specific information. During a period of high market dispersion, more firm-specific 
information is available in the market and stock prices are more affected by firm-specific 
information than by market conditions. This improves the profitability of fund managers’ 
selectivity skills, since using private information to estimate assets value is more reliable. On the 
other hand, during periods of low market dispersion, all stocks closely follow market 
benchmarks. Fund selectivity may not be profitable or may even hurt fund performance, since 
the benefits of active bets are expected to be less pronounced and actively building a portfolio 
based on firm-specific information will draw more risk into the fund when fund performance is 
more related to market-level information, such as economic shocks. Following von Reibnitz 
(2013), we measure market dispersion using the standard deviation of stock returns for all stocks 
in each country in month t: 
              √
 
   
∑ (             )
  
                               (3) 
where n is the number of stocks traded within country j in month t, Ri,j,t is month t’s return for 
each stock i in country j, and Rm,j,t is the equally weighted average return of all stocks traded in 
country j for month t. The data for both active and delisted stocks are from the Bloomberg 






Previous studies have documented that, besides fund-level variables, country-level 
characteristics are essential determinants of mutual fund performance (Otten and Bams, 2002; 
Ferreira et al., 2012). Rather than investigate the direct relationship between funds’ domicile 
country characteristics and fund performance, in our study we investigate whether those country-
level variables can influence the profitability of fund selectivity skills. In other words, we 
examine which country-level factors will make fund managerial skills more valuable and 
produce superior fund performance. To address this issue, we use a two-step regression 
procedure. First, for each year from 2001 to 2015, we regress fund performance (fund alpha) on 
fund selectivity, controlling for other fund-level variables using monthly data for the current year 
and one year prior. Only funds with data for the full 24-month period are considered. Then we 
collect the coefficients of fund selectivity for each year from the prior regression, which is used 
as a proxy of fund selectivity profitability, and run a regression of the coefficients on various 
country-level variables. Similar to the country-level variables used by Ferreira et al. (2012), we 
classify our country characteristics into different groups: economic development, equity market 
development, investor protection and legal strength, and mutual fund industry development. The 
details of country-level characteristics can be found in the Appendix. 
First, we use the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the percentage of Internet 
users to capture economic development. Both sets of data are collected from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. The GDP per capita is the GDP divided by the mid-
year population, while the percentage of Internet users measures the percentage of individuals 
who have used the Internet in each country in the last year. Greater economic development is 





relationship between fund selectivity, profitability, and country economic development, since 
information quality should be higher with better-informed and more educated investors, which 
places more value on the accuracy of fund managers’ selectivity ability. 
To capture equity market development, we use equity share turnover and the total size of 
equity markets. These two variables are also accessible from the WDI database. Share turnover, 
which is the value of domestic shares traded divided by their market capitalization, measures the 
liquidity of the equity market in each country. A higher share turnover ratio, that is, higher equity 
market liquidity, will help fund managers to establish and change portfolios based on new 
information. This argument indicates a positive relation between fund selectivity profitability and 
the share turnover ratio. On the other hand, a large equity market size may have an ambiguous 
effect on the implementation of fund managerial skills. First, a large equity market means more 
investment opportunities, which allows skilled managers to find profitable investment 
opportunities much more easily. On the contrary, a large equity market contains more noise, 
which hinders selectivity skills from being profitable. 
We use a dummy variable that equals one for a common-law country and zero otherwise to 
capture common-law countries and securities regulation to capture investor protection and legal 
strength. According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), common-law 
systems provide more protection for investors than civil-law systems do and enhance the 
enforcement of business contracts. Another variable used as a proxy for a country’s legal 
strength is securities regulation, which combines disclosure requirements, liability standards, and 
public enforcement, introduced by La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). We expect a 
strong positive relationship between fund selectivity profitability and investor protection and 





trading activities and promote informed arbitrage, which makes fund managerial skills based on 
analytical ability more valuable (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 1999). In addition, stock markets in 
countries with weak property rights protection are more influenced by political events and 
rumors, which create more noise in the markets and harm the profitability of fund managers’ 
selectivity ability. 
Finally, we use fund industry age and the mutual fund industry’s proportion of the equity 
market to capture mutual fund industry development. We collect mutual fund industry age data 
from Ferreira et al. (2012). We argue that the older the mutual fund industry, the more 
competitive it is and the harder it is, therefore, for fund managers to achieve superior 
performance, since they will generate fewer risk-adjusted returns due to a higher market 
competition. To estimate the mutual fund industry proportion, which is calculated as the 
percentage of total mutual fund equity within the total capitalization of the equity market, we 
collect mutual fund industry equity data from the annual Asset Management Report of the 
European Fund and Asset Management Association. From our perspective, a larger mutual fund 
industry proportion means a more competitive mutual fund industry, which will hurt the 
profitability of fund managers’ selectivity skills. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Effect of Fund Selectivity on Fund Performance 
We begin our examination of whether high fund selection ability leads to superior fund 
performance in the European mutual fund industry by predicting fund performance (fund alpha) 
based on the fund’s selectivity, estimated using the lagged logistically translated 1 - R2. The 





                                                                    
            
                                             (4) 
The dependent variable is the fund alpha, which is the difference between the fund’s 
excess return in month t and the expected excess return the same month. The expected excess 
return for each fund in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from 
the preceding 24-month estimation period (months t - 24 to t - 1) by the FFC model factors in the 
current month. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test period one month at a 
time. The main independent variable is fund selectivity, which is the logistically transformed 
value of (1 - R
2
t-1). Fund-level control variables contain the fund alphat-1, which is the intercept 
from the preceding 24-month estimation period (months t - 24 to t - 1), the expense ratio, the log 
value of fund age, the value of TNA, and the squared log value of TNA. All control variables are 
lagged by one month. Following Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we report the results with and 
without alphat-1 as a control variable. Our sample period ranges from January 2000 through 
December 2015. If a positive relation between fund selectivity and fund performance exists in 
the European mutual fund industry, as we predicted, we hypothesize that β1 >0. The regression 













The effect of fund selectivity on fund performance 
This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity controlling for other fund 
characteristics. The dependent variable is fund alpha, which is the difference between fund excess return 
in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. The expected excess return for each fund in 
month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month preceding 
estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current month. The process repeats by moving 
the estimation and test period one month at a time. The main independent variable is fund selectivity, 
which is the logistic transformed value of (1-R
2
t-1). Fund-level control variables contain fund alphat-1, 
which is the intercept from the 24 month preceding estimation period (t-24 to t-1), expense ratio, log 
value of fund age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Sample period covers 




Intercept -0.194*** -0.140** -0.162** -0.083 
 
(0.002) (0.022) (0.022) (0.241) 
Fund Selectivity 0.115*** 0.090*** 0.113*** 0.088*** 
 










Expense Ratio -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 
 
(0.427) (0.469) (0.387) (0.407) 
Log(Age) 0.130*** 0.118*** 0.131*** 0.120*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(TNA) 0.063*** 0.051** 0.064*** 0.053** 
 
(0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.012) 
Log(TNA)
2
 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 
(0.039) (0.044) (0.038) (0.042) 
Strategy Control NO NO YES YES 
Adj. R
2
 0.12% 0.17% 0.12% 0.17% 
 
Consistent with the above prediction, the results in Table 4 show that selectivity in all 
regression specifications is positive and significantly correlated with the fund alpha (p < 0.0001). 
These results present strong evidence that the positive relationship between fund selectivity and 





lagged 1 - R
2 
values, in accordance with the literature focusing on US mutual fund industry, can 
be used to proxy fund managers’ selectivity ability. 
Next, we repeat the regression, as shown by Eq. (4), for each country and we present the 
coefficients of fund selectivity, along with p-values, in Table 5. 
TABLE 3.5 
The effect of fund selectivity on fund performance for each country 
This table reports the coefficients of fund selectivity from regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity 
controlling for other fund characteristics for each country. Sample period covers from January 2000 
through December 2015. P value for each coefficient is also reported. ***, **, * denotes significance at 





































The results in Table 5 show that, of 11 European countries, seven show significantly positive 
relationships between fund selectivity and fund performance. On the other hand, we find no 
evidence that the above relationship exists in Finland, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom, but 
none of the coefficients of selectivity within those four countries is significantly negative. 





fund managers and high fund selectivity leads to better performance for European actively 
managed domestic mutual funds. 
Effect of Selectivity, Market Sentiment, and Market Dispersion on Fund Performance 
We then re-examine the effect of fund management skill on fund performance by 
incorporating market sentiment and market dispersion into the analysis. The purpose of this 
analysis is to see whether selectivity still contributes to fund performance after controlling for 
investor sentiment and market dispersion. First, we divide the sample periods into periods of 
high and low investor sentiment based on the median number of the monthly CCI index, 
orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions. If month t’s CCI is higher 
(lower) than the median number of the monthly CCI for all sample periods (January 2000 to 
December 2015), we define month t as a period of high (low) sentiment. Then, we estimate the 
model as shown in Eq. (4) in periods of high and low investor sentiment separately. The results 
are shown in Table 6, columns (1) and (2), respectively. As predicted, fund selectivity has a 
stronger relationship with fund performance during low-sentiment periods (0.154, p < 0.0001), 
when asset prices are around fundamental values, than in high-sentiment periods (0.001, p = 













The effect of fund selectivity on fund performance in high/low market sentiment and market 
dispersion periods 
This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity controlling for other fund 
characteristics during high/low market sentiment periods and during high/low market Dispersion periods. 
The dependent variable is fund alpha, which is the difference between fund excess return (over risk free 
rate) in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. The expected excess return for each 
fund in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month preceding 
estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current month. The process repeats by moving 
the estimation and test period one month at a time. The main independent variable is fund selectivity, 
which is the logistic transformed value of (1-R
2
t-1). Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) free of 
macroeconomic influences is used to capture the market sentiment for all countries. If month t’s CCI is 
higher (lower) than the median number of monthly CCI for all sample periods, we define month t as high 
(low) sentiment period. Market Dispersion is measured as the stock return standard division for all stocks 
in each country in month t. Then, if the country’s Dispersion for this month is higher (lower) than the 
median market Dispersion of this country for all sample periods, we define this month as high (low) 
market Dispersion period. Fund-level control variables contain fund alphat-1, expense ratio, log value of 
fund age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Sample period covers from 





































































As with investor sentiment, we separate our sample into periods of high and low market 
dispersion based on the median of the market dispersion index for the whole sample period 
(January 2000 to December 2015). If a country’s market dispersion for month t is higher (lower) 
than the median market dispersion of this country for all sample periods, we define month t as a 





fund selectivity and fund performance periods of high and low market dispersion are presented in 
Table 6, columns (3) and (4), respectively. Interestingly, during periods of high market 
dispersion, when private information is more valuable, fund selectivity skill is positively and 
significantly related to fund performance (0.230, p < 0.0001). On the contrary, during periods of 
low market dispersion, the relationship is negative and significant (-0.051, p < 0.0001). Our 
explanation is that, during periods of low market dispersion, when market-level information (i.e., 
economic shocks) is more important for estimating stock prices, increased attention on private 
information will not generate visible abnormal returns and will bring more risk into the portfolio. 
In this scenario, a strategy of building a portfolio deviating from market movements during 
periods of low market dispersion is costly and will decrease fund performance. 
Next, we incorporate investor sentiment and market dispersion into the main regression (Eq. 4). 




























The effect of fund selectivity, market sentiment, and market Dispersion on fund performance 
This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity controlling for other fund 
characteristics during high/low market sentiment periods and during high/low market Dispersion periods. 
The dependent variable is fund alpha, which is the difference between fund excess return (over risk free 
rate) in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. The expected excess return for each 
fund in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month preceding 
estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current month. The process repeats by moving 
the estimation and test period one month at a time. The main independent variables are fund selectivity, 
which is the logistic transformed value of (1-R
2
t-1), consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) free of 
macroeconomic, and market Dispersion, which is the stock return standard division for all stocks in each 
country in month t. Fund-level control variables contain fund alphat-1, expense ratio, log value of fund 
age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Sample period covers from January 






Intercept -0.167** -0.279*** -0.331*** 
 
(0.019) (0.001) (<.0001) 
Fund Selectivity 0.116*** 0.099*** 0.124*** 
 













Alphat-1 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.110*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Expense Ratio -0.010 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.327) (0.639) (0.510) 
Log(Age) 0.120*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(TNA) 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log(TNA)
2
 -0.005* -0.007*** -0.006** 
 
(0.052) (0.010) (0.016) 
Strategy Control YES YES YES 
Adj. R
2










First the regression results in Table 7 show that fund selectivity is still positively related 
with fund performance (0.124, p < 0.0001) after controlling for market sentiment and market 
dispersion. In addition, market sentiment can hurt overall fund performance (-0.042, p < 0.0001 
without market dispersion in the regression; -0.039, p < 0.0001 with market dispersion in the 
regression) and market dispersion, on average, can benefit fund performance (0.017, p < 0.0001 
without investor sentiment in the regression; 0.014, p < 0.0001 with investor sentiment in the 
regression). Jointly, these results confirm our previous findings that fund selectivity is positively 
and significantly related to fund performance and this relationship remains significant even when 
controlling for investor sentiment and market dispersion. 
Next, we repeat the above analysis for each country and we report the coefficients of 
selectivity, investor sentiment, and market dispersion in Table 8. 
After we consider investor sentiment and market dispersion, the results, as shown in 
Table 8, are consistent with previous findings. Of all 11 European countries, eight show positive 
and significant relationships between fund selectivity and fund performance, which indicates 
that, after controlling for investor sentiment and market dispersion, fund selectivity still has 
strong predictive power for future fund performance in the majority of European mutual fund 
industries. Even though the selectivity coefficients for the remaining three countries are not 
significant, they still show positive signs (0.007, p = 0.900 for Finland; 0.013, p = 0.502 for 
Spain; 0.058, p = 0.253 for the United Kingdom). The sentiment coefficients for nine of the 11 
countries appear to be significantly negative, while the market dispersion coefficients for seven 








The effect of fund selectivity, market sentiment, and market Dispersion on fund performance for 
each country 
This table reports the coefficients of selectivity, market sentiment, and market Dispersion from regressing 
fund alpha on manager’s selectivity, market sentiment, and market Dispersion, controlling for other fund 
characteristics for each country. P value for each coefficient is also presented. Sample period ranges from 
January 2000 through December 2015. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level.  
 
Selectivity Coeff. Sentiment Coeff. Dispersion Coeff. 
Austria 0.159*** -0.018*** 0.089*** 
 
(<.0001) (0.002) (<.0001) 
Denmark 0.163*** -0.002 0.105*** 
 
(0.001) (0.904) (<.0001) 
Finland 0.007 -0.051*** 0.327*** 
 
(0.900) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Germany 0.272*** -0.066*** 0.042*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ireland 0.120*** -0.033*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Italy 0.064*** -0.088*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.009) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Netherlands 0.334*** -0.058*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Spain 0.013 -0.104*** -0.053*** 
 
(0.502) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Sweden 0.190*** -0.018* 0.066*** 
 
(<.0001) (0.058) (<.0001) 
Switzerland 0.265*** -0.025** -0.103*** 
 
(<.0001) (0.014) (<.0001) 
United Kingdom 0.058 -0.015 0.012** 
 













To examine the sensitivity of our finding of the relation between the European mutual 
fund industry’s performance and market sentiment, in this section we replace our major 
sentiment measure (CCI) with four alternative market sentiment measures, including the 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), which is from the European Commission's Business and 
Consumer Surveys and is constructed from the following indicators: the industrial confidence 
indicator (40%), the service confidence indicator (30%), the CCI (20%), the construction 
confidence indicator (5%), and the retail trade confidence indicator (5%); the Economic Climate 
Index (ENOMWLEC), which is drawn from surveys of business conditions in Germany among a 
broad range of business executives across the manufacturing, construction, wholesale, and retail 
sectors; and the German Consumer Confidence Index (GECSI), where a value of 100 indicates 
an equal number of optimists and pessimists and figures below 100 indicate more pessimists than 
optimists (and vice versa). The same as with the CSI sentiment index, we use the residual from 
the regression of the each index on a set of macroeconomic variables, including Europe’s 
inflation rate, the growth rate of Europe’s employment rate, the growth rate of Europe’s 
industrial production, the growth rate of Europe’s durable consumer goods production, the 
growth rate of Europe’s nondurable goods production, the consumer price index change in 
Europe’s service industry, and OECD-based European recession indicators. 
Since no financial market in the world is isolated with the others, especially large and 
developed ones, we also use the Baker–Wurgler (BW) sentiment index, orthogonalized with 
respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions to replace the European sentiment measures. This 
index is formed to measure US market sentiment but the argument here is that the US equity 
market, which is the largest and most developed equity market in the world, can influence other 





pessimism) can transfer to other markets. The time series plots of all the sentiment indexes used 
are shown in Figure 1. The regression results for this analysis are shown in Table 9. 
FIGURE 1 
Time series plot of each sentiment measure (free of macroeconomic influences) from January 2000 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The effect of market sentiment on fund performance, using alternative European Sentiment 
measures 
This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity and different market 
sentiment measures, controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is fund alpha, 
which is the difference between fund excess return (over risk free rate) in month t and the expected excess 
return of the same month. The expected excess return for each fund in month t is calculated by 
multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24 month preceding estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by 
the FFC model factors in current month. The process repeats by moving the estimation and test period 
one month at a time. The main independent variables are fund selectivity, which is the logistic 
transformed value of (1-R
2
t-1), and market sentiment. We use 4 alternatives to measure market sentiment: 
ESI, which is the Economic Sentiment Indicator calculated from the European Commission's Business 
and Consumer Surveys; ENOMWLEC, which comes from surveys of business conditions in Germany; 
GECSI, which is the German Consumer Confidence Indicator, and BW, which is Baker and Wurgler 
sentiment index (BW sentiment index, available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website). All the sentiment indexes 
are free of macroeconomic influences. Fund-level control variables contain fund alphat-1, expense ratio, 
log value of fund age, value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Sample period 




Intercept -0.105 -0.068 -0.263*** -0.081 
 
(0.138) (0.339) (0.000) (0.258) 
Fund Selectivity 0.113*** 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.114*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ESI -0.044*** 
   
 
(<.0001) 










   
(<.0001) 
 BW 
   
-0.392*** 
    
(<.0001) 
Alphat-1 0.131*** 0.102*** 0.162*** 0.122*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Expense Ratio -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.006 
 
(0.340) (0.416) (0.269) (0.553) 
Log(Age) 0.104*** 0.116*** 0.162*** 0.096*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Log(TNA) 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.043** 0.070*** 
 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.044) (0.001) 
Log(TNA)
2
 -0.005** -0.005** -0.004* -0.006** 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.086) (0.022) 
Strategy Control YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R
2







The results in Table 9 are consistent with the previous ones shown in Table 7 using the CCI 
to measure investor sentiment. All the alternative sentiment indexes show a strong negative 
relationship with fund performance and fund selectivity remains positively and significantly 
correlated with fund performance. 
Effect of Country-Level Variables on Fund Selectivity Profitability 
In this section, we use a two-step regression procedure, as described in Section 1.4, to 
investigate the country-level characteristics’ influence on the profitability of fund managers’ 
selectivity ability. Unlike the previous literature, which focuses on the direct influence of those 
variables on fund performance, we treat the country characteristics as mediating variables.. The 
results of regressing the selectivity coefficient on a list of country-level variables are reported in 
Table 10. 
The results in Table 10 confirm our hypothesis that country-level characteristics work as 
mediators and affect the relationship between fund selectivity and fund performance. First, we 
find no evidence that a country’s GDP per capita can influence the profitability of mutual fund 
managers’ selectivity ability. As Ferreira et al. (2012), we argue that, after incorporating other 
country-level variables, the effect of this broad economic indicator is diluted. However, we find 
a strong relationship between fund selectivity profitability and Internet usage, as we expected. 
We conclude that higher Internet usage proxies for better-educated investors in the equity 
markets, which consequently increases the information quality and benefits skilled fund 
managers. 
Both of our variables capturing the quality of a country’s legal system show a positive 





legal strength limits insider trading and market noise, thus making fund managerial skills based 
on analytical ability more valuable. 
Market liquidity, measured by the share turnover ratio, has a strong positive relation with 
selectivity profitability. The results, in line with our expectation, indicate that fund managers’ 
skill will raise more profits for fund clients if the fund strategy can be quickly adjusted to 
incorporate new information. On the other hand, we find a significant negative relationship 
between equity market size and fund selectivity profitability. This might be caused by noisier 
information in the equity market. 
TABLE 3.10 
The effect of country level variables on the relationship between fund performance and selectivity 
This table presents the regression results from the two-step procedure. First we calculate the coefficient 
between fund selectivity and fund performance by regressing fund alpha on fund selectivity, controlling 
for other fund level control variables, for 24 months. Only funds have full 24 months’ data within current 
year and the prior year will be included. Then we have an annual time series data for each coefficient for 
15 years (2001 to 2015). Second, we run regression of each coefficient (selectivity profitability) on 8 
country level variables. The country level variables contain GDP per capital, percentage of Internet user, 
total size of equity market, equity share turnover, dummy variable for common law (if common then 1, 
otherwise 0), securities regulation, mutual fund industry age, and mutual fund industry proportion within 
equity market. We also show adjusted R
2




Intercept -34.117*** -53.177*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
GDP per Capital (million $) -0.059 0.135 
 
(0.660) (0.309) 
Internet (%) 0.877*** 1.209*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 











Equity Market Size (billion $) -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 
(<.0001) (0.005) 
Share Turnover (%) 0.061*** 0.030*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Mutual Fund Industry Age (years) -0.607*** -0.930*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 










Finally, we find that fund managers’ selectivity ability is more profitable if the country’s 
mutual fund industry is young. Since the older the mutual fund industry is, the more competitive 
it is, it is harder for fund managers to achieve superior performance by competing with each 
other. In addition, the mutual fund industry proportion of the equity market shows no evidence of 
affecting the relationship between fund selectivity and fund performance. 
Briefly, the results provide strong evidence that country-level characteristics work as mediators 
between fund selectivity and fund performance and that better economic development and legal 
protection, a less developed mutual fund industry, a smaller equity market, and greater equity 
market liquidity will make fund managers’ selectivity ability more profitable. 
CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the predictive power of fund selectivity on fund performance (i.e., 
fund alpha) within the European mutual fund industry using a unique sample of actively 
managed domestic equity mutual funds from 11 European countries. Our study reveals empirical 
evidence that, as in the US mutual fund industry, selectivity is a valid skill measure in the 
European mutual fund industry and mutual fund managers with higher levels of selectivity 
ability can generate superior performance for their clients. Even though mutual fund 
performance can be influenced by financial market conditions, such as market sentiment and 
market dispersion, the positive relationship between fund selectivity and fund performance still 
holds after controlling for those effects. We also find that country-level characteristics serve as 
mediating variables between fund selectivity and fund performance. Fund selectivity is more 
valuable and profitable if the fund is from a country with better economic development, stronger 
legal protection, a less developed mutual fund industry, a smaller equity market, and greater 
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APPENDIX 3 
Country level variable description and data resource 
Variable name Variable Group Description Data Type Data Resource 




Gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population. Data are 








Percentage of individuals who 
have used the Internet (from any 
location) in the last 12 months. 
Internet can be used via a 
computer, mobile phone, personal 
digital assistant, games machine, 









The total number of shares traded, 
both domestic and foreign, 
multiplied by their respective 
matching prices.  Data are end of 
year values converted to U.S. 
dollars using corresponding year-








The value of domestic shares 
traded divided by their market 
capitalization. The value is 
annualized by multiplying the 







and legal strength 
1 if the legal origin is common 
law and 0 if the legal origin is 
civil law 




and legal strength 
Combination of disclosure 
requirements, liability standards, 
and public enforcement 
Cross-
sectional 







Number of years since the first 
open-end fund was sold in the 
country 







Relative mutual fund industry 
size, which is total equity assets 
under management divided by 









This dissertation participates into the study stream of mutual fund industry by 
investigating the relation between managerial skills possessed by mutual fund managers and fund 
performance, and it contributes to the literature by investigating the validity and efficiency of 
fund manager’s skills under different market states, finding the essential elements of fund 
manager’s stock picking skills, and exploring the research of mutual fund managerial skills to 
other countries. Given the important role of mutual fund industry to the financial markets, the 
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